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Civil society initiatives in Turkey are transforming from organizations based on 
traditional commitments, religious ties, and other primordial forms of relations to 
organizations based on universal values, which are shaped mainly by the claims of a 
larger civil society on a global scale.  These universal values are in close 
interconnection with changes taking place at the local level, exerting an influence on 
particularistic values.  This results in flows of interaction between global civil society 
and grassroots initiatives.  In this sense, civil society organizations at the national 
level play a crucial role in the provision of the link between the global and the local 
within a given nation-state.  However, values promoted at the national level, shaped 
mainly by politics of the nation-state, can be in sharp contradiction to those of a 
universalist and equally particularistic character. 
 
This situation is currently prevalent in Turkey with respect to the discussions on the 
crisis of democracy in the country.  Civil society organizations, represented mainly 
by vakıfs and derneks as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are trying to bring 
closer together the national practice of democracy with the changes of the notion of 
democracy at the global level, with reference to local particularities.  It is the role of 
the national NGOs in Turkey, then, to ease the tension with respect to the clash of 
values between the state and the local community level as shaped by a global civil 
society.  On a global scale, NGOs have started filling the gap between the top-down 
policies of the state and the bottom-up demands of local grassroots activity.  The 
three-tier relationship between the state, NGO, and the local community is becoming 
increasingly complex due to the internal as well as external forces at play. 
 
 iv 
It is this role of Turkish NGOs that is the focus of the current study.  It is interesting 
to observe the degree to which NGOs in Turkey are creating alternatives to 
development and a move towards participatory democracy through women’s 
empowerment centers within a larger state-sponsored development project in 
Southeastern Turkey.  Given the peculiarities of gender and minorities as essential 
components of the case study, the thesis analyzes the role of Turkish NGOs in 
creating the links between local and central authorities on the one hand, and the local 
community on the other. 
 
 
Keywords: Civil society, NGOs, Development, Women’s Community Centers, 
Southeastern Turkey 
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Türkiye’deki sivil toplum girişimleri, geleneksel bağlılık, dini cemaat ve hemşehrilik 
ilişkilerine dayanan örgütler olmaktan çıkıp küresel sivil toplumun şekillendirdiği, 
evrensel değerlere dayanan örgütlere dönüşmektedir.  Yerel düzeyde gerçekleşen 
değişikliklerle yakinen bağlantılı olan evrensel değerlerin partiküler (özgün) değerler 
üzerinde doğrudan bir etkisi bulunmaktadır.  Dolayısıyla, küresel sivil toplum ile 
tabandan gelen girişimler arasında bir etkileşim ortaya çıkmaktadır.  Bu anlamda, 
ulusal düzeydeki sivil toplum örgütleri, herhangi bir ulus-devlet içerisindeki küresel-
yerel bağlantıyı sağlama hususunda önemli bir rol oynamaktadır.  Ne var ki, büyük 
ölçüde ulus-devlet siyasetiyle şekillendirilimis ve ulusal düzeyde yüceltilen 
değerlerle, evrenselci ve aynı zamanda partikülerist karakterdeki değerler arasında 
keskin çelişkiler görülebilmektedir. 
 
Ülkedeki demokrasi krizi üzerine yapılan tartışmalar bağlamında sözkonusu durum 
Türkiye’de şu an için geçerlidir.  Daha cok vakıflar ve dernekler tarafından temsil 
edilen, hükümet-dışı örgütler olarak sivil toplum kuruluşları (STK), ulusal düzeyde 
uygulanan demokrasi ile küresel düzeyde değişen demokrasi anlayışını yerel 
uygulamalara gönderme yaparak birbirine yaklaştırmaya çalışmaktadır.   O zaman, 
devlet ile küresel sivil toplumun şekillendirdiği yerel toplumun değer 
çatışmalarından kaynaklanan gerginliği asgari düzeye indirmek Türkiye’deki ulusal 
STK’lara  düşmektedir.  Küresel ölçekte, STK’lar, devletin yukarıdan aşağıya 
uygulanan devlet politikaları ile tabandan yukarı doğru ilerleyen yerel toplumsal 
hareketlilik sonucu doğan talepler arasındaki boşluğu doldurmaya çalışmaktadırlar.  
Devlet, STK ve yerel toplum arasındaki üçlü ilişkiler yumağı, iç ve dış etkenlerin 
oynadığı rol sonucu git gide daha karmaşık bir hal almaktadır.  
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Halihazırda, Türkiye’deki STK’ların oynadığı rol, çalışmanın ana temasını 
oluşturmaktadır.  Türkiye’deki STK’ların kalkınmaya ne ölçüde alternatif 
yarattıklarını ve ülkenin güneydoğusundaki Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) 
kapsamında, Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM) aracılığıyla, katılımcı 
demokrasiye ne ölçüde katkıda bulunduklarını gözlemlemek ilginç olacaktır.  
Azınlıklara ve toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı özgünlükler çalışmanın temel bileşenlerini 
oluşturmakta ve bu bağlamda Türkiye’deki STK’ların, yerel ve merkezi otoriteler ile 
yerel toplum arasındaki ilişkileri oluşturmakta nasıl bir rol oynadığı konusunun 
analizi yapılmaktadır. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil toplum, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları (STK), Kalkınma, Çok 
Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri, Güneydoğu Anadolu 
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Changes in the global scene are characterized by different social, cultural, economic, and 
political forces that are operational in seemingly converse trends.  These trends seem to 
lead to the homogenization of a world culture on a global scale as well as simultaneous 
heterogenization of diverse cultures.  The globalization process poses threats and 
uncertainties as much as opportunities.  Alternative lifestyles and cultural diversity 
emerge together with the creation of a mass industrial culture and the destruction of the 
natural environment.  While political theorists emphasize the emergence of a new 
politics, a politics of identity, global governance, and radical forms of democracy, 
developmentalists have traditionally seen the negative effects of economic globalization 
and the creation of a mass consumption culture that does nothing else than destroy the 
natural environment and create social injustice.  Within developmentalist thinking, 
however, there can be different ways of looking at the globalization process, as the 
changes taking place in the development paradigm today are precisely the instigators of 
cultural pluralism and difference that is flourishing on a global scale. 
 
Processes of globalization create a milieu of opportunities as well as tensions.  With the 
increase in social movements on a global scale, we see the emergence of a global civil 
society.  Recent discussions on the crisis of democracy have partially been the engine for 
the creation of civil society organizations with global objectives, leading to social 
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policies that gain an increasingly global character.  Nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), increasingly becoming more political, have been the main instigators of this 
move towards a globalized civil society.  Processes of globalization have repercussions 
that simultaneously affect the globe and the village.  NGOs at the national level are in a 
position to enable the smooth flow of interaction between these two levels. 
 
As witnessed on a global scale, changes are similarly discernible in Turkey where 
multiple forces are at play.  Leaving behind the more community-oriented, parochial 
forms of civic organization, trends of a global civil society are being observed in Turkey 
with discussions on the further ‘democratization’ of the country.  Turkey has witnessed a 
tremendous increase in the number of civil society organizations, especially since the 
early 1990s.  This increase is proof that civil society in Turkey is equally affected by the 
formation of a world culture.  However, there lies another actor at the national level, that 
of the Turkish state, which is a potential level of tension among other actors at various 
levels of activity.  It is this interaction between civil society, the grassroots level and the 
Turkish state, which is the core problematique of the current research. 
 
There is no doubt about the Turkish state’s mixed relations with civil society 
organizations in the country.  While global trends have encouraged the flourishing of 
civil society initiatives based on universalist values, particularistic claims are being 
nurtured by communities at the local or regional level.  The Turkish state, while 
attempting to complete its nation-building process, is heavily influenced by international 
and transnational changes in the world, as is the Turkish society.  The socio-cultural 
setting at the local level is defined by traditional commitments and networks as well as 
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global identities where developments at the global level have resulted in recent political 
changes in Turkish societal arrangements.  Despite the inheritance of a strong Ottoman-
Turkish state and a weak civil society, and the adoption of the notion of a unified, 
homogeneous ‘Turkishness’, there is a concurrent awareness of diverse cultural 
identities at the local level.1  Despite contrary assertions at the official policy level, it is 
argued that Turkish people no longer experience a homogeneous, shared ‘Turkishness’, 
but an ‘alternative brand of Turkishness’, implying the ‘many different ways of being 
Turkish.’2  New civil society organizations that create the link between the state and 
society, both in the world and in Turkey, are situated between the two seemingly 
opposing forces of global culture.  This becomes more evident upon the consideration of 
demands of religious and ethnic particularities by various groups in the country.  Thus, 
changes at the global level have the potential of creating tensions at the nation-state level 
as cultural and minority rights become more assertive at the local level in Turkey.  
Given the recent trends of globalization, it is the aim of this thesis to observe to what 
extent civil initiatives in Turkey are influenced by and contribute to this global culture. 
 
Discussions on the crisis of democracy have reflections on development policies and 
practice.  States, as the traditional providers of development theory and practice, have 
mainly regulated the presence and operation of nongovernmental activity within their 
territories.  NGOs with a humanitarian welfare objective have initially started as 
                                                 
1  Cultural pluralism and diversity are a result of factors including reactions to political oppression, 
strategies of dealing with economic hardships, and the aspiration for better opportunities and personal 
fulfillment.  For details look at Bruce G. Trigger,  Sociocultural Evolution  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 1998), 238. 
2  Kevin Robins and David Morley, “Almancı, Yabancı [Germaner, Foreigner],”  Cultural Studies.  10:2 
(1996), 250-251, and Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robbins, “Thinking Across Spaces: Transnational Television 
from Turkey,”  European Journal of Cultural Studies.  3:3 (2000), 352. 
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organizations outside the political system.  Since the 1960s, however, it is no longer 
possible to think of civil societal organizations as apolitical actors.  As opposed to the 
continual tensions created by anti-state movements, NGOs have realized the multiple 
benefits of cooperation with the state.  The notions of ‘good governance’ as well as 
‘global governance’ have contributed to the increasingly political role of NGOs within 
policy making and implementation.  Issues of ‘governance’ have included the fruitful 
and positive collaboration of NGOs with their respective governments. 
 
NGOs dealing with issues of development have tended to include into their agenda a 
variety of issues, from human rights to minority welfare to environmental concerns, as 
well as alternative approaches to development such as ‘empowerment’, ‘local 
participation’, ‘grassroots activism’ and ‘people-centered development’.  As opposed to 
the notion of linear progress through economic growth and the top-down approaches of 
development assistance carried out by the state and multilateral aid agencies, NGOs 
became increasingly aware of the need to incorporate into the development process the 
cultural resources at the local level, achieved through the direct participation of the 
community.  Development NGOs, interested in promoting participatory democracy, 
strive for culturally diverse, socially just, economically sustainable, gender balanced 
societies living in environmental harmony.  Thus, NGOs have been acting as the link 
between the top down approaches of state authorities and the bottom up practices of the 
grassroots level. 
 
With respect to development policy and practice in Turkey, the Turkish state has 
adopted a progressive policy of regional development in Southeastern Anatolia.  The 
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adoption of ‘sustainable human development’ as the official development policy of the 
Regional Development Administration of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) 
places this institution in a peculiar position with respect to other public institutions, 
national NGOs working on issues of development, and the local community in the 
region.  The Turkish state, influenced by the notion of sustainable development as 
initially promoted by the intergovernmental Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, has adopted this approach in its master 
development plan for the Southeastern Anatolia Project.  A number of UN-related 
agencies in Turkey have helped in promoting the sustainability dimension of the various 
projects comprised within the larger GAP framework.  While providing direct technical 
assistance, these agencies have also promoted the activity of national NGOs in social 
development projects.  Within the larger GAP project are women’s empowerment 
centers for a gender balanced development in the same region.  These women’s centers, 
called Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOMs), translated as Multi-purpose 
Community Centers, aim to develop local women’s resources and build capacity in order 
to make them aware of their potentials in the creation of better qualities of life, for 
themselves, their families and the communities in which they live.  Through these 
ÇATOMs, it is the aim of this thesis to evaluate the interactions among state authorities, 
national NGOs involved in the respective project, and the local community as 
beneficiaries of the ÇATOMs. 
 
Factors that make the Southeastern Anatolia region and the ÇATOMs interesting in 
terms of the current research are the diverse cultural composition of the region and its 
characteristic of extreme gender imbalance.  The region is significant in its tribal 
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arrangements of social, political and economic relations.  The harsh characteristics of 
this local culture are especially prevalent in its gender relations.  Being the region in 
Turkey with the least resources and opportunities, smaller scale social development 
activities are being carried out by development NGOs and a small number of women’s 
associations.  Moreover, this is a highly delicate part of the country as it has been scene 
to armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the militants of the Kurdistan 
Workers Party, referred to as PKK, defined by the Turkish state as an illegal, terrorist 
organization.  The armed confrontations in the region during two decades have enforced 
Emergency Rule in the Southeast that has resulted in the inhibition of civil society 
activism and organization.  All these factors provide the best testing grounds for state-
civil society relations in the region and in Turkey. 
 
The dynamic factors, both global and local, affecting regional development in 
Southeastern Turkey and the ÇATOM project are evident.  Factors of a national 
character are equally relevant and determinant.  In an attempt to view the role of national 
NGOs in bringing closer the related state authorities with the beneficiaries of 
Southeastern women within the ÇATOM project, the main part of the empirical study 
was based on qualitative data collected from the field.  In addition to reviewing the 
existing literature on developments at the global and national scale for the conceptual 
framework of the current research, primary data included the results of the fieldwork 
undertaken in selected ÇATOM centers.  Given the three different parts of the fieldwork, 
namely the target group of the ÇATOMs, the NGOs directly or indirectly involved in the 
ÇATOMs, and the local and central state authorities in relation with the particular 
ÇATOMs, field data was collected at different time periods between September 2000 
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and December 2001.  The monthly and annual reports of each ÇATOM gave an 
overview of the type of activities that were carried out in the centers, but it was the field 
study that provided the essential raw data for assessing the impacts of the ÇATOMs and 
the genuine role of Turkish NGOs within the given context.  The provinces visited in the 
Southeast included Batman, Siirt and Şırnak, with the counties of Şirvan, Cizre and 
Beytüşşebap along with the village of Uluköy. 
 
Given the focus of the thesis on the role of NGOs in Turkey within social development, 
the conceptual framework is divided into two chapters, namely chapters II and III.  The 
initial chapter situates NGOs, as civil society organizations, within development theory 
and practice.  While NGOs are regarded as instigators of the recent shift in global 
development theory and practice, they are also viewed in terms of their changing 
relations with state authorities.  Chapter III includes a portrayal of the country-specific 
case of development efforts in Turkey, along with the emergence of civil society and its 
institutions in the country.  Since development and NGOs in Turkey are issues specific 
to the country, an extensive part of chapter III is dedicated to the historical background 
of the Ottoman-Turkish political culture, developments within republican Turkey, the 
nature of civil society organizations, the recent effects of the processes of globalization 
on these organizations, followed by their changing relations with the Turkish state.  
Chapter III gives the reader an insight on factors leading to the current situation of 
regional developmental inequalities and civil society organizations in Turkey today. 
 
Chapter IV presents an introduction to the empirical study of the thesis.  An overview of 
the Southeastern Anatolia region is provided, as the location of the fieldwork.  The 
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socio-political situation of the region is portrayed with respect to the Turkish state and 
nongovernmental activity in Southeastern Turkey.  The unique approach of the GAP 
project to issues of social development is revealed in the Administration’s new 
development policies and plans for the region.  ÇATOMs, as women’s empowerment 
projects within the broad topic of social development, are selected for the specific 
fieldwork of the current thesis.  ÇATOMs constitute an important case study, as they are 
centers in which NGO-state cooperation is encouraged. 
 
Chapter V, VI and VII present the results of the analysis of data collected from the field.  
The realities of women in Southeastern Anatolia region are detailed and their views of 
the ÇATOM centers are portrayed in chapter V.  Chapter VI includes the perspective of 
state officials on the ÇATOM project, including military officials in the region, public 
administrators such as governors and directors, and the officials of the GAP 
Administration.  Having adopted ‘sustainable human development’ as the official 
approach to development and ‘gender balanced development’ as the specific policy of 
ÇATOM activities, the peculiar position of the GAP Administration is given special 
attention.  Finally in chapter VII, views of the NGOs active in the ÇATOMs are 
presented.  Their approaches to development in general and their direct and indirect 
involvement in the ÇATOM project in particular are analyzed.  NGO relations with the 
local community and the target group in the ÇATOMs, as well as their relations with the 
state authorities are presented. 
 
NGOs, within the framework of the ÇATOM project, are evaluated as a possible link 
between the state and society in Turkey.  As the main problematique of the research, an 
 9 
 
analysis of state-NGO-target group interactions within the ÇATOM project is the main 
focus of chapter VIII.  The degree to which NGOs in Turkey are creating alternatives to 
development and a move towards participatory democracy through the ÇATOMs of the 
GAP project is also assessed in the same chapter.  The concluding remarks of the thesis 
in chapter IX reveal the answer to the potential role of NGOs in Turkey as 
representatives of a world culture shaped through policies and practices of global 
development. 
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CHAPTER II: 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1.  The Shift in the Development Paradigm 
 
2.1.1.  Emergence of Global Civil Society 
 
New social movements are synonymous with the growth of a global civil society.  The 
claim is that the process of modernization increasingly poses threats of survival to the 
whole of mankind.  The fact that the processes have become universal renders their 
effects universal and hence the necessity of universal action through a global civil 
society.  This, by definition, argues for movements against the currently prevailing 
norms and values.  Given their reactionary character, Dalton et al. define global civil 
society as “the co-existence of radical critique of the existing order, on the one hand, and 
de facto integration into the existing society and into the political arena, on the other”.3  
Similarly, Zaidi claims that the relationship between these movements and the host 
government is one that is “based equally on antagonism and cooperation”.4 
 
                                                 
3  Russell J. Dalton, Manfred Küchler, and Wilhelm Bürklin, “The Challenge of New Movements,” in 
Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies,  eds. 
Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Küchler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 281. 
4  S. Akbar Zaidi, The New Development Paradigm: Papers on Institutions, NGOs, Gender, and Local 
Government  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 209. 
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It can be suggested that global civil society and social movements are ‘post-ideological’ 
given the fact that there is no one doctrine that they all subscribe to.5  Nevertheless, 
Inglehart refers to ‘post-material’ values as the common drive behind a global civil 
society.6  On the issue of value changes, however, Inglehart makes the key argument that 
these post-material values “complement rather than replace” traditional material values.7   
 
A number of concepts characterize the global civil society, including universal values, 
particular interests, difference, identity and culture.  While there is an emphasis on 
universal ideals as a prerequisite for human survival, there is a simultaneous emphasis 
on particular values that are more local in scope.  Seemingly contradictory trends, as 
advocated by Mouffe,8 there is also the claim that they are in fact two sides of the same 
phenomenon.  As Trigger phrases it, “the expansion of loyalties to embrace humanity as 
a whole would not extinguish narrower loyalties”.9 
 
In the light of these global developments, Wapner claims that new social movements 
have led to the surgence of a global civil society, a ‘world collective life’, that functions 
across national boundaries.10  Similarly, Boli and Thomas stress the influence of civil 
society organizations operating at the global level and with global alternative approaches 
                                                 
5  Ibid., 281. 
6  Ronald Inglehart, “Values, Ideology, and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements,” in 
Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies, eds. 
Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Küchler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
7  Ibid. 
8  Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political  (London: Verso, 1993). 
9  Bruce G. Trigger, Sociocultural Evolution (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998), 247. 
10  Paul Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics,” World 
Politics.  47 (1995), 323. 
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in propagating a ‘world culture’ which represents ‘humanity’.11  They detect a number 
of principles that underlie the effects of these civil society associations on world culture.  
Their universalism and individualism is prevalent in their worldviews and organizational 
structures as well as their democratic decision-making approaches.  For the common 
good of humanity, global civil society organizations choose to pursue a model of 
rational progress.  Through scientific means, their aim is a safer and better world for all.  
Trigger calls this a ‘pan-human identity’ in which people from all over the globe, 
irrespective of nationality, religion, language, and race are able to mobilize themselves 
for a common cause.12 
 
In parallel with the homogenization of global culture due to universalism, 
heterogenization is also in process due to the particularities of ethnicity, religion, culture, 
and so on.  Axtmann envisages the emergence of both socially and politically active 
grassroots groups in which heterogeneity, difference, and diversity are accommodated 
and promoted.13  Trigger suggests the emergence of local and regional cultural diversity 
that aims to offset the exploitative consequences of mass industrial culture.14  Hence, at 
the same time, parallel to the universal character of certain values, it is possible to 
observe the resurgence of culture and cultural diversity related to issues of the quality of 
life.  As opposed to the linear progress of modernization, we witness the pluralization of 
culture and the politicization of identity conflicts.  Through the maintenance of 
                                                 
11  John Boli and George M. Thomas, “World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International 
Non-governmental Organization,”  American Sociological Review.  62 (April 1997), 172-173. 
12  Trigger, Sociocultural, 246. 
13  Roland Axtmann, Liberal Democracy into the 21st Century: Globalization, Integration, and the Nation-
state (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1996). 
14  Trigger, Sociocultural, 211. 
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traditional knowledge of survival, a group of people can be better fit to face the 
challenges and threats of the future.15 
 
In fact, instead of the use of ‘culture’ in the noun form, Appadurai16 notices the 
increasingly new use of the word in the adjective form, as in ‘cultural’ diversity.  
Appadurai does not emphasize the traditional meaning of culture, that is the collection of 
traditions and local knowledge of the past, but aspects of culture that help mobilize 
group identity and activity.  In this sense, Appadurai places an emphasis on collectivities 
and prepares the foundation for discussions on ethnicity.  He stresses the instrumental 
aspect of culture rather than the primordial one.  Culture becomes crucial in that it brings 
out difference as a value in itself in a ‘purely identity-oriented instrumentality’, thus 
forming the basis for the mobilization of group identities.17  Movements involving these 
conscious group identities are what Appadurai defines as culturalism.  Trivializing the 
immediate effect of primordial tribal relations and histories on the concept, culturalism 
and hence multiculturalism is “identity politics mobilized at the level of the nation-
state”.18  Projecting this into the future, it can be argued that given their greater 
knowledge of the different traditions and cultures, multicultural societies compared to 
monoculture nation-states are better prepared to face the criticisms and challenges of a 
globalizing world.19 
 
                                                 
15  Ibid., 211. 
16  Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization  (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
17  Ibid., 12-14. 
18  Ibid., 15. 
19  Trigger, Sociocultural, 212. 
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Despite the continuation of local cultural identifications, there is also the phenomenon of 
local cultures being increasingly influenced by global cultural forms, leading, in many 
cases, to the creation of hybrid cultures.  This intermingling of the different forces, the 
homogenizing effect of the global culture and the reassertion of local cultures and 
identities, leads to the fusion of these two forces, giving rise to ‘third cultures’.20  The 
‘creolization of cultures’ is a result of groups who adopt certain features of global 
culture while at the same time holding on to their own particularities.  This, however, 
does not clash with the arguments on multiculturalism, as advocated, for instance, by 
Appadurai. 
 
Considering the phenomenon of the increase in such social movements and civil society 
organizations worldwide, it is possible to put forth the notion of ‘global governance’ 
which includes the proliferation of actors and the establishment of international norms 
and networks in an attempt to deal with the challenging issue of governance on an 
increasingly global scale.21  Given the emergence of a global civil society, state policies 
and institutions are being challenged.  Within this framework, Held22 suggests a 
redefinition of the structure of political power as the different forces of globalization and 
internationalization on the one hand, and regionalization and localization on the other 
are being intertwined.  The current move towards a new global politics thus points to 
changing relations between the state and society.  States no longer have the monopoly on 
                                                 
20  Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, 
Reflexive Development,”  Development and Change.  29 (1998). 
21  Raimo Vayrynen, “Norms, Compliance, and Enforcement in Global Governance,”  in Globalization 
and Global Governance, ed. Raimo Vayrynen  (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 
25. 
22  David Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995). 
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the governing of society and the setting of policies, leading to the challenge of the 
traditional definition and role of the state as provider of public services.  While 
criticizing government, yet at the same time working in cooperation with it, civil society 
organizations have become a crucial factor in global governance.  This, Wapner claims, 
is a new form of governance,23 resulting in the new notion of ‘good governance’.24  
 
2.1.2.  Relevance for Global Social Policy 
 
The arguments given above do have a relevance for development as issues of peace, 
human rights, environmental protection, and gender equity as the motivators of social 
movements are also the concerns of development, especially in the context of 
sustainable human development.  However, it is important that we examine these 
phenomena a bit more closely for the following discussions on development. 
 
One major point to consider is that these arguments are developed mainly within the 
discipline of political science leading to theories of democracy.  Other disciplines such 
as sociology, environmental studies, women’s studies, cultural studies and so on have 
made use of these theories, however, it is interesting to note that these arguments mainly 
take shape and evolve around contexts of industrialized societies.  Having secured 
stability in the long-run, societies in the developed world are looking for alternative 
values of freedom, experience and quality of life.25  Despite the preparedness of 
                                                 
23  Wapner, “Politics Beyond the State”, 336. 
24  Potter mentions the World Bank’s extensive emphasis on the concept in the 1992 World Bank report on 
Governance and Development. 
25  Inglehart, “Values.” 
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governments and societies to accept the existence of a multicultural social composition 
within their territory, even industrialized countries live through problems of adaptation 
and stability.  This problem is put forth by Halil Magnus Karaveli, as a Turkish 
journalist in Sweden, on the delicacy of the concept of nationality and the nation-state.  
He points out that although the Swedish government has responded to claims from the 
grassroots level of Sweden as a multicultural society and currently makes efforts to 
maintain the image of a tolerant government, there are nationalist surges from the 
Swedish people who are not always welcoming to claims of multiculturalism.26  
Consequently, even in contexts of relative welfare and high standards of living, the 
tensions of different identity claims and the evolution towards multicultural settings can 
create the grounds for potential tensions. 
 
One other perspective to look at with respect to the recent discussions on identity 
politics is the clash between individual rights and freedoms and their collective 
counterparts.  Although there seems to be a tendency for the preference of individual or 
universal rights over collective or particular rights, in any case, multicultural societies 
are struggling through the equal accommodation of both rights, without having to protect 
one over the other.27  Robertson, for instance, reveals the contradiction of universal 
ideals promoting particularistic values.28  As such, global culture is in fact multi-faceted. 
 
                                                 
26  Halil Magnus Karaveli, interview by Gülden Aydın, Hürriyet Gazetesi, December 30, 2000. 
27  Trigger, Sociocultural, 240. 
28  Roland Robertson, “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,” in Global 
Modernities, eds. M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson  (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 
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One last point I would like to make about the considerations made so far is that within 
the discipline of environmental studies, in particular, and development studies, in 
general, globalization has been mainly perceived as a negative phenomenon.  With the 
stress on the environmental destruction of the processes of globalization and its 
widening of the gap between the rich and poor, globalization has mainly been seen as a 
trend to stand in reaction to.  Despite the highly critical and oppositional stance of some 
social movements in the West, and their perception by neo-conservatives as 
revolutionary and anti-systemic, it is now realized in industrialized states and societies 
that this reaction is in fact a ‘crisis of democracy’,29 as theorized by political scientists. 
 
What makes the case of development, especially social development, harder to deal 
with, then, is the fact that it is an intervention.  Given the difficulty of the industrialized 
nation-states in tackling the challenges of diverse global and local demands, creating a 
context of social, economic, and environmental harmony in a developing nation-state 
makes the situation even harder and definitely more delicate.  Hence, it is not surprising 
that social policy, which is the basis of social development, has not, up to date, attracted 
much attention within the discussions of globalization.  In addition, it is a field of study 
that is not adequately researched and is therefore under-theorized.30  After all, social 
development is a field with complex policy dilemmas. 
 
A global social policy, despite its growing significance as a concept, faces the danger of 
tensions within and among different nation-states as well as between nation-states and 
                                                 
29  Dalton, “The Challenge,” 5. 
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global civil society.  This becomes especially evident in the discussion of minority rights 
in countries with a strong nationalist tradition, such as in the field of humanitarian aid.  
Pieterse, for instance, points out the tensions that arise between political unrest in a 
region and the assistance that is offered to that region.31  Given the strong political 
implications of the area of conflict, offering assistance becomes a highly delicate issue.  
Indeed, Lewis32 argues that nongovernmental organizations active in humanitarian 
assistance in regions of conflict are becoming objects of manipulation.  They are 
increasingly being used as interventions for policy imposition. 
 
In any case, with the increasing participation of civil society organizations and voluntary 
groups in issues of social policy and particularly global social policy, it is being realized 
by the international community that social policy is of a more ‘supranational and 
transnational character’.33  For instance, with the adoptation in 1948 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, more and more countries give priority to satisfying human 
rights and undertaking social reforms on the basis of international declarations and other 
conventions.34 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
30  Bob Deacon, Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare  (London: 
Sage Publications, 1997), 1. 
31  Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond: Introduction,”  in World Orders in 
the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, ed. J. N. Pieterse  (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 
1998). 
32  David Lewis, “Development NGOs and the Challenge of Partnership: Changing Relations between 
North and South,”  in Transnational Social Policy, ed. Catherine Jones Finer (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1999). 
33  Deacon, Global Social Policy, 1 and 153. 
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2.1.3.  From Social Development to Sustainable Human Development 
 
A short history of the notion of social development will help situate the concept within 
current discussions of the role of civil society in issues of development.  Even though 
the concept of social development is relatively new, its roots are found in colonial 
history.  In addition to economic relations that were sustained through colonial ties, 
social welfare and the notion of social development shaped itself through British 
colonial history.  After the initial focus on the education and welfare of communities 
through British ‘mass education’ programs in the East African colonies, the term 
‘community development’ was used to emphasize the education and ‘development’ of 
the community rather than the individual.  In Britain, the focus of social provision and 
welfare was the community and remained rather small-scale until the United Nations in 
the 1950s started using the term ‘social development’ to connote the development of 
non-industrialized countries, and shifted the focus from the community level to 
government provision of social welfare and central planning.35 
 
During the 1970s, the international community had agreed on the importance of social 
welfare in addition to the mainstream development approach of economic growth.  In 
the 1980s, it was merely economic growth that received attention.  By the 1990s, we 
witness the revival of issues of social development as it becomes increasingly clear that 
the benefits of economic growth do not ‘trickle down’ to sustain social progress and 
                                                                                                                                                
34  Ibid., 30. 
35  James Midgley, Social Welfare in Global Context  (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1997), 184-185. 
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quality of life at the local level.36  Hence, a balance between the two aspects of 
development, along with environmental and cultural harmony, has gained relevance.   
 
Social development, preceeded by economic development, has traditionally been the 
domain of state activity and economic indicators such as the Gross National Product, or 
the GNP, have measured developmental progress, including social progress.  The 
realization of the inadequacy of purely economic indicators for the measurement of 
social welfare, in 1990, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) made 
available a new indicator of social progress, the ‘Human Development Index’.  Hence, 
the development terminology shifted the attention to what is now called ‘human 
development’.37  Furthermore, with the understanding of continuous social 
impoverishment despite long-established efforts at development, it became clear that 
natural resources were being rapidly depleted and exploited for their economic value as 
raw materials for industrial goods.  This was a consequence of civil society 
organizations acting as pressure groups dealing intensely with awareness raising 
concerning the negative impacts of global trends on the natural environment and the 
threat to human survival on the planet.  This realization led to the urgency of what is 
widely known today as ‘sustainable human development’. 
 
The realization of the pressing urgency of social reforms for human development and the 
quality of life, the first World Summit on Social Development took place in Copenhagen 
in 1995.  Among the commitments made by the 117 world leaders in the summit, 
                                                 
36  Change: Social Conflict or Harmony? Results of a Stockholm Roundtable (New York: United Nations 
Development Program, Division of Public Affairs, March 1995). 
 21 
 
organized by the UN Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, 
were the eradication of absolute poverty, the promotion of social integration based on 
the enhancement and protection of all human rights, the achievement of equality and 
equity between men and women, and the need to place people’s participation at the 
center of development.38  The agreements and consensus reached in the world summit 
drew upon the recommendations of the previous major UN conferences.  Most 
importantly, it was a continuation of the conclusions drawn for sustainable development 
at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, and the 
1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo.  The World 
Summit for Social Development also prepared the grounds for the following conferences 
on Women in Beijing in September 1995 and on Human Settlements in Istanbul in June 
1996. 
 
This transition of development to include the concepts of sustainability, participation, 
and empowerment, along with the creation of a ‘new social contract at the global level’39 
has not been a smooth one however.  The new social movements and their 
corresponding civil society organizations were the main instigators of these 
developments.  Although there is no unified, global term or definition to describe these 
nonprofit, nongovernmental associations in the context of development, the term 
‘private voluntary organizations’ is used widely by development agencies of the USA 
                                                                                                                                                
37  Human Development Report 1990 (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1990). 
38  World Summit for Social Development: The Copenhagen Declaration and Program of Action, (New 
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, August 1995), Preface. 
39  Ibid., 1. 
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and the term ‘nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs) is used by the United Nations to 
encompass all such associations.40  The latter term is used throughout the present thesis. 
 
Starting off as charities in different countries of the world, NGOs started developing 
their own alternative views and approaches of development, thus becoming more 
influential as pressure groups and lobbyers of change.  NGOs have been carrying out a 
number of different local development projects in the poorer regions and countries of the 
world.  The projects are implemented through either the branch offices of international 
NGOs based in the countries of the North, or national and local NGOs working in their 
own regions in countries of the South.41  With the additional involvement of a large 
number of intergovernmental development agencies and multilateral assistance agencies, 
in addition to the state, actors in the field of development have multiplied as well as the 
sectors within human development.  Issues such as the environment, gender, 
microfinance, empowerment, participation, and sustainability have become essential 
components of the development process or policies in their own right.  A look at the 
history of the development of nonprofit, nongovernmental activity reveals the evolving 
political role of NGOs on a global scale. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40  Helmut K. Anheier, “Indigenous Voluntary Associations, Nonprofits, and Development in Africa,”  
The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, ed. Walter W. Powell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987), 417. 
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2.1.4.  Origins of Nongovernmental Activity and the Effects of Globalization  
 
Despite a long history of NGOs, their proliferation has taken place only since the second 
world war.  The origin of NGOs in the non-industrialized world has been linked to 
independence struggles in those countries.  In developed countries, NGOs were initially 
involved in emergency relief aid to the victims of the two world wars.  They slowly 
extended their work to the third world as the needs in these areas of poverty became 
acute.42  Many North-based NGOs started off as humanitarian charities helping out in 
situations of natural disaster.  Although they were important for immediate emergency 
relief, NGOs later came to realize that development is not an end in itself but a delicate 
perpetual process.43 
 
Simultaneously, in the 1970s, many developing countries had started feeling the 
negative effects of the post-war rapid economic growth strategy aimed at intense 
industrialization.  The resulting neglect of agriculture revealed itself in the food crisis 
and reached disastrous levels in the early 1980s.  Food production in the South had not 
been able to keep up with rapidly expanding populations.  As a consequence, the South 
became dependent on the North for food imports, which damaged its balance of 
payments.  Nutritional deficiencies and famine started becoming a characteristic of third 
world underdevelopment.  The oil crisis further increased dependency on the developed 
                                                                                                                                                
41  In political economy and development discourse, North is used to denote industrialized, developed 
countries, while South is used for the poorer, non-industrial countries.  
42  John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations  (London: Earthscan 
Publications Ltd., 1991), 34. 
43  Ibid., 36. 
 24 
 
economies.  These two shocks halted and even reversed economic and social 
development of many countries in the South.44 
 
It was in such an economic, social, and environmental chaos that NGOs, as institutions 
of civil society, proliferated.  Civic dissatisfaction with the emerging situation revealed 
itself in the expansion of North-based NGOs in countries of the South, as well as the 
formation of national, regional, or local voluntary associations in the South, called 
‘grassroots organizations’ or ‘people’s organizations’.45  In opposition to mainstream 
governmental development practices, these organizations emphasized the different ways 
of reaching better standards of living.  They introduced the significance of cultural 
factors and self-reliance on the effective increase in the quality of life.  From the late 
1970s onwards, international NGOs brought along their expertise in fields such as 
preventive health, education, shelter, and improved farming practices, while heavily 
stressing self-reliance for the beneficiaries of development assistance.  They set up 
projects that would continue to benefit the local people even after NGO assistance came 
to an end.  These included approaches which emphasize the participation of 
communities involved and their empowerment through cultural forms of expression.46 
 
                                                 
44  Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations (London: St. Martin’s Press 
Inc., 1990), 165-167. 
45  Julie Fisher, Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West 
Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998), 70. 
46  Charles David Kleymeyer, “The Uses and Functions of Cultural Expression in Grassroots 
Development,”  in Cultural Expression and Grassroots Development: Cases from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, ed. Charles David Kleymeyer (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1994). 
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New approaches were thus put forth by NGOs starting from the early 1980s.  
‘Conscientization’47 was one such approach adopted by the Latin American grassroots 
organizations, in which the aim was not only improving the quality of life, but also 
helping the poor realize the reasons for their oppression and to encourage mass 
organization.  The approach included political education, social organization and the 
eventual bottom-up improvement of living conditions.  The approach of ‘empowerment’ 
was also developed later and is now widely used in South Asia, an approach that is 
rapidly adopted in many other parts of the world, especially for women’s empowerment.  
The purpose of the approach is to empower individuals and communities, and 
particularly women, through greater self-reliance and self-confidence in order to 
counteract the cultural, social, economic, political, and psychological disadvantages that 
they might face as a result of prevailing socio-cultural norms and harmful economic 
growth.  The empowerment approach encourages policies and practice that guarantee the 
active participation of community members and women in the development process, 
thus increasing the beneficiaries’ control over the choices in their lives.48 
 
The (re)introduction of concepts such as culture, participation, and empowerment 
brought with it a whole new paradigm of development.49  Considering the fact that all 
these concepts are linked together, the NGO alternative is one that has a holistic and 
integrated outlook on the development process.  In the earlier models of development, 
‘culture’ had a negative connotation, regarded as an impediment to technical progress, as 
                                                 
47  The concept was developed by Paolo Freire, cited in Fisher, Nongovernments. 
48  Jo Rowlands, “A Word of the Times, but What Does it Mean?  Empowerment in the Discourse and 
Practice of Development,”  in Women and Empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World, ed. Halef 
Afshar  (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1998). 
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modernization required ‘backward’ societies to rid themselves of their traditional ways 
of life.50  The trend in development studies and practice now is the abandonment of “the 
monolithic thinking of the past in favor of a pluralist outlook”, which becomes 
particularly essential when the beneficiaries of a development project or policy are a 
group that is culturally or ethnically different from the mainstream.51  Hence, it can be 
concluded that, in lines with the argument of cultural diversity in the context of 
industrialized societies, development policy and planning also includes the move 
towards the celebration of cultural pluralism and the creation of multicultural 
environments. 
 
The necessity and advantages of such bottom-up approaches become clear, for instance, 
in the promotion of a sustainable human development.  Given the universality of an 
ecologically and socially balanced human development, it is increasingly recognized that 
it is only within the particularities of the target group that this universal aim can be 
realized.  It is only the members of the group involved that is able to define the specifics 
of their situation, their problems, their aspirations, and it is only they who are able to 
shape the path of their own transformation, development, and thus liberation.52 
 
                                                                                                                                                
49  Zaidi, The New Development Paradigm, 203. 
50  David Maybury-Lewis, “Foreword: Culture and Development,”  in Cultural Expression and Grassroots 
Development: Cases from Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. Charles David Kleymeyer  (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1994), ix-xv. 
51  Ibid., xiii. 
52  Tim Jordan, “Too Many Universals: Beyond Traditional Definitions of Exploitation,”  in Storming the 
Millennium: The New Politics of Change, eds. Tim Jordan and Adam Lent (London: Lawrence & Wishart 
Ltd., 1999), 149-150. 
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All these bottom-up strategies of ‘people-centered development’, ‘participatory 
development’, and ‘grassroots development’ are regarded as ‘alternative development’,53 
attempting to bring alternatives in terms of the actors, methodologies, and the values of 
development.  This trend, which comes in different names, has been the mobilizer of a 
shift in the development paradigm at the intergovernmental level, resulting in the wide 
acceptance and application of the notion of ‘sustainable human development’.  The most 
fundamental aspect of this kind of a development approach has been determined by 
Korten as issues of power.54  The current approach is to make people aware of their 
rights with respect to the state and the international community, thus enabling 
individuals and communities to take advantage of what the state and the wider political 
context has to offer.55 
 
Alternative development recognizes the role of the insiders over those of the outsiders: 
“the relevant reality must be the people’s own, constructed by them only”.56  Hence, the 
universal values of human rights, democracy, environmental harmony, social justice, 
and gender equity, all embedded in the concept of alternative development, have now 
become the concern of most NGOs.  Pieterse regards alternative development to be a 
part of a larger phenomenon that he calls ‘reflexive development’,57 in which changes 
are occurring in the world political order.  Although NGOs have traditionally been seen 
as influential in lobbying the decisions taken at the state level, they are increasingly 
                                                 
53  Pieterse, “My Paradigm or Yours,” 345-346. 
54  David C. Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda  (West 
Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1990).   
55  Dan Connell, “The Importance of Self-Reliance: NGOs and Democracy-Building in Eritrea,”  Middle 
East Report (Spring 2000), 29. 
56  Rahman cited in Pieterse, “My Paradigm or Yours,” 357. 
57  Ibid., 367-369. 
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viewed as a separate group of political actors.  Strange argues that various forces have 
rendered non-state actors as politically important as state actors.58  Acknowledging the 
importance of these two roles, perhaps the most critical character of NGOs is the direct 
promotion of local civil society, or better, grassroots political activity, thus constituting 
political action within larger, collective bodies of civil society.  In other words, global 
civil society takes shape through the encouragement of local level activism. 
 
Pieterse observes a process of ‘repoliticization’ with the blurring of boundaries between 
the political and nonpolitical, and the resurgence of sub-politics.  He claims that 
“development is now anchored in people’s subjectivity, rather than in overarching 
structures and institutions”.59  However, an increasingly challenging position is created 
for NGOs that support local development initiatives.  Shaped by the ideals of alternative 
development, encompassing cultural forms of expression, local participation, and 
empowerment, they are confronted with the traditional political setting of the nation-
state and its institutions.  It is these complex set of interactions among the different 
levels that I wish to analyze in the current study. 
 
2.1.5. From Sustainable Human Development to Global Development Policy? 
 
As social policy becomes globalized, the effects are being felt in the field of 
development, both in its approach and its organizational structure.  As noted by 
development experts in preparation to the 1995 World Summit on Social Development, 
                                                 
58  Susan Strange, “The Limits of Politics,”  Government and Opposition, 30:3 (1995), 309. 
59  Pieterse, “My Paradigm or Yours,” 369. 
 29 
 
“instead of approaching international relations in terms of conflicts between states, we 
should see them in terms of resolving global problems as people, not as citizens of 
states”.60  With the influence of NGOs, international and multilateral aid agencies, 
including the World Bank and especially the UN agencies, increasingly promote this 
new approach to development.61  The UNDP approach to development has transformed 
to the extent that the Human Development Reports are assessed by many as “unusual 
and brave document[s] to come from the UN stable”.62  As can be observed from the 
reports of the UNDP, there is the wide acceptance that the new approach of sustainable 
human development shifts its focus on NGOs as one of the primary implementers of 
these new development strategies. 
 
This signals to a global development policy, very similar to that of a global social policy, 
in which the focus of globalizing policies on social development and sustainable human 
development urge the shift of decision making structures down to the local level as well 
as the international, global level.  The national level is no longer the only viable sphere 
for decision making and planning in terms of development.  Stable NGO activity thus 
becomes the key point in the transition to global development policy, planning, and 
implementation through the adoption of grassroots development. 
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2.2.  Changing NGO-State Relations in Development 
 
In an attempt to look at nongovernmental activity in the light of developmental thinking, 
this section views the role of the NGO within the state apparatus.  Nongovernmental 
activity has been encouraged as well as discouraged for different reasons, with NGOs 
increasingly taking the opportunity of influencing government policies and 
democratizing state structures and approaches to development. 
 
2.2.1.  State and the Provision of Development 
 
Mackintosh63 has observed the link between the emergence of NGOs and the role of the 
state with respect to the notion of development.  The concept of development was 
originally associated with state provision.  The state was viewed as a benevolent 
institution.  The so-called ‘public interest’ state was defined using three basic 
characterizations.  First, a given society has a set of common interests that need to be 
served.  Second, the government is capable of correctly identifying this public interest.  
Third, the government will make use of its powers and take the necessary actions in 
order to serve this public interest. 
 
The public interest view of the state came under severe attack from two perspectives.  
The left wing critics found fault in the first assumption of the public interest theory.  
They argued that it is not possible to speak of a homogenous public interest.  They 
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regarded the state as serving merely the powerful interests of the dominant classes.  In 
developing countries, these critics claimed, the government would also tend to serve the 
interests of foreign investors in hope of benefiting its own employees and supporters. 
 
The view of the state as concerned with its own private interest was also advocated by 
right wing critics.  Instead of attacking the first assumption of the public interest theory, 
however, these critics tackled the other two elements of the theory.  They suggested that 
the state was not competent enough to identify this public interest, and even if it was 
able to do so, did not have the motivation to serve this public interest.  They claimed that 
in the absence of competition, the government would exploit its monopolies of 
information and services in order to expand its own budget and power. 
 
In search of a common solution to the ‘private interest’ view of the state, both critics 
have agreed on the devolvement of the state.  Devolving the control of state resources to 
the ‘third sector’64 seemed to fit the ideology of both the left and right wing critics.  This 
alliance of the two ends of the political spectrum has encouraged the expansion of the 
role of NGOs on a worldwide scale. 
 
It must be noted, moreover, that with the new perspectives of post-modern left wing 
criticisms, the state is no longer regarded as serving only the dominant classes, since the 
axis of production is no longer the only clevage in a globalizing world.  Other lines of 
division, including race, gender, and ecology, have shifted the focus from concerns of 
                                                                                                                                                
63  Maureen Mackintosh, “Questioning the State,”  in Development Policy and Public Action  (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). 
 32 
 
class only to those of culture and identity.65  It is now impossible to speak of a 
homogeneous public interest given the fact that a multiplicity of identities have emerged 
and the existence of each of them is a statement of difference which requires the 
satisfaction of each and every difference claim within the same territorial setting.66  
 
2.2.2.  Traditional NGO-State Relations 
 
NGOs, in the contemporary sense, have traditionally stood in opposition to government 
and its policies.67  Explicit in its definition, NGOs have emerged as a result of their 
criticisms of governmental standing with respect to numerous issues.  Given their 
supposedly flexible, innovative, and anti-bureaucratic organizational structure and 
culture, they stand in sharp contradiction to the hierarchical, centralized bureaucracy of 
the state.  This, in turn, poses a threat for governments.  Considering the tremendous 
increase in their numbers in the last two decades as well as the extension of their scope 
and fields of activity to include a large area of human interest, governments, particularly 
in the third world, have been suspicious of the activities of NGOs.68  Environmental and 
human rights activist groups, for instance, have been repressed under the claim that they 
attempt to diminish state power.  In countries where nation-building is a strong policy, 
NGOs can be regarded as sources of weakening state authority and territoriality.69  
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Consequently, as a result of the recent explosion in the numbers of NGOs, governments 
have imposed tighter laws and regulations on nongovernmental activity.70 
 
Clark analyzes state-NGO relations in three different political regimes.71  Under military 
and authoritarian regimes, Clark observes almost no collaboration between the two 
sectors as he views the third sector as siding with or becoming the political opposition.  
Secondly, Clark observers the absence of civil society organizations in single party 
states and regimes where the state regards itself as the ‘vanguard of the people’.72  In 
such an environment, the third sector is allowed to flourish only to the extent that the 
projects advocated are in lines with the policies and outlook of the ruling party or 
government.  Finally, it is in liberal democracies that NGOs find it easiest to exist and 
flourish.  This is supported by the system of voting in which satisfying certain interests 
becomes a mode of survival for those in government.  Instead of direct ousting of the 
third sector, strategies in liberal democracies include either the intimidating or the 
devaluation of social movements.  Otherwise, NGOs are easily given full support in 
liberal democracies. 
 
2.2.3.  NGO-State Relations in a Changing World 
 
Despite the increasing independence of the NGO sector and the decreasing importance 
of the state, NGOs have come to realize that it is still the state that defines the 
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framework within which NGOs operate in a particular setting.73  Moreover, it is the 
attitude of the state with respect to the third sector as well as the laws regulating this 
sector that NGO presence and survival is determined in that particular country.  In El 
Salvador, for instance, while a number of NGOs have started creating fruitful initiatives 
together with state institutions in terms of reformist educational programs, other NGOs 
in the same country regard the government as authoritarian and hostile, while the state 
perceives most NGOs as inconsistent, unreliable and unaccountable.74  This example 
illustrates the ambiguous nature of the relationship and interaction between states and 
their civil society organizations. 
 
What is most important perhaps is that given the declining importance of the nation-state 
in the determination of policy in all fields, issues must be reinforced on a larger scale in 
order to ensure policies that are more egalitarian on a global scale.75  This brings forth 
the significance of global social movements and their positive relations with their 
respective governments.  In both cases it has become important to influence government 
policy and practice at various levels in a way that establishes the foundations for the 
desired transformation. 
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While there is a shift in cooperating with governmental bodies and public institutions in 
the planning and implementation of projects, Bebbington and Farrington76 assert that 
state-NGO relations are particular to each country and depend on the political context of 
that country, affecting the degrees of this collaboration.  Dealing specifically with NGOs 
in the South and their role in agricultural development, the authors note three types of 
relations of NGOs with the state level.  On the one hand, NGOs can be regarded by 
governments as assistant providers of public service.  The gap of weak and inefficient 
government programs can be filled in and supplemented by NGO projects.  In this way, 
NGOs are merely tools for the implementation of state oriented and designed programs.  
A second means of cooperation is through a more collaborative interaction between the 
state institutions and the NGO.  Given the innovative nature and capacity of most NGOs, 
state organizations can receive assistance in the improvement of certain projects.  This 
kind of an interaction involves the training of state officials by NGO staff on specific 
topics.  The third, most ideal relationship between the two is the representation of NGOs 
on all aspects of government policies and programs.  In a situation of this kind, NGO 
representatives are asked for advice on a wide variety of topics.  Whatever relation exists 
between the state authorities and the NGO, the conclusion is that a complete isolation 
between the two reduces the impact of NGOs in the given area of implementation. 
 
In terms of social welfare provision in general, NGOs represent an opportunity for states 
in that they divert public resources from the mere establishment of social infrastructure 
and provision to other fields of public responsibility including more innovative 
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approaches to social development.  It is also important to note that NGOs are a tool for 
the channeling of foreign funding into the country since a large number of funds are 
available through NGOs only.77 
 
Concluding from a number of case studies on NGO-state cooperation, Edwards and 
Hulme point out the obstacles and restraints of this relationship.78  In highly centralized 
structures, civil servants at the lower levels of the state bureaucracy are hard to work 
with given their lack of responsibility and consequent lack of motivation.  Their lack of 
enthusiasm also results from the usually low salaries of civil servants.  The frequent 
rotation of civil servants within the state structure adds another constraint as it makes 
NGO influence through directly working with state personnel almost impossible.  The 
lack of public resources is another factor that hinders productive NGO-state 
partnerships.  The presence of a lack of consensus and agreement among government 
authorities and ministries will render NGO inputs even more ineffective.   
 
As a result of successful collaboration in the planning and implementation of 
development projects and programs, models of good practices have been detected, thus 
legitimating the cooperation between NGOs and their states.79  The concept of good 
governance has acted as a further legitimation of this partnership, looking into ways of 
encouraging a more participatory and democratic decision making process in terms of 
policy setting, planning, and implementation, while at the same time assigning an 
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appropriate role and position for the state.  The notion of governance becomes 
particularly important with the increasingly political role of NGOs. 
 
Given the ever-changing nature of the relationship between states and the 
nongovernmental sector, NGOs have found it essential to declare their independence 
from governments as well as internally regulate their own activities within the sector.  
As the NGO movement becomes more institutionalized and the numerous humanitarian 
and developmental efforts are concerted at the national and international levels, NGOs 
increasingly attempt to professionalize and regulate their own activities.80  Hence, this is 
an effort on the part of NGOs themselves to self-regulate in addition to existing state 
regulations on nongovernmental activity. 
 
Concerning the self-regulation of NGOs, it was in the field of disaster relief activities 
that such an international Code of Conduct was first prepared.  Together with the 8 
initial nongovernmental humanitarian agencies that adopted the Code in 1994, by 1996, 
an additional 72 organizations pledged their commitment to the Code, along with 142 
states.81  Additionally, a number of codes of conduct are now being put together at the 
national and regional levels.  Through such self-regulation, NGOs have officially 
declared their separation from the state and their full independence as a sector: “we shall 
formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement 
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the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent 
policy”.82  Through such developments, NGOs strive to become strategically 
influential.83  Clark claims that such strategic NGOs both criticize the state and its 
approaches, yet provide constructive alternatives for the move towards a participatory, 
democratic, and a people-centered human development.84 
 
2.2.4.  The ‘Globalizing’ State and the Provision of Development 
 
It is clear that in the last fifty years of world development, states have provided both the 
motives and obstacles for just development.  According to the experts of the World 
Bank, these mixed outcomes have been direct results of the ‘effectiveness’ of the state in 
the provision of development.  Depending on development experience in the last fifty 
years, the 1997 World Development Report asserts that sustainable development is 
unattainable without an effective state.  Since there is the concern that states might 
increasingly be incapable of responding to the ever-more increasing demands of a 
globalized nature, experts stress that the role of the state should rapidly be changing 
from that of direct provider of development to the role of ‘partner, catalyst and 
facilitator’. 85 
 
Unlike the single-solution recipes thus far suggested for the development of all 
countries, the World Bank now accepts that formulations of an effective state and 
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subsequent development are relative, urging individual states to opt to find their own 
specific measures for reform.  As the 1997 report suggests, “the range of differences 
among states is too enormous, as are their starting points”.86  The two aspects involved 
in this reform of the state include the transfer of the provision of certain collective goods 
to the hands of civil society on the one hand, and the change in the better and effective 
functioning of the state’s existing central and decentralized institutions, on the other.  
Hence, the new formulation for development is based on the specification and definition 
of the precise role of the state and then the building of capabilities of the state to match 
this role.  The fact that most states try to do too much with too little resources and 
capability makes this formulation ever more important for a sustainable human 
development.  An analysis of the potential for NGO-state cooperation in relation to 
changes in state effectiveness is an offshoot of the current study. 
 
As clearly seen in this chapter, developments at the global scale result in repercussions 
at the local scale and visa versa.  Global civil society, advocating alternatives to 
mainstream development policies and practice, has established a link with local civil 
society, in terms of the introduction of new definitions and concepts of development.  
These changes have brought with them the importance of NGO-state collaborations for a 
move towards good governance.  Despite the move towards a new politics, state 
authorities still exercise power in the determination of development policy and 
approaches.  Although state authorities in some countries are increasingly more inclined 
to hand partial power over to civil society organizations, this is less so the case in other 
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countries, including Turkey.  While NGOs at the national level have increasingly 
become reflections of the link between the global and the local, they are still confronted 
with a strong state structure in Turkey.  The details of nongovernmental activity in social 
development, and the particular approach and attitudes of the Turkish state towards civil 
society organizations are the focus of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER III: 
DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY 
 
Despite global challenges, the internal dynamics of nation-states in terms of their 
relations with their civil society and their institutions are highly different from one 
another.  The case of Turkey is no exception.  Development policies in Turkey have 
shaped and regulated the emergence of private initiatives, both for economic and social 
motives.  Starting from the history of development and the nature of nongovernmental 
activity in the country, the current attitudes of state elites towards civil society 
organizations in Turkey and NGO relations with the Turkish state are considered in the 
current chapter.  Although more specific data on current issues of development in the 
Southeastern region of the country are highlighted in chapter IV, the current chapter 
gives the historical background of the reasons behind regional developmental gaps in 
Turkey.  This overview is provided in preparation for the empirical study of the 
research. 
 
The attitude of the Turkish state towards the nongovernmental sector can be best 
understood within its historical dynamics and the context that gave rise to social 
movements and organizations of civil society in Turkey in the 1990s.  The development 
of the third sector in Turkey is different from that in the North as well as some countries 
in the South, mainly in Latin America and South Asia.  The history of development 
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policies, the changing nature and role of civil society associations as well as the Turkish 
political culture reveal the characteristics of today’s development approaches and state-
civil society relations in Turkey. 
 
3.1.  History of Development in Turkey 
 
3.1.1.  Westernization and Modernization as Development 
 
Mardin points out certain characteristics of Ottoman-Turkish political culture which 
determine the state’s attitude towards its civil society.  These include intolerance 
towards opposition due to the state’s tendency to see power as absolute, as well as the 
exclusionary orientation of the Turkish state.87  Using Berki’s distinction of the 
‘transcendental’ and the ‘instrumental’, Heper draws a picture of Turkish political 
culture.  On the one extreme lies transcendentalism which refers to the state as the prime 
actor in the setting of goals for society, while on the other extreme lies instrumentalism 
which refers to civil society and its interests as the prime mover of politics.  State 
orientation, or transcendentalism, assigns priority to the ideals of duties and services of 
moral, responsible citizens, while societal orientation, or instrumentalism, allocates 
priority to the various interests of the public, highlighting freedom, diversity, and 
pluralism.  Using this distinction, Heper characterizes Ottoman-Turkish political culture 
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as a tradition of strong transcendentalism and weak instrumentalism, pointing to a strong 
state and a weak civil society.88 
 
In terms of the decisions on social engineering and development, Mardin points out the 
top-down approaches in the Ottoman state administration, a quality he argues was 
inherited by the creators of the Republic.89  Kazancıgil comments on the reality of the 
Ottoman-Turkish political tradition: “The Young Turks and the Kemalists, although very 
different from the traditional Ottoman bureaucrats, since they were trained in secular 
schools to become adepts of Western ideas and European-style patriotism, were the heirs 
to the old patrimonial tradition, which assumed the dominance of the state over civil 
society and reserved the monopoly of legitimacy and authority to state elites, at the 
expense of social and economic elites.”90 
 
Efforts at modernization in the Ottoman Empire, intensifying with the Tanzimat reforms 
starting in 1839, included the establishment of secular institutions of education, justice, 
and law, while some traditional institutions remained intact.91  But even prior to the 
Tanzimat reforms, at the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had started its 
reformation, that is westernization, efforts with the changes in the military.  The 
bureaucrats at the time, inspired by Western social and political thought, had faith in 
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emerging constitutionalism and trade arrangements among states.92  The modernizing 
elite of the Empire had full trust in the “value of objective scientific truth, a great (and 
somewhat naïve) faith in the power of education to spread this truth and elevate the 
people [from their ignorance], an implicit belief in the role of the central state as the 
prime mover in society, and a certain activism, a belief in change, in progress.”93 
 
As a continuation of projects of modernization within the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish 
republic was quick to implement reforms in which the level of development of Western 
nations was taken as a direct reference point.  Modernization policies included the 
‘secularization’ of institutions, among which were the vakıfs.  Vakıfs94 (evkaf in 
Ottoman Turkish), active since the early years of the Ottoman Empire, were 
philanthropic foundations in which a certain endowment such as property was given up 
to be used for a charitable purpose.  Vakıfs were the tools immensely used for the 
mobilization of a just social order as proclaimed in the Koran.  They were essential 
elements of the Ottoman Empire, both in terms of social welfare and the provision of 
economic services.95 
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During the Ottoman period, vakıfs and their leading ulema undertook agricultural 
activity on vast amounts of state-owned land, which they used in the funding of social 
and economic services.96  Traditionally, the aims of vakıfs have been to provide 
assistance to the poor and needy, financial aid for religious, social, cultural, economic, 
and educational purposes, and the provision of public sector services such as mosques, 
mescits, medreses, libraries, meal distribution units, drinking water fountains, roads, 
bridges, hospitals, hans, hamams, and caravanserais.97 
 
With the declaration of the Turkish republic in 1923 it was decided that progress had to 
be hastily taken in fulfilling the task of firmly establishing a Turkish national identity 
and creating a Turkish nation-state.  This, in turn, determined the path to be taken on the 
route to modernization.  All religious and ethnic diversities were homogenized for the 
supremacy of rationality and progress, and the notion of cultural evolution gained 
importance.  Hence, Turkish state and society’s modernity came to be identified by how 
much it resembles western technological, social, and cultural characteristics.98 
 
Although Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had announced that the sovereignty of the new 
Turkish nation-state belonged to the people, and no longer to the Sultan, it was still the 
duty of the state to ‘elevate the people to the level of contemporary civilization’.  Since 
the uneducated could easily be manipulated by undesirable forces, Mustafa Kemal 
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believed in ‘shaping’ public opinion rather than ‘consulting’ it.  In his search for the 
ultimate ‘truth’ in terms of public policy, Mustafa Kemal determined that there was only 
‘one best way’.  The ‘collective conscience’ of the people would eventually realize the 
true path towards rational progress.  Mustafa Kemal, however, made a distinction 
between ‘real’ and ‘artificial’ orientations, claiming that those ideas not in lines with the 
collective conscience could not be taken as real.  Moreover, these artificial tendencies, 
which sometimes revealed themselves through public opinion, could only be interpreted 
as ‘personal tendencies’.  Since the collective conscience of the Turkish people had not 
yet reached the desired level, sovereignty would not belong to the people until it did 
so.99  This general approach which Kadıoğlu calls the ‘republican will’100 continues to 
shape state-society relations in Turkey, with the visible dedication of the Turkish armed 
forces to the heritage of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
 
Becoming medeni, civilized, required an adoption of the material aspects of modernity 
exerted in the importance given to outward appearances.101  This revealed itself clearly 
in the changes in dress codes, including the reforms within the military and the 
adaptations of western clothing within the Palace.  Images of modernity culminated with 
the reforms of the Turkish republic during the 1920s, including the changes in the 
Arabic script, the Ottoman language, the Arabic calendar, the replacement of Islamic 
law with the Swiss civil code, the ban on religious brotherhoods, their vakıfs and other 
institutions of education and worship.  The changes that were taking place at a rapid 
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pace led to the emergence of a new class with its distinct clothing and lifestyle, which 
was very different from the mainly rural masses who had no economic, social, and 
cultural access to change.  Lacking the institutions of industrialization and the political, 
social, and cultural foundations to support these institutions, the top-down policies of 
modernization did nothing more than enhance these cultural cleavages within society.102 
 
The other distinguishing feature of modernity in Turkey is well explained by Kadıoğlu, 
in her distinction between the ‘republican will’ and ‘enlightened reasoning’.103  As the 
Turkish republican will has always triumphed over enlightened reasoning, opposition to 
and criticisms of the republican ideology has systematically been repressed.  The spread 
of republican ideology to the masses has, then, been assigned as the task of the 
reformers.  This, in fact, was also seen among the Ottoman modernizing elite.  The 
belief of the elite in their capacity to influence and transform ‘ordinary’ people is similar 
to the republican elite’s missionary attitude of ‘enlightening’ the masses.104  Tanzimat 
elite, and later the republican elite, thus took over a socio-political mission and regarded 
themselves as ‘educators of society.’105 
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Consequently, development activities in Turkey today revolve around the notion of 
çağdaşlaşma,106 a synonym for Western civilization and modernization.  In fact, since 
the establishment of the Turkish republic, ‘westernization’ [‘batılılaşma’ in Turkish] is a 
term more frequently referred to than ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ itself.  
However, to a large extent, the idea of progress has been brought to non-industrial 
countries without the collective consciousness of the local population.  Similarly, top-
down plans of westernization in Turkey were different from the changes taking place 
within the grassroots level of society.  In other words, political change from above did 
not coincide with social change from below.  As Zürcher describes so well: “There was 
an exceedingly wide chasm between this civilization [of the ruling elite] and the outlook 
of the almost totally illiterate rural population, whose horizon was limited by the 
surrounding villages and, at best, the market town.”107  
 
3.1.2.  Development in the Turkish Republic 
 
Development efforts in the Turkish republic have been heavily state-driven until the 
1980s.  Development initiatives until this period have been labeled as ‘etatism’ 
[devletçilik in Turkish], characterized by heavy state intervention in the economic and 
social development of the country.  This is a period marked by the development of state 
economic enterprises, perceived as the ‘engines of industrial and regional 
development’.108  The international economic crisis of the 1930s, which resulted in the 
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strategy of import substitution in Turkey, contributed to the state’s efforts at 
industrialization.  This is typically regarded as the period from the establishment of the 
republic to the 1950s, since this date marks the beginning of the development of private 
enterprises, despite heavy governmental support in the form of credits and investments.  
A return to devletçilik in the 1960s continued to be influential in the country’s 
development until the 1980s. 
 
The first 5-Year Industrialization Plan implemented from 1934 to 1939 resulted in the 
establishment of state industrial and agricultural enterprises, including factories and 
processing units for steel, chemicals, glass, paper, tobacco, alcohol and sugar.109  During 
this period, the construction of railways gained priority, as the transportation of both raw 
materials and processed goods throughout the country became an essential component of 
development.  Hence, railways were constructed from major seaports to significant spots 
of mining and centers of agricultural production.110  National levels of industrialization 
increased so much during the 5-Year Plan period that in 1939, Turkey shared with the 
Soviet Union and Japan the first top three countries with the highest economic growth 
rates.111   
 
As opposed to such developments witnessed mainly in the coastal areas of the country, 
the East and Southeastern regions of Turkey remained isolated from such state 
investments in the economy.  In the 1930s, 80% of agricultural production in the eastern 
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provinces was for subsistence purposes.  Even then, surplus produce was sold merely in 
the nearest local markets.  Far from large scale agricultural production, industry in the 
region was also practiced at a small scale.  The small number of state enterprises 
established in the eastern provinces was based on and enforced the traditional tribal 
relations in the region.  Even though weaving was an important economic activity in the 
region, textile and carpets were woven in small ateliers in Diyabakır, Gaziantep, Mardin 
and Şanlıurfa.  Work was sometimes undertaken in the home environment [eve iş verme 
in Turkish], hence again replicating the tribal and gender traditions in the region.112 
 
The reasons for this underdevelopment were manifold.  This was partly a result of 
limited access to the region, both in terms of access from the western part of the country 
and within the region due to harsh geographical and climatic conditions.  Other factors 
included the socio-political structure of the region and its traditional relations with the 
state.  Southeastern Anatolia, populated mainly by Kurdish tribes, had traditionally been 
relatively autonomous from the central state during the Ottoman Empire.  As long as 
Kurdish tribal leaders paid their taxes to the state and agreed to not riot in an attempt to 
expand their territorial boundaries, Ottoman administration left them to their own affairs 
in the region.  Upon Ottoman and subsequent republican policies of state centralization, 
relations with the region that were ‘unproblematic’ until the 19th century, became tense.  
Consequently, a large number of riots broke out, starting with the first organized revolt 
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by Kurdish beys in 1879.  The riots that continued during the republic were reasons for 
the political and economic repression of the region.113 
 
Although equal prioritization was attached by the Turkish state to the connection of the 
Southeastern region to the rest of the country through railways networks, the motives 
behind this were not social and economic in nature, but political and military.  Because 
of limited access to and within the region, railways constituted high value for the 
presence of the military and the state in the Southeast.  Indeed, the only reason that the 
military was able to settle the Şeyh Said rebellion in 1925, for instance, was because it 
had been able to make use of the French railway system in Syria to access Southeastern 
Anatolia.  Interestingly, these, frequently armed, conflicts in the region led to the 
construction of police and gendarmerie stations, prisons, hospitals and various facilities 
for civil servants, as the first public investments of the republic in the region, thus 
paving the way for the entry of the state and the security forces into the provinces, 
counties and villages of the Southeast.114 
 
There were also internal impediments to the development of the eastern part of the 
country.  The ‘provincialization’ of Kurdish beyliks and their attachment to the central 
state did not, in fact, lessen the economic and political power of Kurdish tribal leaders in 
the region.  Upon transition from nomadic livelihoods to settled agricultural practices, 
tribal leaders, who were already dominant figures within tribal communities, became 
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large landowners, as they legally confiscated and bought traditionally communal lands, 
paving the way to semi-feudal production relations in the region.115  This development 
did nothing more than further strengthen traditional patron-client relations and vertical 
power structures within and among communities. 
 
The turn of the half-century was important in terms of the globalization of the economy 
and polity in Turkey.  Together with 43 other countries, Turkey pledged in the Bretton 
Woods conference in 1944 to become a part of the global economy.  In addition to IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, other memberships included the 
Marshall Plan, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).  These developments opened up an era in 
which international credits were obtained for the infrastructural, agricultural and 
industrial development of the country.  The upgraded infrastructure of transportation, 
energy, irrigation and communications was to enable produced goods to be more readily 
available in both domestic and international markets.116 
 
During the 1950-1960 period, large scale irrigation projects constituted a major 
proportion of public investments.  While 50,000 hectares of land was being irrigated in 
the entire country in 1950, this figure reached nearly a million hectares in 1960.  
However, in the Economy Congress in Istanbul in 1948, the decision was taken that the 
state would no longer be the sole provider of economic development.  The only areas of 
responsibility earmarked for the state were education, communications, and national 
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defense.  It was emphasized in the Congress that economic initiatives be taken up by 
private individuals and groups.  Indeed, there were increasingly liberalist oriented 
intellectuals and businessmen eager to open themselves up to the changes taking place at 
the international arena.  According to Yücekök, this emerging class of new elite 
presented the ‘antithesis of the military-civil bureaucratic elite,’117 who had been the sole 
decision makers until that date. 
 
Despite these changes, during the 1950s, there was an increase in the number of landless 
farmers.  The situation of land ownership was such that in some Southeastern provinces, 
the territory of entire villages was in the possession of individuals and their families.  
According to a report of the State Planning Organization, this number was 360 villages 
in the Southeast in the year 1977.118  The increase in the number of landless farmers 
resulted in migrations from rural areas to cities, increasing the supply of seasonal labor.  
This migration, observed all over the country was above average for provinces in the 
east.  The fact that there were insufficient economic activities in eastern cities to absorb 
this supply of seasonal labor led to migrations to the western parts of the country.  
Parallel to the migration of labor was the migration of private investments to regions 
outside the east.  Even the capital accumulated by large tribal landowners in the 
Southeast was invested in the western parts of the country, rather than in the economic 
development of the Southeast.119 
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From 1960 to mid-1970s, Turkey witnessed a period of economic growth, with industry 
occupying a larger share of national income.  Together with the growth in the economy, 
increase in the number of workers backed by the migration of surplus labor from the 
rural areas to the cities, intensification of capitalist relations in agriculture, and the 
subsequent change in power relations,120 this period also marked the growth of class 
tensions in Turkey, thus preparing the foundations for conflicting interests and socio-
political organization for the attainment of these interests. 
 
But even during years of growth, the Southeast did not receive its share of investments.  
Especially during the 1970s, the ‘political’ decisions concerning public investments 
reduced growth impacts on the Southeast.  The share of the Southeastern region in 
Turkey’s GNP values, which were already scarce, dropped to levels lower than ever 
before.  This situation, which remained until the 1980s, brought with it a drop in living 
conditions, unemployment and increased migration to the west of the country, thus 
adding to the discrepancies among regions.  Even though in 1968, the Southeastern 
Anatolia region was selected as the priority region in the development plan of the State 
Planning Organization, public investments in the region continued to be in the nature of 
‘political investments.’121 
 
A trend of inconsistent economic development and industrialization started to reveal 
itself in the middle of the 1970s.  In contrast to the growth levels of the 1960s, the 
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Turkish economy was about to go bankrupt by the end of the 1970s.  As a solution of 
economic recovery, the government in 1979 decided to put into action a structural 
adjustment program, which was continued by the succeeding military government, 
which took over after the coup d’etat in September 1980.  The important outcome of 
these structural reforms has been the reduced role of the state in the country’s economy 
and development.  With the increase in private initiatives in industry and the service 
sector, the state was reminded once again that it was no longer the sole actor in 
economic and social investment.122 
 
These changes starting from the 1980s, according to Turan, had significant outcomes for 
the activation of civil society in Turkey.  Increased awareness and resources of private 
enterprises resulted in support for social improvement through vakıfs formed by these 
newly emerging private businesses.  This development resulted in the formation of a 
class of professionals with relatively higher levels of skills and know-how, thus 
contributing to the development of a pool of human resources capable of establishing 
and managing organizations of civil society.  The increase in GNP per capita allowed the 
newly emerging middle and upper-middle class citizens to contribute a proportion of 
their income, despite minute in most cases, to associational activities.  Moreover, rural 
areas unable to absorb increases in population exacerbated the migration of people from 
villages to cities in search for job opportunities and better living conditions.  This 
migration, which started in the mid-1950s, resulted in the formation of gecekondu 
squatter neighborhoods in the outskirts of large cities.  Gecekondu inhabitants, stripped 
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from the support systems they had in their villages, found the solution in organizing for 
social solidarity and cooperation.123 
 
3.1.3.  Emergence of Nongovernmental Activity 
 
Throughout political history in Turkey, the military and bureaucracy have been the main 
instigators of a strong state, regulating economic and social development efforts in the 
country.  The Turkish state’s strategies of nation-building have traditionally determined 
the acceptable levels of social and political participation from below.  This, naturally, 
affected the organization of civil society in Turkey.  Mobility at the grassroots level has 
been under strict state regulation up until 1995.  State and military elites have started 
loosening their grip on civil society since that date, in parallel to trends of 
democratization in the country.124 
 
State control over civil society has been the fiercest during the single-party rule (1932-
1950) of the Turkish republic.125  Turkish nation-building, containing a strong element 
of secularism, led to strong state control over religion.  The sharp polarity between 
religion and science was one of the factors that resulted in hostility towards vakıfs, as 
the initial form of nongovernmental organization in Turkey.  Religious brotherhoods had 
respective power through vakıfs, in addition to their influence within the state cadres as 
well as the masses.  Not surprisingly, from the mid-1920s to the 1950s, the abolition of 
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vakıfs occupied the minds of many state and political elites.  In addition to the 
weakening of religious power, there was also the project of the creation of a Turkish 
nation-state formed on the basis of a unitary Turkish state and society, for which no 
obstacles were tolerated.126  Given the negative attitudes towards vakıfs and the new 
restrictions brought on the establishment of such organizations, the number of vakıfs 
during the first 40 years of the Turkish republic was merely around 50.127 
 
When derneks, translated as associations, became legalized as another form of civil 
society organization with the Law of Associations in 1938, a part of the activities and 
services in the nonprofit sector was then provided by these organizations.  Legally, both 
vakıfs and associations are nongovernmental entities for the provision of public benefit.  
Associations, referred to as a ‘union of individuals’, are made up of the voluntary 
gathering of individuals for purposes of a common good, mainly through the generation 
of ideas and personal efforts.128  Given the laws regulating the activities of associations, 
these organizations became agents of lobbying and acted as pressure groups in Turkey, 
aiming at political change.  In that sense, the objectives and motives of associations in 
the country are similar to syndicates and political parties. 
 
Vakıfs, refered to as a ‘union of properties’, are formed mainly for the purposes of the 
transfer of assets and funds for a public objective.129  The main factor distinguishing a 
vakıf from an association is that vakıfs are able to generate profit and funds to be 
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allocated for the purpose of ‘culture, charity and solidarity’.130  Another difference 
between the two forms of civil organization is that vakıfs in Turkey can operate within 
more than one field of activity, while the association is legally allowed only one field of 
specialization.131 
 
From the end of single-party rule in Turkey to 1961, the freedom of formation of 
political parties was considered under the Law of Associations.  The influence of 
political parties on social movements and trade unions resulted in reactions of the state 
towards the freedom of social and political organization.  Only in 1963, during a period 
of state deregulation, was a separate Law for Political Parties designed and state control 
on social and political activities relaxed.132 
 
In terms of vakıfs during this period, from 1967 to 1973, 250 new vakıfs were 
established133 and the number reached 1,877 by 1985.134  Corresponding to a phase of 
state deregulation nearly a decade later,135 the increase in vakıfs has been exponential.136  
This was especially the case after another change in regulations allowing for the 
establishment of vakıfs depending on the funding to be raised in the aftermath of 
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establishment,137 hence paving the way for civil society organizations dependent on 
external sources of funding and donor agencies other than the treasury. 
 
Given the expansion of civil rights with the new legal arrangements of the 1961 
constitution, the number of associations proliferated during the 1960s.  This was a period 
that witnessed tremendous cultural, social, and political change in the country.  
However, political unrest in Turkey during the same period led to the revision of laws 
pertaining to civil society formation.  It was believed by the military and bureaucracy 
that these organizations formed the basis of ‘terrorism and anarchy’ in the country.138  
Following the period after the coup d’etat in 1980, all activities of associations were 
ceased, leading to further revisions and curtailment of civil rights.  The military 
intervention as well as the following increase in the number of vakıfs and associations 
also resulted in the drafting of a law by the National Security Council, which 
strengthened the position of the Ministry of Interior with respect to civil society 
organizations.  Upon reporting of organizational activities of a fundamentalist and 
radical nature, the Ministry of Interior was assigned the power to shut down any 
suspicious formation of civic nature.139 
 
Although according to the 1961 constitution, associations could be established without 
prior notice to state authorities, with the 1982 constitution, associations could no longer 
be politically active or receive support from and provide support to political parties.  
These organizations could easily be dissolved in the case that they are viewed as 
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threatening the indivisible unity of the Turkish state and nation, threatening its 
sovereignty, security, and the public order.  Their lobbying and awareness raising 
activities were also restricted in that associations were prohibited from organizing 
meetings and demonstrations, and making press releases without undertaking an array of 
procedural bureaucratic requirements and obtaining the necessary permissions for such 
actions.140 
 
This phenomenon, then, clearly brings us to the situation in Turkey today, where there is 
still relative state control over and hostility towards interests groups within society and 
local manifestations of global civil society.  Efforts at the centralization of state power, 
through the binding force of nationalism based on cultural homogeneity and secularism, 
have been fierce in republican Turkey.  How this is beginning to change with the most 
recent developments is the crux of discussions of civil society in Turkey today. 
 
In conclusion, economic disparities among regions, traditional civic dissatisfaction 
revealing itself in rebellions, and the continued unwillingness of the Turkish state to 
share its power with civil society are all factors that have led to the shaky development 
of nongovernmental activity in Turkey.  Suppression of anti-republican forces, defined 
as reactionary and divisive, has restricted the potentials for civic mobilization and social 
organization.  The changing nature of civil society in Turkey since the 1980s, and state-
society relations are detailed in the remaining sections of the current chapter. 
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3.2.  Changing State-Society Relations and Civil Society in Turkey 
 
3.2.1.  The Changing Nature of Civil Society 
 
For an analysis of the organization of civil society in Turkey today, it is imperative to 
reveal its sharp contradictions to the situation in the Ottoman Empire.  Vakıf activities, 
as the first form of nongovernmental activity, were historically centered around a 
mosque, serving the “spiritual and material welfare of the believers.”141  This religious 
base of vakıfs was slowly dissolved starting from the reforms within the Ottoman 
Empire, their secularization reaching a climax with the formation of the Turkish 
republic.  However, values of religion and kinship, still constituting an important source 
of bondage within society in Turkey, play a key role in the formation of informal 
networks as well as formal associations.  A large number of civil society organizations 
in Turkey today are still constructed around communal ties and networks.142 
 
In a study carried out during the 1970s, Dubetsky analyzes a special characteristic of 
Turkish culture and social structure called hemşehrilik (home-of-origin relations).  
Looking specifically at the organization of production, he detects the importance of 
kinship and primordial ties of home-of-origin, rather than relations based on rational 
criteria.143  As unique features of society in Turkey, he stresses the validity of “cultural 
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prescriptions for appropriate ways of relating to others.”144  These highly personalized 
social relationships result in cultural obligations to the hemşehri.  These relations have 
continued to exist in urban settings where there are plenty of associations formed to 
maintain social solidarity among hemşehris and strengthen hemşehri relations.  
Similarly, Meeker145 points out the peculiar social organization of kinship ties in 
communities in Turkey.  Through ethnographic studies in the region, Meeker 
emphasizes the different possibilities and terms of meaning and significance based on 
Islam.  Hence, Meeker identifies Islam as one of the common bases for the closeness of 
ties of kinship. 
 
With time, the industrialization of the economy and the intensification of capitalist 
relations led to economic, social and political change in Turkey.  The interests of 
individuals, groups and classes moved from the limited scope of the religious and or 
hemşehri community to other broader groups of interest.  Such dynamics of 
globalization brought tremendous changes to civil societal movements and their 
institutions in Turkey as well as other Muslim countries.  It is recognized that socio-
political trends on a global level include the universalization of issues such as human 
rights, conservation of the environment, feminist concerns, participatory democracy, and 
so on.  This is strengthened by the urbanization of societies and the involvement of 
Turkish intellectuals in the international arena that promote these values.  Turkish elites 
have in turn been inspired by these values for the formation of nongovernmental 
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organizations in the country.146  This is prevalent in the current activities of a large 
number of civil society organizations in Turkey. 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the West started concentrating on a large number of new 
projects for the democratization of the socio-political system of the successor states of 
the Soviet Union, including a strong emphasis on human rights.147  This implied the 
encouragement of civil society in these newly formed countries.  Hence, these countries 
have become a testing ground for Western neo-liberal views on democratization and 
privatization.148  As evident in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
democratization process in certain parts of the world is vigorously encouraged by donor 
agencies.  Together with the Central and Eastern European, Central Asian, and Middle 
Eastern countries, Turkey has also been receiving its share of international funds for 
democratization and peace-related projects, and the encouragement of a globalized civil 
society in the country.  These have been taking place particularly within the context of 
the country’s potential accession into the European Union.149 
 
Perhaps the most relevant factor for the purpose of the current study relates to the 
political and economic policies of market liberalization on a global scale.150  One is the 
approach of the structural adjustment of the developing country, requiring cuts in 
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government expenditure on social services, hence creating a gap in social infrastructure 
and services.  The solution of the international providers of credit for development is 
rapid economic growth and a minimal involvement of the state in matters of social 
welfare and provision.  Realizing the negative effects of structural adjustment on 
vulnerable groups in society, the consequence of this approach is the increasing 
importance given to NGOs by donor organizations such as the UN agencies and other 
international development assistance agencies.  As has been the case in Afghanistan, for 
instance, a number of NGOs have been established in Turkey in response to initiatives 
by the UN agencies, the UNHCR in particular, to serve as implementers of UN 
development programs and projects.151 
 
Turan makes the sharp distinction concerning the nature of nongovernmental activity in 
Turkey prior to and after 1980.  Prior to this date, the state was regarded as the sole 
provider of economic and social development in Turkey.  Associations and vakıfs 
operational in the field of development that were established prior to 1980 were 
responsible for support to the realization of public services.  In most cases, public 
authorities had initiated and encouraged the establishment of third sector organizations 
for the undertaking of social and economic activities.  During the period up to 1980, 
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associations and vakıfs feebly accepted their developmental roles as assigned to them by 
the Turkish state and tried their best at successfully fulfilling these roles without 
criticism.152 
 
On the other hand, the political parties of the pre-1980 period encouraged and helped 
establish associational organizations as a means of easily establishing contacts with their 
potential electorate.  At the time, these associations, mostly tied to political parties 
through ideological attachments, acted as mere extensions of the respective parties 
during their rule in government.  They were heavily involved in the undertaking of 
clientelistic activities, thus acting within the established system of vertical power 
relations.  The 1982 constitution brought serious curtailments to connections between 
political parties and associations, rendering parties ineffective mobilizers of associations 
in Turkey.153 
 
Economic changes in the post-1980 period brought with it new understandings of civil 
society organizations and their normative relations with the state.  As stated earlier, the 
growing possibility of funds from private entrepreneurship helped increase the 
independence and autonomy of civil society organizations.  In addition to the effect of 
internal transformations in Turkey, processes of a global nature also contributed to the 
change in civil society organizations.  The proliferation of global NGOs, their 
connections with civil society at the national and local levels, along with the support 
offered to these developments by the international community all contributed to related 
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Period 1972-1996]”, 206-207. 
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changes in the organization of civil society in Turkey.  Instead of acting merely as sub-
contractors of public services, for the first time, civil society organizations had 
flourished as “organizations with the potential of instigating genuine change”, in the 
words of Turan.154 
 
As a result of these global influences, starting from the mid-1980s155 and especially 
during the 1990s, the number of civil society organizations in Turkey has increased 
tremendously.156  Some associations acting as pressure groups have cooperated in 
attempts to influence government policy on a number of issues, including strategies of 
nuclear energy and gold mining with cyanide in Turkey.  Together with the interest in 
other humanitarian issues such as environmental harmony, gender equity, and 
particularly human rights and democracy, a large number of civil society organizations 
regard themselves as posing an alternative to the current arrangement of the political 
system in Turkey, thus being closely associated with the political agenda of 
democratization.  They regard themselves as an alternative voice to the conventional 
statist outlook of ‘either coup d’etat or the sheriat.’157  Together with the presence of 
both religiously oriented and leftist civil organizations, the general feel among civil 
societal groups in Turkey is that they have now created a more moderate stream of 
possibilities to exist alongside with mainstream politics, together with the possibility of 
generating positive transformation at the state level.  Hence, influenced by movements 
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in the West, civil society in Turkey also tackles the question of the crisis of democracy.  
The growth of the NGO sector in the 1990s is regarded by many as a positive step 
towards participatory democratization in the country.158 
 
Since the 1980s, Turkey has been witnessing a rise of political Islam and a revival of 
Kurdish ethno-nationalism.  Although these are forces derived from civil society,159 they 
are considered as challenges that need to be overcome and settled by the Turkish state.  
This is evident in the state policy towards religiously oriented associations and civil 
society organizations that promote religious and cultural rights.  Religiously oriented 
organizations, for instance, are excluded from the legally defined list of civil society 
organizations in Turkey as they are constitutionally prohibited.160  Instead, organizations 
of a public nature are included in the list.161  Carapico has made a similar analysis of the 
                                                 
158  This recent increase in the number of civil society organizations in Turkey is the result of an increase 
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perceptions of certain voluntary organizations in the Middle East and the Arab world.162  
These organizations have either been classified as terrorist organizations as in the case of 
the Kurdistan Workers Party and Hizbullah, or, for those organizations that promote 
minority rights and receive foreign funding, as organizations of western import 
threatening the unitary character of the state and society.  The idealization of the nation-
state and its perceived benefits have tended to result in the overstressing of religious, 
cultural and ethnic diversities as a threat.  Some scholars believe that this ‘divisiveness’ 
and ‘separatism’ has been overemphasized, especially in third world countries, to the 
benefit of authoritarian and exploitative governments.163 
 
Increased demands for the recognition of cultural, religious, and ethno-nationalist 
diversities result in different dynamics of political identification on a transnational and 
global scale.  This, Hann believes, contributes to the expansion of the definition of civil 
society.164  He argues that a mere emphasis on universalism legitimizes too ideal a 
conception of social organization and has consequently isolated itself from current social 
realities, practices, and power relations.  As stated above, White and Dubetsky portray 
the particularities of civil society in Turkey through the portrayal of importance given to 
communal and kinship relations in such civic networks.  Similarly, the recent reassertion 
of Islamic values together with ethno-nationalist claims in the last two decades also 
portrays the particularities of civil society movements in the country.  These movements 
have become more visible with the urbanization of society in Turkey.  Mango argues 
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that the Turkish state’s traditional efforts at the homogenization and secularization of 
society have “broken the texture and natural harmony of Turkish society.”165  It can, 
then, be concluded that there are civil societal initiatives in Turkey today that aim at the 
restoration on a new dimension of these community values, both religious and ethnic (of 
which kinship plays a major role), in addition to struggles for the triumph of universal 
values such as democracy.  However, it is interesting to note that these efforts become 
universal only in the sense that a respect for all religions, ethnicities, and cultures has, in 
itself, become a universal value.  Given the challenges of issues such as 
multiculturalism, ethnocentric nationalism, and religious communitarianism on a global 
scale, Madison asserts that the modern conceptualization of civil society must be 
rethought in a post-modern context.166 
 
3.2.2.  State-Society Relations 
 
Although most social movements in the West are now regarded and accepted as 
manifestations of the crisis of democracy, in Turkey, apart from some members of the 
civil society and some intellectuals, social movements and their organizations are 
regarded by most political and state elite along with members of the armed forces with 
extreme precaution.  This view is the most prominent among extreme secularists today, 
particularly members of the armed forces, given their mission of safeguarding the 
Republic against divisive forces.  Vakıfs with a traditional religious character and the 
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more recent associations with a more contemporary agenda, such as human rights and 
democracy, are both organizations which are regarded with suspicion. 
 
Similar to the case witnessed in Turkey, Pitner states that in the Muslim world on the 
whole, NGOs are regarded by their states as ‘the most dire national security concerns’ 
facing their countries.167  Of all NGOs, those dealing with human rights issues are 
labeled as the most dangerous, as these organizations are all-inclusive and directly 
include claims to religious, cultural and ethnic rights.  With the increase in foreign 
funding on issues of human rights and the promotion of democracy, these organizations 
have become particularly suspicious to respective state officials.  The Tunisian 
government, Pitner states, has solved this problem through the creation of NGOs by the 
national intelligence service.  The intelligence personnel, through these organizations 
which Pitner calls GNGOs, or governmental NGOs, are thus able to monitor conferences 
and other activities undertaken by Tunisian human rights organizations both in Tunisia 
and abroad.168  As stated by Adiin-Yaansah and Harrell-Bond, few NGOs that work on 
the issue of human rights are perceived by their governments as ‘non-partisan, non-
sectarian, and non-political’.169  The regular reaction by governments to movements that 
point out their failure with respect to the maintenance of human rights and democracy is 
the suppression of these movements rather than the introduction of the demanded 
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reforms.170  Thus, given the globalizing position of the issue of human rights, Pieterse 
points out the tension between the current understanding of state sovereignty and the 
increasing importance given to human rights.171  As indicated above, this dilemma is 
strongly felt in the Turkish context in which any foreign assistance on issues of the 
protection of human rights is seen as a threat and in direct conflict with state sovereignty 
and integrity. 
 
The current issue of NGOs in the Muslim world can be described as ‘both trendy and 
controversial’,172 a case which shows similarities to the situation in Turkey.  On the one 
hand, in lines with the thinking in the West and international agencies, the growth of 
civil society in the Muslim world is regarded by many as the foundation for the 
flourishing of a more democratic environment, a cure to ineffective, inefficient state 
bureaucracies, and a compensation to the provision of social welfare in the respective 
countries.  Discussions on civil society and democracy are similarly prevailing in 
Turkey.  On the other hand, the same organizations are viewed with precaution by a 
large number of authorities of the state institutions and members of the military.173  They 
are viewed as agents of western imperialism by others.174 
 
Historically, the Turkish state has been highly suspicious of civil societal elements, and 
hence has tended to control and suppress these forces.175  Carapico, analyzing the social 
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and political changes that civil societal movements have brought to the Muslim world in 
the 1990s, detects the factor of traditional state repression of oppositional parties, 
syndicates, cooperatives and other institutions formed by what the scholar calls ‘civic 
energies’.  Similarly, in terms of the relationship between the state and civil society 
organizations, Hazama asserts that state regulation and deregulation of civil societal 
elements in Turkey has coincided with the country’s nation-building strategies.176  
Stressing the effect of nation-building on the functioning of NGOs in Turkey, 
Yerasimos,177 having led a research project on civil society funded by the European 
Union, observes that civil society is underdeveloped in Turkey and its institutions are 
scarce.  He states that it is difficult to find NGOs operating in the western sense of the 
term.  This, he believes, is related to the recent history of nation-building in the country.  
He observes that NGO working principles are close to etatist viewpoints and nationalist 
values and have taken on the role of replication of statist ideals. 
 
The cultural policies of the post-1980s Turkey inscribe a special role for vakıfs.  The 
perceived threats to the republican ideology as well as their influence on civil society 
organizations in Turkey has placed state and political officials in a position in which 
they are able to use these organizations for the benefit of the nation and the state.  With 
the military intervention of 1980 and the termination of the communist threat, the 
Central Asian Turkic communities became a field of opportunity for the expansion of 
Turkish nationalist ideology.  The Turkish state, having realized the potential of vakıfs, 
supported these organizations in their activities in the former Soviet states.  With the 
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establishment of the Anavatan Partisi in 1983, the government provided official funds to 
Turkish vakıfs for activities in these regions.  These vakıfs are mainly involved in the 
research and development of the culture of the Turks in their regions of activity.  
Moreover, they are supported by funds from the Ministries that are connected to the 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, the ultra-nationalist political party in the country.178 
 
3.2.3.  NGOs and the New Development Paradigm 
 
 
Linking up with the arguments in the previous chapter on the globalizing of a civil 
society and development policies on a worldwide scale, it is clear that NGOs have 
helped take a broader perspective of the notion of ‘good governance’ by bringing in the 
importance of civil society in addition to the traditional actors in the political arena.  In 
addition to NGO influence in the formal political system through lobbying, civil society 
organizations also advocate change in less traditional ways, such as directing 
participatory democracy to the level of grassroots mobilization and helping state 
institutions function more effectively and efficiently.  As stated earlier, through the 
innovations of NGOs, a new development paradigm has emerged in the last two decades 
emphasizing a more participatory and hence democratic development, stressing the 
significance of social justice and harmony through cultural expression, environmental 
health, and equality between the sexes.  The importance of the role of civic participation 
and empowerment has been emphasized in this new development paradigm,179 thus 
encouraging the global growth of local civil society in developing countries.   
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Concerning NGOs in the Middle East, and particularly in Egypt, Masonis El-Gawhary 
distinguishes the recent transformation of nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations that 
have functioned as amateur institutions run by volunteers, to the more ‘professional 
NGOs’ run by permanent staff and an extended budget usually including ‘generous 
foreign funding.’180  The focus has thus shifted from charity activities such as the 
distribution of goods for those in need to NGOs that strive for alternatives to 
development.  Distancing themselves from the framework of orthodox Islamic thinking 
to a more universal philosophy based on justice and humanity, these have included 
NGOs that deal with alternative education aiming at a change in mentality to those that 
strive to genuinely tackle the root causes of the gap between the poor and the better off 
through participation and empowerment. 
 
However, the growth of the third sector in Turkey has been very different, for instance, 
from that in South Asia and particularly India where grassroots activity and local 
movements developed in response to the challenges of acute poverty and social 
injustice.181  The long-standing tradition of a strong state and weak civil society has 
shaped both the regional economic and social inequalities and the underdevelopment of 
grassroots initiatives and NGOs in Turkey today.  Given the catchwords of ‘culture’, 
‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ in the new development paradigm, development 
activities of a global nature have started revolving around reflexivity and are reflected in 
the changes in civil society.  According to Kadıoğlu, however, the official republican 
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ideology in Turkey prevents the formation of self-criticism and reflexivity.  The 
possibility of enlightened debate and democracy in the country requires a distance from 
the ‘republican epistemology’,182 which seems to be the greatest challenge for NGOs in 
Turkey. 
 
Moreover, it is important to consider the special case of Turkey, given the country’s 
position as a western country and the aspiration for becoming a member of a 
supranational arrangement, the European Union.  On the other extreme, the large amount 
of loans from the World Bank, the importation of structural adjustment schemes through 
the IMF, and the implementation of large-scale development projects through 
international development agencies all suggest the international positioning of Turkey as 
a country in need of development.  This positioning accentuates the different dynamics 
operative in the Turkish context. 
 
As indicated in the discussions given above, the main problematique of the current 
research is precisely this dilemma of national NGOs in Turkey, their interactions with 
global civil society, their relations with the target group, and their standing with respect 
to the Turkish state.  I intend to look into the expected benefits of projects carried out by 
NGO-state collaboration in Turkey through this alternative channel, to find out the 
internal dynamics of national NGOs, and the nature of their relations with the state as 
well as the beneficiaries of development projects in the country.  An introduction to the 
empirical research of the thesis and the characterization of the location of the case study 
is the focus of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IV: 
SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA AND THE ÇATOM PROJECT 
 
The empirical study of the current thesis is based on women’s empowerment centers 
specific to the Southeastern Anatolia region in Turkey.  These women’s community 
centers are called ÇATOMs in Turkish, abbreviated from Çok Amaçlı Toplum 
Merkezleri or Multi-purpose Community Centers.  The Turkish word for these centers is 
used throughout the thesis.  ÇATOMs which are under the supervision of the larger 
Southeastern Anatolia Project, shortly refered to as the GAP project (from ‘Güneydoğu 
Anadolu Projesi’ in Turkish), have a semi-civil character due to the involvement of 
national NGOs in this women’s project.  ÇATOMs are an interesting case for study 
given their positioning within the development paradigm, the gender dimension of the 
project and NGO involvement.  Perhaps most important for the purposes of the current 
thesis is the role of the ÇATOM in creating the foundations for a healthy study of NGOs 
and their relations with the target group as well as the relevant state authorities and 
institutions in the region.  Prior to an in-depth analysis of the Southeastern Anatolia 
Project, the ‘gender’ dimension of the project and the structure and operation of 
ÇATOMs, an introduction is made to the social, cultural and economic characteristics of 
the Southeastern Anatolia region.  The special cultural demands that originated in the 
region, the specific conditions of the Turkish state in relation to the Southeast, the 
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difficulties of civil societal organization in the region, and the particular situation of 
Southeastern women make up the contents of the initial sections of the present chapter. 
 
4.1.  The Southeastern Anatolia Region 
 
Despite the fact that Turkey was among the top ten countries with the most rapid 
economic growth rate during the 1980s, the country ranked below average in the Human 
Development Index of the United Nations Development Program.  Turkey’s ranking is 
still low, with social inequalities, especially those of gender, in the East and 
Southeastern regions of the country especially striking. 
 
According to the 1990 figures, the population of the Southeastern Anatolia region is 5.2 
million, around 9% of the country’s total population.  The region’s contribution to the 
country’s GNP is a mere 4%, indicating the low level of economic production in the 
area.  Southeastern Anatolia is still highly rural with 56% of the region’s population 
inhabiting the cities.  The annual population growth rate in the Southeast is 3.5%, which 
is above the country’s average rate.  In 1989, when the number of children per woman in 
the whole of the country was 3.4, this figure was 5.7 for Southeastern Anatolia, reaching 
6.1 in the rural areas.  In 1990, the literacy rate was 76% among men and 44% among 
women in the same region.  In 1993, the percentage of children attending primary school 
was 75%, secondary school was 34% and high school was 14%.  During the same year, 
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among university-aged youth, the percentage of university attendance was a mere 0.3%, 
compared to 12% in the whole of the country.183 
 
Due to its historical background, the social, cultural and ethnic composition of the 
Southeastern Anatolia region is highly diverse.  The traditional tribal system [aşiret in 
Turkish], which determines socio-political organization within the tribal community as 
well as the household and regulates social behavior, is a semi-feudal and semi-nomadic 
arrangement.  Despite its transformation over time, particularly with the migration from 
the rural areas into urban settlements, the tribe system is still predominant in the region.  
Extended families with a large number of children, marriage within the tribe at an early 
age, and patriarchal household arrangements are some of the features of social and 
cultural life in the Southeast.  In general, social hierarchy in the region is determined 
according to ancestry, age, sex, and economic status.  Women and children are the 
traditionally disadvantaged groups of the society in the Southeast.184 
 
4.1.1.  Resurgence of Demands for Cultural Recognition 
 
The Turkish republic, built upon the religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the 
Ottoman Empire, rejected all heterogeneity and celebrated the unitary nature of the 
‘Turkish’ nation.  Within the boundaries of the new nation-state, it was clearly stated 
that all ethnicities of Anatolia were united as members of the homogeneous Turkish 
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nation.185  After 1925, the non-Turkish population living in Turkey accepted 
‘Turkishness’.  The Kurds, by contrast, were cut off from the rest of the country by their 
remote location in the mountains of East and Southeastern Anatolia, and were socially 
and politically organized around tribal lines, with distinct features of cooperation and 
division.  The Kurds were economically dependent on the local landed elites.  Given 
physical isolation and economic dependence, the Kurds remained largely unaffected by 
the new regime’s policies of Turkish nationalism and modernization.186  Although the 
Turkish state does not distinguish according to ethnic origin in national censuses, it is 
estimated that Kurds make up around 20% of the country’s population, with 
Southeastern Anatolia their original location of settlement.187 
 
Given the Kurdish ethnic identity of the Southeastern Anatolia region, serious claims of 
political difference were first made through the PKK, Kurdistan Workers Party, which 
made itself heard for the first time in the late 1970s.  In fact, the PKK originated in 1974 
with a small group of Kurdish university students organizing an association to gain 
official recognition for the Kurdish language and cultural rights.  However, within a 
radical leftist orientation, Party members advocated a Kurdish Marxist republic in 
Southeastern Turkey, with the ultimate aim of creating an independent Kurdistan uniting 
Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  Armed struggle was advocated as the 
only method by which this goal could be achieved.  Consequently, the struggle for 
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Kurdish independence started with the launching of a number of major attacks on 
Turkish targets throughout Southeastern Anatolia.188 
 
At the time, state authorities in Turkey described this newly emerging Kurdish militia 
resistance as the work of ‘a group of bandits’.  Since the establishment of the PKK, the 
region has been the scene of prolonged armed conflict, with peak violence during the 
early 1990s.  With a distinctly Kurdish identity and a strong dose of Kurdish 
nationalism, the guerrilla activities led by Abdullah Öcalan were initially underestimated 
in the ultra-political climate of the pre-1980 period in Turkey.  Following the end of the 
Cold War, the PKK gave up some of the Marxist-Leninist claims of the party but 
intensified its military campaign for ‘Kurdish liberation’ during the late 1980s.  The 
Turkish military responded harshly with a strong reaction varying from armed struggle 
with its ‘special forces’ to the forced evacuation of villages in order to create ‘security 
buffer-zones’.189 
 
Forced evacuation both by the PKK and the Turkish armed forces, and the destruction of 
villages in the Southeast continued, reaching a peak in 1994.  Since the PKK attacks in 
1984, the Turkish government stated that more than 30,000 people were killed in the 
region.  At the end of 1994, the Minister responsible for Human Rights declared that 
around 2 million people in the region were left homeless.  The Minister of Interior stated 
in 1995 that 2,297 villages and sub-villages had been fully or partially destroyed and 
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emptied.190  Kurdish organizations argued for the displacement of 3 million people from 
over 3,000 villages and smaller settlements.191  Most affected settlements have been 
evacuated since 1990.192  As a result of the armed conflict, huge numbers of people fled 
into the towns and city centers of the region.  The displacement and consequent 
migration has been so tremendous in that the population of Diyarbakır, for instance, 
more than doubled in four years from the initial 400,000.193   
 
The economic and social poverty in the Southeastern Anatolia region, coupled with the 
‘denial’ policy of the Republic tends to make the situation in the region highly complex.  
Neither the Turkish state nor the PKK managed to abandon their political-military 
discourse, leaving no space for a potential Kurdish opposition movement with relatively 
liberal and pacifist tones.  The political party heritage, tracing back to the early 1990s 
with HEP or Halkın Emek Partisi (People’s Labor Party) and DEP or Demokrasi Partisi 
(Democracy Party) continues to live today with HADEP or Halkın Demokrasi Partisi 
(People’s Democracy Party), despite the numerous court decisions taken to close down 
consecutive parties.  In 1993, several parliamentarians accused of ‘collaborating’ with 
the PKK were taken from parliament, arrested and imprisoned according to the 
respective legal procedures.194  Although the consecutive Kurdish parties gained 
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Rights Foundation of Turkey, Ankara, January 1995. 
194  The parliamentarians were arrested and imprisoned according to articles 125, 168 and 169 of the 
Turkish Criminal Code which will be elaborated in the following section. 
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impressive amounts of votes in the Southeastern Anatolia region, they never managed to 
gain the required minimum to have the right of representation in parliament.195 
 
Apart from PKK and HADEP, the Kurdish opposition remains fairly poor.  Some 
pacifist figures criticized the militant policies of the PKK but remained fairly marginal.  
The Kurdish Democracy Platform aimed at distancing the Kurdish movement from 
violence and militance, however, ended up ‘being squeezed’ between the denial policy 
of the Turkish state and the armed encounters of the PKK.  Despite due changes in the 
last years of the 1990s, the political discourse on the ‘Kurdish question’ continues to be 
determined through the legitimacy of armed struggle.196 
 
For many years, for an average Turkish citizen on the street, the word ‘Kurd’ signified 
something derogatory.197  Kurds signified ‘people living in the mountains’, ‘uncivilized’, 
‘rural’ and perhaps most importantly, ‘terrorists’.  The PKK undeniably changed the 
perception of the Kurdish image at least among the Kurds themselves providing an 
element of self-confidence.  Even though, among the majority of the Turkish population, 
there is still the refusal of the existence of a separate Kurdish culture and identity, this 
bares little convincing capacity in a country where books, magazines and music are 
readily available in the Kurdish language.  The public use of the Kurdish language 
which was banned in 1980 became legal again in 1991.  In today’s Turkey, the existence 
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of a separate Kurdish language is no longer ignorable.198  For instance, a Kurdish 
weekly, in the name of Welat, is published in Istanbul in the various dialects of the 
Kurdish language. 
 
In the early 2000s, the armed conflict in the region has now become minimized, 
following PKK ceasefire after Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in 1999.  Even though there is 
less military repression by the state compared to two decades ago, the Kurdish 
population in Turkey is still yet to be recognized by the state and the wider mainstream 
Turkish population.  However, irrespective of what goes on at the state or society level, 
the Kurdish minority is on the route to finding ways of expression that are no longer 
militant.199  Particularly during the last few years, there is an explosion in expressions of 
Kurdish culture, illustrating itself through mythology, folklore, literature, theatre, 
cinema, music, and language.  Although the Kurdish language preserves strong 
differences in itself, Kirmanji is the most commonly used dialect in Turkey.  The 
broadcasting of the former Med TV and the recent Medya TV via satellite seems to be 
effective in the use of Kirmanji as the standardized Kurdish language in the country.  
Years of guerrilla struggle obviously played a role in breaking ties with the semi-feudal 
structure of the rural setting.  For some young Kurdish women, given the deep 
traditional and religious social structure prevailing in the region, being a guerrilla fighter 
of the PKK or working for HADEP means ‘emancipation’.  The Kurdish liberation 
movement, to a certain extent, was the only means to coming closer to the cultural 
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expressions of Kurdishness.  In that sense, a standard, homogenized language was of 
utmost importance. 
 
However, during the earlier years of armed struggle there were priorities over cultural 
matters and the reform in the Kurdish language did not seem to pose an immediate 
urgency.  Abdullah Öcalan, himself, once noted that his first language was Turkish and 
not Kurdish.200  Indeed, it is now possible to argue that the old generation of the Kurdish 
movement represented by the PKK, HADEP or Özgür Gündem (the newspaper of the 
Kurds published in the Turkish language) is being replaced by a new generation of 
Kurdish youth who is keen on learning the Kurdish language and heritage more than 
ever before.  Establishing and maintaining a Kurdish network through language seems to 
be the primary concern in urban centers such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Mersin, Antalya 
and Diyarbakır.  To be ‘culturally’ recognized as a Kurd in Turkey is the ultimate wish 
and aim of many young Kurds living in the metropolis.201  Nothing can illustrate more 
vividly their determination to gain their rights to learn Kurdish in schools than the 
thousands of petitions signed at universities during the year 2001, in spite of harsh 
reactions from official authorities.  It seems that the PKK lost the armed struggle for a 
Kurdish nation-state, but the young Kurdish population in Turkey seem determined in 
obtaining their right for cultural recognition. 
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Despite no concrete moves of the Turkish state towards a policy of ‘recognition’ rather 
than ‘denial’ and the persistence of Emergency Rule202 in the East and Southeastern 
regions for the past two decades, current discussions on the right to learn Kurdish in 
schools and the right to undertake radio and TV broadcasts in Kurdish have the potential 
of opening a new page with respect to the Kurdish minority in Turkey.  Particular effects 
of the possibility of Turkey’s accession into the European Union has accelerated the 
discussions of the recognition of Kurds as an ethnic group in the country.  Such 
developments have the potential of benefiting especially the population in Southeastern 
Anatolia who are tired of military operations, terrorist attacks and emergency rule in the 
region. 
 
4.1.2.  State and Civil Society in Southeastern Anatolia 
 
Top-down authority and one-way communication characterize the Turkish bureaucracy 
both internally and in relation to the society.  Unresponsiveness to social problems is 
prevalent in high-level, ministerial conferences, where no discussions and debates are 
encouraged from stakeholders.  These are platforms where the various relevant 
authorities view a single ideal, that of the official ideology as inherited from Mustafa 
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Kemal Atatürk.  This is the practical manifestation of what scholar Kadıoğlu theorizes as 
the dominance of the ‘republican will’ over ‘enligthened debate’.203 
 
In a ministerial conference on the ‘Solutions to the Problems of Southeastern Anatolia’, 
which took place on 23 November 2000 in Ankara, participants included members of the 
Ministry of Interior, governors in the region, high ranking members of the Turkish 
armed forces, journalists and academicians.  Although the conference was organized by 
the Association of Turkish Administrators, no representatives of other associations and 
vakıfs were present.  Despite high participation in the conference, all participants were 
in strong agreement of the same views on the issue, thus leaving no room for debate or 
questioning.  Members of parliament with Kurdish origin were asked to attend the 
conference.  With no emphasis on their Kurdishness, these parliamentarians voiced their 
dedication to Turkish national culture.  The high-level officials, mainly members of the 
military, were quick to reprimand the occasional slightly stimulating words that were 
uttered.  A governor from Van was the only person with a few different remarks to 
make.  He was a man who had obviously had confrontation with concepts of 
participatory development, and advocated a ‘people-centered development’ as the best 
solution to the ills of the Southeastern Anatolia region.  He received no questions from 
any of the authorities present at the conference.  The only reaction that the governor did 
receive was from the army General who quickly raised a questioning eyebrow and 
reminded the governor that he must be careful about such fancy words as ‘people-
centered development’.  “The delicate condition of the region is clear” he argued, and 
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“so we must be determinant about how we want to proceed.”  As the best solution, the 
answer was clear: village towns (köykent in Turkish) must be created all over the East 
and Southeastern Anatolia region to keep the population out of small settlements 
isolated in mountains, to help mix the Turkish and Kurdish populations in the cities of 
the East, and dissolve the feudal and tribal structure of Kurdish communities in an 
attempt to dissolve the socio-political bond among Kurds.  This option was strongly 
voiced as the single solution by all members of the Turkish military present at the 
conference, and was forcefully confirmed with the slamming of a fist on the table. 
 
A highly negative attitude was portrayed towards civil society organizations active in the 
region because they were regarded as ‘too political’.  Instead of the dozens of 
nongovernmental organizations working on issues of human rights in the region, an 
army General noted the necessity for and urgence of NGOs eager to implement the 
‘development model of Atatürk’, urging the ‘support of social movements leading to 
social solidarity’ in the region.  The same General asserted that organizations like the 
Association of Human Rights204 could not be considered as NGOs. 
 
The example above portrays well the attitudes of state and military bureaucrats with 
respect to the development of the Southeastern region and the evaluation of civil society 
organizations.  With the effect of the military intervention in 1980 and the subsequent 
depoliticization of Turkish society, there was a sudden decrease in the number of civil 
society organizations in the country.  This, undoubtedly, had a negative effect on the 
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already scarce civic initiatives in Turkey.  The effects of the increase in political 
pressure exerted by the state continue today.  Coupled with the armed conflict in relation 
to PKK activity in the Southeastern Anatolia region, prolonged state pressure added to 
the existing pattern of vertical power relations.  These phenomena have played a 
significant role in the curbing of any kind of civil organization and social mobilization in 
Southeastern Turkey.205 
 
In addition to the hierarchical social and political organization of the population in the 
region, problems of representation through political parties in the Southeast have had a 
negative influence on social representation.  Political party organization in Turkey, and 
more specifically in the Southeastern region, builds upon the unevenness of social power 
relations and leads to the further confirmation of these relations.  Despite the scarceness 
of civil society organizations in the region, civic organizing on a voluntary basis and 
with a non-governmental character has nevertheless been observed as the most active in 
Diyarbakır.206  However, it is important to note that since political representation is not 
maintained through political parties, civic initiatives reveal themselves within a political 
discourse, in the form of politically loaded civil society organizations.  This, in turn, 
perpetuates the existing state pressure in the region through the use of military and 
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police force.  This eventually leads to a highly negative relationship between the state 
and civic initiatives in Southeastern Anatolia.207 
 
The constitutional and other specific restrictions such as the Law of Associations of 
1983 pertaining to the establishment and operation of civil society organizations in 
Turkey in general apply even more harshly to such organizations in Southeastern 
Anatolia.  Other legal limitations are put forth by the Turkish Criminal Code, Anti-
Terror Law, and the OHAL Law within ‘Applications of Emergency Rule’ specific to 
the region.208   
 
Baysal portrays the grim picture of court cases against civil society organizations in the 
OHAL region.  Court cases in Turkey as well as the Southeast are easily filed against 
apparently suspicious organizations and individuals within the Turkish Criminal Code.  
Most cases are analysed under the offense of “provocation to commit a crime” and 
“threat for the purposes of creating fear and panic.”  More specifically in relation to 
individual and organizational activity in Southeastern Anatolia, article 125 is used for 
the analysis of crimes, which asserts that “with or without the use of violence, those who 
attempt at territorial disintegration or a distancing from the sovereignty of the central 
authority will be punished with execution.”  According to another article within the 
Code, if a meeting or demonstration is to be held, the organizers must inform a number 
of authorities in state institutions, including the respective governorates, the security 
forces and the regional governorate of the OHAL in Diyarbakır.  However, in practice, 
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the requirement goes far beyond a mere information and the organizers are forced to get 
the full permission of all authorities before any kind of demonstration and group event 
can be held in the region.209 
 
The Anti-Terror Law in general, and article 8 in particular, is yet another piece of 
legislation which is flexibly used against civil society organizations.  The justification is 
the “use of propaganda against the unity of the state.”  Any action, both verbal and 
physical which is considered as a threat to the official ideology of the state is taken into 
court consideration under this article.  Similarly, article 159 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code includes “crimes that have been committed against the state forces, referring to the 
police, gendarmerie, and the military forces.” 
 
Article 169 of the Turkish Civil Code has also recently been frequently used for the 
hindrance of the organization of civil society in the OHAL region.  According to this 
article, “whoever knowingly provides shelter, assistance, ammunition, weapons and 
clothing to such an organization [cemiyet and çete in Turkish connote an illegal 
organization] or provides unconditional support will get imprisonment from 3 to 5 
years.”  Although this article requires physical action, most court cases filed under 
article 169 have included verbal action as a proof to be used within this article.  This, 
along with other legislation, clearly restricts freedom of thought and expression, 
especially in this part of the country.  Due to the intensity of such court cases, civic 
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initiatives aiming at social development, health care, improvement of education, gender 
equality and others are naturally discouraged.210 
 
Articles 9 and 10 of the OHAL Law also impede the activities of civil society 
organizations in the region.  In an OHAL condition, among the precautions that can be 
taken to ensure general security, the protection of public order and the prevention of 
violent incidences include the separate investigation of each association and the 
cessation of association activities for up to 3 months.  Their assets can subsequently be 
confiscated.  The fact that both articles are broadly defined and that means of objection 
to the decisions of the OHAL administration are nearly impossible, let alone successful 
operation, the survival of civil society organizations becomes challenging.211 
 
Because of such difficulties, there are cases in Southeastern Anatolia in which 
organizations are established as private sector organizations but function as voluntary, 
nonprofit organizations.  One such example is KAMER [Kadın Merkezi in Turkish], 
established in Diyarbakır.  Despite the fact that it is registered as a private business 
company, KAMER is accepted and functions as a third sector organization.  The NGO 
works for the raising of awareness among women in the region on their legal rights as 
women.  In a round table meeting organized in May 2001, a number of civil society 
organizations in Diyarbakır had the chance to talk about the situation of such 
organizations in Southeastern Anatolia.  In addition to problems pertaining to NGOs in 
general in Turkey, problems and aspirations specific to the Southeast were discussed.  
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The greatest problem in the region was voiced as the armed conflict and political 
instability witnessed during the last two decades. 
 
According to the observations of scholar Diken,212 as the organizer of the round table 
meeting, due to limited political representation in Southeastern Anatolia, 
nongovernmental activity in the region is highly politicized.  Given the national limit of 
10% for representation in parliament, in localities where there is as high as 60% support 
for HADEP, there is severe confrontation and conflict between state institutions in the 
region and organizations with a more civil character.  In such a highly politicized 
environment, there are also nongovernmental organizations cautiously maintaining their 
‘unbiased’ stance with respect to state ideology.  For instance, the Democracy Platform 
in Diyarbakır, a forum of local NGOs, portrayed a stance very much in reaction to and 
against the state.  But some other NGOs who were offered to join in the Platform 
rejected the offer in the justification that they were politically neutral. 
 
Under normal circumstances, syndicates, chambers, and public and private professional 
organizations would not be considered as NGOs since they are interest groups working 
for the benefit of their members.  Altruism and voluntarism is not a characteristic of 
these organizations.  However, in Turkey and especially the Southeastern Anatolia 
region, these interest groups have gone beyond their own specific interests to the wider 
platform of lobbying on a larger scale.  In this regard, these organizations have become 
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prominent as ‘civil society organizations’ in the region.  In most cases they act as 
pressure groups for the benefit of the society at large.  The Diyarbakır Chamber of 
Trade, for instance, was once highly oppositional and hence political.  Their starting 
point was that “if there are no democratic rights, there is no trade.”213  Similarly, 
GÜNSIAD, the Association of Southeastern Industrialists and Businessmen [Güneydoğu 
Sanayiciler ve İş Adamları Derneği in Turkish], have on their agenda issues such as 
political reform and changes in macroeconomic policies.  While acknowledging and 
experiencing the obstacles to such activity, interest groups and the nonprofit sector in 
Southeastern Anatolia explain that they have no other choice but to lobby for solutions 
to political problems in the region and in Turkey.  Another factor for the prominence of 
syndicates, chambers and professional groups in the region is their relative freedom of 
association.  Unlike other organizations of a more civil character, these organizations do 
not confront as many legal obstructions.   
 
Difficulties of organizing and mobilizing civil society were recounted by NGO 
representatives present at the round table meeting in Diyarbakır.  An environmental 
NGO member, trying to collect signatures for a campaign against the construction of a 
power plant in Siirt, confronted such reactions from the locals: “You are going to burn 
our house down.  The people involved [in the campaign] are probably against the state.  
They will recognize our signatures and then we will all get in trouble.”214  Such fear, 
NGOs agree, is another significant obstacle behind the leasing of civic energies in the 
region.  In such a situation, it is agreed that there are mainly two types of civil society 
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associations in the Southeastern Anatolia region.  One group consists of civil societal 
formations created as a reaction to state and military dominance and a result of 
subsequent high levels of politicization in the region, while the other group is made up 
of associations and vakıfs that are an extension of the state, such as the associations for 
Fight against Tuberculosis of the Turkish Red Crescent Society.  It can be concluded 
that in a region where the word ‘organization’ [örgüt in Turkish] is automatically 
associated with terrorist activities, impediments for the organization of civil society are 
evidently tremendous and diverse. 
 
4.2.  The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) 
 
Given the armed conflict in Southeastern Anatolia for over two decades, the overall 
quality of life in the region has been deteriorating as people are forced into the unhealthy 
outskirts of urban settlements, consequently losing their self-reliance on the land on 
which they were able to at least provide for their subsistence livelihoods, such as the 
production of their own food.  Given the high rate of fertility, low productivity, and high 
unemployment in the region, along with the insecurity of available jobs, the Turkish 
state is no longer able to cope with these problems on its own.  The Turkish state has 
listed the provinces in East and Southeastern Anatolia as the priority in terms of social 
and economic development.  Regional inequalities in Turkey have been acknowledged 
starting with the fourth 5-Year Development Plan, in which Priority Provinces and 
Regions (Kalkınmada Öncelikli İller ve Yöreler in Turkish) have been detected.  
Followed up in successive plans, regional development has become a national aim.  The 
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seventh 5-Year Development Plan places emphasis on human resource development 
along with equality among regions within the country.  In the early 1980s it was decided 
that a major step must be taken in that direction.  Hence, a large-scale development 
project in the name of Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP), Southeastern Anatolia 
Project, was initiated by the Turkish state.215 
 
The Southeastern part of Turkey, which is the area covered by the administrative 
provinces of Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa 
and Şırnak, is also referred to as the GAP region.  The Southeastern Anatolia Project, or 
GAP project in short, is a multi-sectoral and integrated regional development effort 
based on the principle of sustainability. Aiming at the full scale social and economic 
development of the region, the Project involves the construction of dams, hydraulic 
power plants and irrigation schemes on and around the rivers of Euphrates and Tigris, as 
well as investments in the fields of rural and urban infrastructure, agriculture, 
transportation, industry, health, education, housing, tourism and various other sectors. 
The GAP project consists of 13 sub-projects.216 
 
The aim of the GAP project is to remove the socio-economic gap between the project 
area and the more developed regions in the country as well as the inequalities within the 
region itself.  The basic strategy adopted for the achievement of this goal is the 
development of land, water and human resources of the region.  At the moment, nearly 
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70% of the economically active population in the GAP region is engaged in agriculture 
where productivity is low.  Traditional production methods still predominate in most 
areas.  With the implementation of the GAP project, agriculture in the region has started 
modernizing.  When the project is completed, the ratio of irrigated land to the total GAP 
region will increase from 2.9% to 22.8%.  As a direct result of the introduction of 
irrigation, agricultural production and crop variety will increase substantially, rendering 
the region attractive for domestic and foreign investment.  It is projected that this will 
radically change the economic structure and significantly improve the living standards of 
the local population, increase their per capita income, and create employment.217 
 
4.2.1.  New Development Strategies and the Social Dimension of the GAP 
Project 
 
The GAP project comprises not only the construction of dams and irrigation systems for 
the promotion of agro-industry but also investments in social services such as health care 
and education, particularly for women and children.  Taking into consideration the social 
and environmental aspects of development, ‘sustainable human development’ has been 
declared as the official policy of the GAP project, as published in the Official Gazette on 
18 March 1997.  The policy of sustainable development has been promoted initially by 
intergovernmental organizations in the Rio Conference on Environment and 
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Development that took place in 1992.  The Turkish state has adopted this approach in its 
Master Development Plan for the Southeastern Anatolia region.218 
 
The GAP Administration has determined that the success of the project in terms of 
attaining its targets of social development requires a penetrating knowledge and 
information on the existing social structure. This is essential for the design and 
implementation of sustainable development projects that involve the participation of the 
local people.  Taking this into consideration, during the period 1992 to 1994, the GAP 
Administration, with the help of NGOs and academicians, undertook a series of social 
research studies to guide development efforts, identify the basic principles of 
development in the region, mobilize community participation and to identify the ways of 
mitigating disparities and imbalances by integration of the disadvantaged sections of the 
population into the development process.  The resultant GAP Social Action Plan was 
prepared to form the general framework for project activities aiming at sustainable, 
equitable and participatory social development.219 
 
With its official policy of sustainable human development, the GAP project is an 
ambitious initiative.  Through international pressure on the Turkish state, national NGOs 
as civil society organizations have been assigned consultative tasks and small-scale 
social development projects in the region.  However, this approach is a new one in terms 
of development policy and planning in Turkey.  A number of UN agencies in Turkey 
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have helped in promoting the sustainability and human dimension of the various 
development projects comprised within the larger GAP framework.  These include the 
Intergovernmental Social Development Policy Committee (ISDPC), United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), United Nations International Development 
Organization (UNIDO), World Health Organization (WHO), and United Nations 
International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF), among other agencies.  Most of 
these agencies, which provide technical assistance, have been particularly influential in 
the adoption of this development strategy as UN-related agencies work in direct 
collaboration with respective Turkish governments. 
 
Under the ISDPC, established in Turkey in 1995, the UN works in cooperation with the 
Turkish state for a sustainable human development in the GAP region.  The objectives 
are the creation of employment possibilities, enabling an environment supportive of 
sustainable human development, improvement of the status of women, and the 
conservation of local natural resources which are essential for the sustenance of local 
communities in the region.  The principle of local people’s participation is determined as 
the tool of implementation in all projects within this extensive program.  ISDPC, 
together with the UNDP, designed a program consisting of 28 projects entitled 
‘Supporting Integrated Regional Development and Alleviating Socio-Economic 
Inequalities in the GAP Region’, which was launched in 1997.220 
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According to the 1992 UNDP Human Development Report of Turkey, inequalities in 
terms of age, gender, ethnic origin and region must be brought to a balance if human 
development in Southeastern Anatolia is to be attained.  These imbalances become 
particularly acute in the case of the GAP region.  The human dimension of development 
is prioritized through participatory and human-centered strategies of human resource 
development and basic social provision including education, health, housing, gender 
equality, environmental sustainability, and capacity building both at the institutional and 
community level.221 
 
These strategies were planned as a result of the Situation Assessment Report222 of 1993 
which detected a number of developmental constraints in the region.  In terms of human 
resources, the constraints in the Southeastern Anatolia region are low literacy and school 
attendance rates particularly in rural areas and among women; high fertility rates in rural 
areas; inadequate knowledge and application of issues of health protection, hygiene, and 
nutrition; intensive outmigration resulting in the loss of already scarce skilled labor in 
the region; and the low status of women. 
 
With respect to social services, problems arise from the inadequacy of education and 
health facilities in the region; the lack of personnel, financial, and technical capacity of 
local administrations; low health conditions resulting from environmental pollution and 
a lack of sufficient sanitary water, sewage systems, and urban and industrial waste 
management systems; the scattered nature of rural settlements which impedes the 
                                                 
221  Ibid. 
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efficient provision of services to these units; and the intensity of inter-regional migration 
resulting in overpopulated urban centers in a manner that hampers the provision of 
public services. 
 
The Report foresees the importance of encouraging local participation, given the top-
down approach of state planners and implementers on the one hand, and the strict social 
organization and hierarchy hindering participation among members at the community 
level on the other.  Local participation becomes particularly essential in the case of 
inequalities among population groups, men and women, and urban and rural.  
Disadvantaged population groups in the region have been determined as landless 
farmers, families with small plots of land, women and children, resettled communities, 
and populations living in migrant neighborhoods.  Projects designed for women have 
been labeled as participatory development projects. 
 
As portrayed in the GAP Master Plan, two approaches are used with respect to planning.  
One is the approach of integrated development and the other is sustainability.  The 
approach of integration denotes a cooperation among the various development sectors 
such as agriculture, industry, education, and health.  Sustainability becomes an 
inevitable aspect of this approach.  In this respect, the GAP project is not merely an 
economic growth project but also a project of social change.  As Bennet asserts, “this 
new approach to development replaces centralized with decentralized structures; it 
promotes accountability over control; and it assumes that the downtrodden, divested of 
                                                                                                                                                
222  Durum Belirleme Raporu [Situation Assessment Report]  (Ankara: GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi 
Başkanlığı, May 1993). 
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the shackles of bureaucracy, will attain their true potential through pluralism and 
participation.”223  It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze to what extent such 
progressive development approaches encourage local participation and grassroots 
mobilization in the Southeastern Anatolia region through the engagement of tools of 
civil society in Turkey. 
 
4.2.2.  Gender Balanced Development 
 
Gender equality, a significant dimension of the sustainable human development 
approach, is adopted by the GAP Administration as an essential prerequisite for social 
development in the region.  The emphasis on gender issues within the social field has 
been the result of several international developments as well as local indicators of the 
quality of life in Southeastern Turkey.  It is common knowledge that national policies of 
rural development have almost always focused on male farmers.224  As a result, most 
rural women are negatively affected by mainstream economic development processes.  
Despite efforts on the contrary, studies of third world women in the 1990s indicate very 
little benefit of development projects to rural women.225 
 
After the first UN Conference of the International Women’s Year in 1975, an observable 
increase in studies on the effects of rural transformation on women has been noted.  One 
                                                 
223  Jon Bennet, “Introduction,”  in NGOs and Governments: A Review of Current Practice for Southern 
and Eastern NGOs, ed. Jon Bennett  (Oxford: INTRAC Publications, 1997), 9-10. 
224  Kathleen Cloud, “Women and Agriculture: Household-level Analysis,”  in Capturing Complexity: An 
Interdisciplinary Look at Women, Households, and Development  (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 
126. 
225  Gina Koczberski, “Women in Development: A Critical Analysis,” Third World Quarterly.  19 (1998), 
395. 
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major attempt to bring together analytical and systematic studies of women’s role in 
rural development was the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) series that took 
place in 1985.  In 1988, the World Rural Sociology Congress was organized around the 
theme of changing gender roles.  Other smaller scale conferences have pulled together 
studies on the topic.  After analyzing a number of these conference outcomes, Jiggins 
comes to the conclusion that the impact of agrarian change and rural development on 
women can hardly be universalized.226  Recent data shows that oversimplifications are 
no longer scientific as the social change that is experienced in a rural setting depends on 
many different variables.227  The best generalization that can be made, according to 
Jiggins, is that agrarian change will mostly be unfavorable to women, especially to the 
poorest, and in almost all cases men experience greater benefits compared to women, 
finally suggesting that the topic is still under-researched.228 
 
In terms of issues of gender equity in development, practical and strategic needs of the 
particular group of women are defined.  For purposes of women’s development projects, 
‘interests’ as the prioritized concerns are translated into ‘needs’.229  Women’s interests, 
or better to say gender interests are drawn upon Molyneux’s distinction of ‘practical’ 
and ‘strategic’ needs.230  Practical needs are responses to immediate necessity and they 
work with women in their socially accepted roles as women.  Strategic needs, on the 
                                                 
226  Janice Jiggins, “Agricultural Technology: Impact, Issues, and Action,”  in The Women and 
International Development Annual Volume 1  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). 
227  Cloud, “Women and Agriculture”, 129, and Ester Boserup, Women’s Role in Economic Development.  
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1970), 80. 
228  Jiggins, “Agricultural Technology,” 25-30. 
229  Caroline O. N. Moser, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice, and Training  (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 37. 
230  Molyneux  cited in Moser, Gender Planning, 38. 
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other hand, challenge the socially accepted role of the female.  These needs, when 
satisfied, help bring women out of their traditionally subordinate position in society. 
 
Today, many specialists working in various fields of development share the view that 
development plans, programs and projects still neglect the role and importance of 
women. Yet, it is widely known that women, today as in the past, take equal or even 
heavier burdens and responsibilities than men in almost every field of family and 
community life, although the weight of burdens and responsibilities may vary with 
respect to the level of development and structure of culture.  
 
It was first in the 1970s that the position of women in the process of development found 
a firm place on the agenda.  It was in the 1980s, during which equalitarian policies 
determined project approaches, that the gender dimension of development became more 
acute.  Today, women’s projects cover such headings as women’s role in the process of 
development and participation in the work force, their status in terms of access to 
modern institutions such as training, credits, health, and other social services, and 
possibilities of enhancing their control over the outcomes of their own labor and daily 
lives.  Gender imbalance was thus defined as a basic problem, which is assumed to be 
originating from both gender structuring within the family and from the nature of 
relations established with the market in the process of development. In this context, the 
approaches of gender balanced development aim at the creation of institutions and 
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processes which will empower women for participation, mobility and initiative taking.231  
All these developments found their reflection in Turkey as well. The place and functions 
of women in the process of development were considered, in 1991, as an important 
parameter by the GAP Administration for the objective of an integrated and human 
centred regional development project. At the initial stage, there were investigations and 
surveys to depict the tendencies, problems, expectations and social relations of women 
in the region which ended up with a model developed to make them active actors in 
development.  Prior to a description of this GAP model for women’s empowerment, I 
will provide a short overview of rural and urban women in the GAP region. 
 
4.2.3.  Women in Southeastern Anatolia 
 
Taking a look at the region-specific indicators of development, one can easily observe 
that the women in the region lag far behind the men in terms of quality of life.  The 
women in the region are under the negative impacts of both traditional social 
stratification and gender imbalances where their roles and status are socially and 
culturally determined.  This situation becomes more apparent in the rural areas of the 
Southeast.  In the rural parts of the region women participate much less in decision 
making and household management, benefit less from basic health and education 
services, face difficulties in having access to sources of income and are unable to benefit 
from the facilities of modern technology compared to the men in the region.  Lack of 
land and high levels of fertility further increase the work burden of women. In addition 
                                                 
231  Yakın Ertürk, “Gender Differentiation and Equality in Sustainable Development,” paper presented at 
the Seminar on “Sustainable Development and Southeastern Anatolia Project”, Şanlıurfa, Turkey, March 
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to routine farming activities, other domestic chores of women include preparing and 
conserving food for winter, making bread, fetching water,232 washing laundry, fetching 
firewood and attending children. 
 
Education level among rural women is very low.  According to 1994 figures, the rate of 
literacy among rural women is about 25%. The low level of education decreases the 
accessibility of women to public social services and their participation in the public 
domain.  According to research undertaken in the region, 37% of young girls get married 
under the age of 15 in rural Southeastern Turkey.  Marriage at an early age naturally 
increases the number of children, reaching the average level of 5.1 children per woman 
in rural areas and decreases women’s control over her own body, as indicated in the 
statistics that only 12.4% of married women had been married on their own will.  More 
than a half of urban women in the region get married within the ages 15-19, with 17.5 
being the average age at first marriage.  For the majority of urban women, their own 
opinion on the decision of marriage is taken into consideration by the family members.  
As is the case in rural areas, early ages at marriage in urban areas also results in a large 
number of children throughout the marriage.  A contributing factor to this is the extreme 
importance of the male child within the family.  The average number of children per 
urban family is 3.5.233 
 
                                                                                                                                                
1995, 27-29. 
232  Making bread takes an average of 2 hours daily, while the fetching of drinking water is a troublesome 
chore especially in remote mountain villages and can take up to 4 hours a day. 
233  All statistics are taken from GAP Bölgesinde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu 
Araştırması [Research on Status of Women in the GAP Region and Women’s Integration into 
Development]  (Ankara: GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, September 1994). 
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The level of education among urban women is relatively higher than rural women, with 
a literacy rate of about 56%.  Despite the trend of an improvement in women’s 
positioning within the family in urban areas, the hierarchical structure of decision 
making is still predominantly male based, with 71% of the men taking the decisions at 
home.  As far as expenditures related to household matters are concerned, women’s role 
is considerable in both decision making and practice.  However, the main economic and 
financial decisions are at the discretion of men.234 
 
Within the framework of gender roles, women in each specific community or area have 
peculiar patterns of relationship with men, with other members of the community, and 
with each other.  These peculiarities are culturally determined.  Furthermore, 
communities assign certain functions and roles to each individual.  However, there are 
usually considerable discrepancies between what communities assign as roles and 
functions, and what individuals perceive as their own roles and functions.  Thus, gender 
roles are specifically related to tradition and cultural values.  Details on gender relations 
in the region are provided in the following chapter, as extracted from field data. 
 
The weight of gender discrimination and women’s inferior position prevent their move 
to a status in which they are equally able to control and manage resources.  Nevertheless, 
one should not infer from this reality that women contribute less than men in the welfare 
and well being of their families and communities.  Observations that gender 
discrimination increasingly plays against women, especially in developing regions, have 
made the issue of the role and function of women in development a more urgent one.  It 
                                                 
234  Ibid. 
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is argued that there are two main reasons for addressing gender issues specifically in 
development programs.  The first one is the obvious argument that women have the right 
to better living conditions and access to these resources just as much as men.  
Additionally, if women, constituting half of any given population, are neglected, a 
potential is left idle and it is impossible to fully reach the targets of development.  The 
second reason, as revealed by various surveys, is related to the fact that any investment 
in women has more immediate effects on the welfare of children, families, and their 
respective communities.235  
 
Although displacement and migration within the region have already started changing 
the social structure and organization of households and communities in Southeastern 
Anatolia, traditional structures still persist and influence daily life.  In this overall 
structure, women are still particularly affected by gender imbalances.  While rural 
women have an active role in production, this is not the case for urban women for such 
reasons as low levels of education and skills and somewhat adverse market conditions.  
However, the idea of the GAP project is to create non-agricultural employment 
opportunities for women.  In the squatter migrant settlements of the region, a small 
number of women and young girls are employed in marginal jobs of a contingent nature 
such as weaving, embroidery, machine knitting, tailoring, and so on.  Albeit limited, 
women living in urban poor neighborhoods occasionally have the opportunity of 
engaging in low status and labor intensive non-agricultural activities. 
 
                                                 
235  21. Yüzyılda Kadın ve GAP [Woman and GAP in the 21st Century]  (Ankara: GAP Bölge Kalkınma 
İdaresi Başkanlığı, September 1997). 
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4.2.4.  The ÇATOM Model 
 
Given the approach of sustainable human development and the adoption of a policy of 
gender balanced development for the region, the ÇATOM model was designed in the 
light of such progressive understandings of regional development.  The women-centered 
ÇATOM project is advocated as one of the participatory and integrated schemes of the 
larger GAP project.  These multi-purpose community centers for women originated from 
a search for an alternative gender balanced development and socio-cultural change, with 
the guidance of findings of the survey on women’s status in the GAP region and the 
possibilities of their integration into the process of development in the Southeast.  
 
The GAP Administration, together with NGO personnel and academicians, designed a 
community center for the empowerment of women, their families, and eventually the 
community within which the center is situated.  The ultimate aim is the creation of self-
sustaining women’s centers for empowerment and development.  At these centers, where 
flexible and modular programs are adopted, the overall aim is to raise the status of 
women, to contribute to gender balanced and sustainable human development and to 
develop relevant and replicable models geared to these aims.  Influenced by the 
Resolution of the 1985 UN Conference for the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, the ultimate objective of the ÇATOM is to render ‘invisible’ women ‘visible’.  
By working with women, ÇATOMs help create an environment of healthier and fruitful 
dialogue between the most needy sections of the community, local state authorities and 
voluntary organizations. 
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ÇATOMs carry out a large number of projects in which the aim is the participation, 
training, and empowerment of the individual, family, and the community through 
activities of personal development and community cooperation.  ÇATOM activities are 
carried out under the three general headings of social programs, income generating 
programs, and health programs.  Each participant has the chance to attend all three 
programs, and in fact are encouraged to do so.  There are also social and cultural 
activities accompanying these educational programs.  In addition, there are mobile 
health cabins working under some ÇATOMs.  These mobile units are used in reaching 
out to those who have difficulties in access to health services and health training. 
 
It is claimed by the GAP Administration that these centers aim to bring together women 
and to create an arena in which they are able to discuss their common problems, share 
their anxieties, and come up with probable solutions and other activities.  They are able 
to acquire the skills to facilitate their daily lives, including literacy, health education, 
hygiene, mother-child care, and nutrition.  Upon demand, they are also trained in 
activities which might later provide income.  The GAP Administration asserts that the 
aim of the ÇATOMs is not to tell women what to do but to show them what they are 
capable of doing.  The aim is to develop women’s resources and build capacity in order 
to make them aware of their potentials.  The objective is to enable women to choose 
among alternatives as well as urge them to create further alternatives.  Characteristics 
such as the ability to organize and get organized, advocacy, leadership and coordination 
qualities, skills in the division of labor, and knowledge on basic civil and human rights 
are all aspects of capacity building that are believed to enhance the situation of women 
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and eventually lead to community development.  The above mentioned skills are 
particularly important in migrant neighborhoods and communities which have been 
formed from people with a wide range of differing experiences, interests, and 
worldviews.236 
 
The ÇATOM tries to create a model in which local resources are mobilized in an attempt 
to improve the conditions of women in the region and their respective neighborhoods.  
The intention is for the local young girls and women to be trained and educated by local 
instructors, and the management of the ÇATOM to be provided by local means through 
local initiatives.  This is done through coordination by the local ÇATOM field worker 
selected from among the young girls in the region.237  This field worker, acting as a 
leader, is the main responsible for the management of ÇATOM activities.  The model 
envisages the field worker to be supported by a democratically elected committee which 
gives assistance in the decision making, planning, as well as implementation phase of all 
activities.  The ÇATOM committee consists of 3 to 5 persons elected by and from the 
ÇATOM’s participants.  The committee is present in the management of the ÇATOM on 
behalf of all participants.  This scheme is expected to contribute to the building of 
managerial capacity among local women as well as increase democratic decision making 
and implementation within the ÇATOM structure.  In this sense, ÇATOMs are centers 
which train future local female development specialists. 
 
                                                 
236  ÇATOM: Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri [ÇATOM: Multi-purpose Community Centers]  (Ankara: 
GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, January 2000). 
237  Except for one male leader in the 22 ÇATOMs, all others are female. 
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ÇATOM centers became functional in November 1995.  Since that date, 22 ÇATOMs 
have been established in 8 of the 9 GAP provinces, with the last ÇATOM center 
completed in February 2000.  There is one ÇATOM building in Adıyaman, 2 in Batman, 
one in Gaziantep, one in Kilis, 5 in Mardin, 4 in Siirt, 3 in Şanlıurfa, and 5 in Şırnak.238  
ÇATOMs are mainly established in urban squatter neighborhoods inhabited mostly by 
those who have migrated in from rural areas, while several ÇATOMs operate in rural 
settlements of a somewhat central location.  In the ÇATOMs, where activities are 
tailored in an integrated, participatory and sustainable approach, the direct target groups 
of programs are women and young girls of age 14 to 50.  ÇATOMs are established 
under the respective province governor through a memorandum of understanding 
between the GAP Administration and the province governor.  The activities of the 
ÇATOM are planned and carried out in cooperation with relevant local state authorities 
and to a lesser extent with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.  The 
organizational scheme of the ÇATOM is given below.239 
 
 
  
                                                 
238  ÇATOM: Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri [ÇATOM: Multi-purpose Community Centers], 21. 
239  The organizational scheme is taken from ÇATOM: Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri [ÇATOM: Multi-
purpose Community Centers], 13. 
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4.2.5.  NGO Involvement in the ÇATOM Project 
 
Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı (Development Foundation of Turkey), or TKV in short, is the 
one national NGO that has been involved in the ÇATOM project since the very 
beginning of the design and planning phase.  Given TKV’s work experience on 
economic and social development projects in various parts of the country and the 
organization’s extensive research and applications in the field, TKV carried out a 
research project on the situation of women in Southeastern Anatolia and put forth an 
action plan on possible projects that could be implemented for women’s empowerment 
in the GAP region.  After the involvement of TKV and the effort of the GAP 
Administration in attracting NGOs for cooperation on the ÇATOM project, a number of 
other national NGOs started supporting the activities of the ÇATOMs. 
 
The main task of TKV in the ÇATOM project is the periodic training of ÇATOM field 
workers.  Through the training sessions of the TKV, ÇATOM field workers learn the 
importance of conducting field surveys in order to derive more information and 
knowledge about the households within their communities, to assist them in guiding the 
target group in realizing their potentials, and to help ÇATOM field workers in the 
planning of programs, monitoring and evaluating the implementations, and the writing 
of periodic reports.  In addition to the practical knowledge of operation in the field, 
ÇATOM field workers are also trained on the more abstract notions of gender equity, 
local participation, democracy, and sustainable human development.  Hence, TKV is 
involved with the building of the capacities of ÇATOM field workers, with the intention 
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of a trickling down of knowledge and experience from the management level of the 
ÇATOM to the participants of young girls and women. 
 
According to the statements of the GAP Administration, TKV is involved in all aspects 
of the ÇATOM project, including the detection of the target group, provision of 
educational and income generational tools, the selection of ÇATOM field workers and 
instructors, education and training of field workers, monitoring and evaluation of the 
ÇATOM project, organization at the grassroots level, marketing arrangements for 
income generational products, and assistance in the engagement of national NGOs in the 
ÇATOM project.  All NGOs other than TKV are stated as being involved in rather 
limited fields of activity, including the planning of educational and training programs 
that are in agreement with the local conditions and needs of the respective communities, 
assistance in the programs of ÇATOM cooperation with state and non-state institutions, 
and the selection of specialists for the project.240  The actual engagement of NGOs in the 
ÇATOM project and their activities are the focus of chapter VII. 
 
4.3.  Case Study and the Related Methodology 
 
The progressive approach of the GAP Administration to development and the semi-civil 
character of ÇATOMs place these women’s empowerment centers in a special position.  
ÇATOMs create the ideal milieu in which state-NGO relations can be studied, in 
addition to NGO-target group relations, thus giving clues about the nature of NGOs as 
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the possible link between state and the community.  The target group of women in the 
respective community, the involvement of the GAP Administration, related province 
governorates and other local state institutions, as well as NGOs in ÇATOMs create the 
circumstances for an analysis of NGOs as intermediaries between the target group and 
institutions of the state. 
 
The conceptual framework of the current thesis has been formed through the review of 
literature on development issues on a global level and its changing counterparts in 
Turkey.  The role of civil society organizations and their respective relations with the 
state have contributed to an understanding of the internal and external dynamics of 
NGOs in development.  Monographs and academic journals were consulted in 
preparation of the theoretical chapters of the thesis. 
 
A larger section of the thesis includes the field findings and analysis of the empirical 
study.  ÇATOMs, taken as the case study, were used as the setting for an analysis of the 
interaction among the three actors of the target group/community, NGOs and state 
institutions.  For an evaluation of the stated relationship, I have chosen to collect 
primary data by use of qualitative methods.  Participant observation was the main 
technique used for data collection during intermittent visits to the Southeastern Anatolia 
region and the ÇATOMs in the period between June 2000 and December 2001.  Of the 
22 ÇATOMs, 7 were selected for the purposes of the current study, the details of which 
are given in the following chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                
240  Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM): Vizyon 2010 ve Stratejik Plan 
[Southeastern Anatolia Project Multi-purpose Community Centers (ÇATOM): Vision 2010 and Strategic 
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In terms of research within the selected ÇATOMs, data collected revealed the 
perceptions of the target group and their progress with respect to personal development 
and self-empowerment.  In addition to data collected from ÇATOM participants, their 
families and neighboring community members were also contacted for an understanding 
of local socio-cultural relations and an evaluation of the extent of community 
organization.  Focus group meetings and in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
frequently used, with a simple quantitative survey utilized with the target group of 
participants in the selected ÇATOMs.  Statistics Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
was used for the computerized statistical analysis of the questionnaire used for collecting 
data among the target group of the ÇATOMs.  The results of the analysis of these three 
groups, comprising direct participants, their families and the community are given in 
chapter V. 
 
The ÇATOM structure itself was also analyzed in an attempt to understand the success 
and failures of ÇATOMs in helping instigate a gender balanced sustainable development 
in the region.  This included an insight into the internal dynamics of ÇATOM centers 
and their relations with both the local state institutions and NGOs.  Considering the 
management of the ÇATOM to be the most critical factor in the success of the model in 
terms of ensuring sustainability, the management structure of the ÇATOM and the 
effectiveness of the field workers and instructors were assessed.  The impacts of the 
ÇATOM approach were measured at the local state level, including all local public 
institutions with which the ÇATOM is in cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                                
Plan]  (Ankara: GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, January 2001). 
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Data pertaining to the second agency of state authorities was collected in the field, as 
local state authorities and their institutions were contacted during visits to respective 
ÇATOMs.  This data led to findings on the perceptions of local, regional and central 
authorities on the ÇATOM project, including the GAP Administration, provincial and 
county authorities, and other related civil servants working in public institutions with 
activities similar to the ÇATOMs, whose results are presented in chapter VI.  The 
collection of data at this level comprised the contacting of province and county 
governors depending on the location of the ÇATOM, and other local state institutions 
with which the ÇATOM has contacts, mainly in the form of public instructors.  These 
included the conducting of semi-structured and open-ended interviews mostly with 
directors and other responsibles of the Directorate of Education, Public Training [Halk 
Eğitim in Turkish], Health, and the local representatives of the Social Services and Child 
Protection Agency [Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu in Turkish]. 
 
As no NGO representatives working in ÇATOMs or related NGO regional branch 
offices were confronted during visits to individual ÇATOMs, a list of NGOs 
collaborating on the ÇATOM project was obtained from the GAP Administration in 
Ankara, as the starting point for an analysis of NGO activity in the ÇATOMs.  Except 
for two NGOs on the list, all other civil society organizations directly or indirectly 
involved in the ÇATOM project were contacted, leading to data collection among 9 
NGOs.  Visits were made to their offices in Istanbul and Ankara, where semi-structured 
and in-depth interviews were conducted with NGO representatives for the collection of 
raw data.  Hence, NGO involvement in the success and failure of the ÇATOM project 
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was evaluated through the words of NGO representatives, rather than through field 
observations of their relations with the target group and state authorities in the region.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this absence of NGOs in the field was in fact an 
indication of their role as intermediaries between the state and community in 
Southeastern Anatolia.  The results of the NGO study are depicted in chapter VII, with a 
concluding chapter of an evaluation of NGOs as the link between state and society 
within the framework of the ÇATOM project in Southeastern Turkey. 
 
In addition to research in the selected 7 ÇATOMs, extensive use of the research 
technique of participant observation was also used for the observation and understanding 
of certain processes of social and cultural interaction in Southeastern Turkey.  This 
approach assisted me in the understanding of relations of hierarchy, both at the inter-
household and bureaucracy level, providing glues of local gender power relations, 
among others.  In addition to the specific case study of the ÇATOMs, during the time of 
empirical research, I had plenty of time to visit both the villages and the urban settings 
of Southeastern Turkey.  The numerous conferences and symposiums that I attended 
during the two-year research also provided valuable input. 
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CHAPTER V: 
WOMEN’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE ÇATOM PROJECT 
 
5.1.  The Southeastern Anatolia Region: Views from the Field 
 
5.1.1.  The Economy of Southeastern Anatolia 
 
The majority of the population in Southeastern Anatolia is made up of Kurdish tribes 
(aşiret) living mainly in the rural areas, exhibiting a semi-nomadic character.  Given 
scant industrialization in Southeastern Anatolia, most families earn their livelihoods 
from animal husbandry and the cultivation of land.  Pastoral production is the main 
economic base along with the trade of livestock and their produce.  Although the region 
is highly mountainous and the larger part of land is used for pastures, there is still arable 
land for cultivation and gardening.  In addition to crops like cereal, corn, and rice, the 
region is suitable for the plantation of sesame, grapes, and walnuts, for which the region 
is infamous.  Families grow plenty of vegetables in their gardens including potatoes, 
radish, turnip, tomatoes, cucumbers, green beans, onions, pumpkin, and cabbage.  Fruit 
orchards in the region contain apricot, plum, mulberry, fig, pear, and peach trees.  The 
produce of fields and gardens is largely for household consumption and some barter with 
other villages.  The main source of income in the rural Southeast, however, is the 
smuggling of herds.  This is done in addition to the raising of mainly sheep and goats 
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and selling their produce.  Animal trade is organized by local traders through an 
unofficial or black market.  The animals are smuggled either legally or illegally to Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria. 
 
It is perhaps more appropriate to talk about these activities in the past tense, as since the 
start of armed conflict in the region nearly two decades ago, livelihoods have rapidly 
changed for a large number of families in the region.  The endless pastures are no longer 
available for the raising of sheep and goats in the mountains of the Southeast, as 
concerns of security make the pastures unsafe to use.  Fields and gardens are abandoned 
together with entire villages and districts. 
 
Nowadays, particularly in the smaller sized settlements, it is the civil servants and 
members of the security forces that keep the economy running to a large extent.  Of the 
places that I visited for the empirical part of my study, this was especially the case in 
Beytüşşebap where all the merchants in the county are somehow in contact with the 
military.  Providing for the military, which has an immense presence in Beytüşşebap, 
guarantees the survival of the small businessmen in the locality.  Prior to the intrusion of 
the military in the region, a large number of the families in Beytüşşebap and in the 
surrounding villagers were involved, in one way or another, in the plantation and 
trafficking of cannabis.  The chief military commander in charge in Beytüşşebap 
explained the discovery of cannabis plantations in the mountains of Beytüşşebap.  Prior 
to the armed conflict with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in the region, the military 
had no idea of the extent of illegal cannabis plantation on these territories.  Now that the 
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security forces have patrolled a large section of the mountains in the region, the 
plantation and trafficking of cannabis has declined considerably. 
 
Again in Kurtalan, a town of Siirt province, the only buyers of the kilims woven by the 
young girls are the civil servants who have temporarily come to the region.  The families 
of police officers, teachers, doctors, and members of the military are the only sources of 
income for kilim weavers.  The local population is thus dependent mainly on this sector 
of civil servants.  This, as has always been the case in this region of Turkey, results in 
unstable, inconsistent, and insufficient revenue for the local producers and merchants in 
Southeastern Anatolia. 
 
Seasonal work has become an essential source of income for a large number of families 
in the Southeast.  While a large number of families have migrated from the villages to 
the towns and the outskirts of the cities of the East and Southeast, an even larger number 
of families have migrated from cities in the East to cities in the West of the country.  In 
both cases, the absence of the male members of the family have disrupted the social 
structure of traditional families.  Seasonal work has become such an essential part of 
household subsistence and income that even some young girls in the region are routinely 
involved in seasonal migration for work such as for hazelnut or cotton picking. 
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5.1.2.  Socio-cultural Life and Social Capital in the Region 
 
The traditional community in Southeastern Anatolia has the extended family and the 
aşiret as its fundamental social and cultural base; this tradition persisting even after a 
transition to the urban setting.  Relations within the family as well as the tribe 
community are organized mainly along vertical structures of power, with the male head 
of the family or the tribe leader at the tip of the pyramid.  As in all patriarchal societies, 
men are the final decision takers as opposed to the subservient role of women and 
children. 
 
What makes the notion of a ‘tribe’ important in the region is tribal relations and 
networks based on patrilineal descent, territorial attachments, common history and 
culture within the tribe community.  In the region, territory is the most indispensable 
consequence of being associated with a particular local tribe.  This is because land in the 
region is traditionally divided according to tribal boundaries and the use of these 
traditional lands is possible mainly on a contractual basis, although this is rarely done by 
way of legal procedures.  The ambiguities resulting from ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ land has 
resulted in fights over these lands, leading to alliances and fissions among tribes. 
 
Close relations within the tribe community leads to the exchange of labor, goods, and 
visits on a regular basis.  Labor is exchanged within the community in the form of 
communal work.  Each household sends one member of the family to the family in need, 
and at the end of a hard day’s work, the host household provides a meal to those who 
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have provided assistance.  Households with the lowest labor force are exempt from these 
responsibilities, and they are provided with assistance in the form of alms-giving.  The 
same social rules of communal exchange apply also to women. 
 
It is interesting to note that, even though there are strong horizontal relations and 
egalitarian rules among the members of the same village, vertical bonds are nevertheless 
prevalent both inside and outside the village setting.  Patron-client relations are 
dominant with respect to traders and leaders within the tribe as well as public authorities 
such as the headmen, governors, politicians and other figures of power.  Personal 
networks gain prominence over mutuality and cooperation. 
 
5.1.3.  Changes after Internal Displacement and Migration 
 
As stated earlier, armed conflict in the region for over two decades has resulted in rapid 
social change among the population in Southeastern Anatolia.  Because a large number 
of villagers have left their original settlements after the start of attacks of the PKK, both 
cultivation and pastoral production, as well as animal trade has come to a near halt in 
Southeastern Anatolia.  Most villages near to the borders with Iran and Iraq have been 
emptied.  However, when a village is forced to migrate, the immigration process usually 
takes place as a whole, with the entire village allocating itself in another location.  A few 
of the younger male members of the village who decide to go their own way, such as 
migration to a larger city, may do so, however, a large proportion of the village remains 
intact even after the migration process, with men leaving home only for purposes of 
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seasonal or daily work.  Traditional customs have loosened as a result of the dislocation 
and there is constant change in the economic configuration of the community. 
 
Territorial changes resulting from internal displacement of families and communities 
result in the weakening of tribal relations.  Both physical proximity from the tribe leader 
and other members of the tribe, and residential dislocation has been factors affecting the 
loosening of tribal networks among displaced communities.  Tribal networks thus 
witness a degree of degeneration, both in the new settlement as well as in the host 
community.  Families are now obliged to pay money for the goods they were once able 
to plentifully produce.  Financial problems, on the other hand, result in malnutrition 
among migrant families. 
 
While the elder members of the community express their longing for their ancestral 
lands and the women are discontent about the absence of the males in the family, the 
younger generations, both girls and boys, are happy about the better opportunities for 
education in the new area of settlement.  As migration takes place into the outskirts of 
towns and larger cities of Southeastern Anatolia, education facilities are giving the youth 
a better chance of education.  However, the darker side of the coin shows us that due to 
financial problems among the same families, the facilities that are present are not 
necessarily accessible.  A woman explained that in her former village, although there 
were no health facilities, they could easily come into the nearest town or city for a health 
check-up and treatment, as they owned the money to pay for the health services.  Now 
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they are closer to these health facilities but no longer possess the money to pay for these 
services. 
 
5.1.4.  Deprivation of Women in the Region 
 
While carrying out my fieldwork in Southeastern Anatolia, I came across a report 
published by the Family Research Institute241 on the increase in suicides among young 
women in Batman province.  The phenomenon was further elaborated by a number of 
journals and newspapers in the country during the winter of year 2000.  In fact, I had 
also come across a few girls both in Batman and Siirt talking about other girls in the 
vicinity they had heard commit suicide.   
 
The women in this deprived region of the country are particularly affected as the recent 
changes taking place do not seem to make an improvement in their socio-cultural status 
as daughters, sisters, wives, and mothers.  The patrilineal pressure that women face 
result in their secondary position as female household members, and their limited access 
to education and other social services in the region.  The harsh local traditions give 
women no chances of making choices that affect their own lives, including the decision 
as to the number of children she bears during her life time, who she marries at what age, 
how many wives her husband will have, how much say she has inside the household, 
and how much space she has to maneuver.  Added to this is the absence of possibilities 
of social interaction and the problems of domestic violence performed against female 
household members.  For instance, projects such as asylum homes for battered women 
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are not implemented in the East and Southeastern parts of the country.  Since the revolt 
of women are regarded as unacceptable within the tribal arrangement of the Southeast, 
women in the region who seek asylum must be taken away from their home environment 
and their address of asylum kept secret.  Seeking asylum in the region is particularly 
difficult for women given the frequent use of firearms in the region.  To solve this 
problem, the few women that seek asylum are taken by relevant state institutions to 
homes in the western provinces in the country.   
 
Authorities noticed that the number of suicides among women in Batman showed an 
unusual increase during the year 2000.  Out of 60 suicide attempts among women in 
Batman, 31 ended in death.242  A closer study of the statistics indicated that during the 
first 8 months of the year, Batman witnessed double the amount of suicides than the 
average in Turkey.243  Compared to the previous year, suicide rates increased by 52%.  
However, acknowledging the fact that the number of suicides in 1999 was already 
higher than average is a further indication that the phenomenon was not specific to the 
year 2000.  There are estimations that the same case is also valid for the East and 
Southeastern Anatolian provinces of Diyarbakır and Muş, two provinces that also need 
to be researched in terms of their increasing suicide rates.  In any case, it would not be 
incorrect to conclude that since 1999, suicide rates in Batman and the rest of the 
Southeast are currently on top of the list. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
241  Aile Araştırma Kurumu is a public research agency under the Prime Ministry. 
242  Ayla Önder, “Batman’da Kadın İntiharları Kolay Açıklanamıyor [No Easy Explanation to Women’s 
Suicides in Batman],”  Pazartesi.  68 (Nov. 2000), 11. 
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75% of the suicides in Batman are committed by the youth in the age range 13-25 and 
80.8% of these are young girls,244 a finding highly particular to Batman.  This becomes 
especially alarming when considering the fact that in all suicides committed worldwide, 
including Turkey, on average, men are in higher percentage than women.  Of the suicide 
cases in Batman, studied by the Family Research Institute, 53% of the women were 
married and the remaining 47% were single.  65% of these were young women that were 
either single or newly married below the age of 25.  Of the 11 suicides committed in the 
center of Batman, 7 were in squatter migrant neighborhoods.  A research carried out in 
Diyarbakır also reveals that the majority of suicides in that province take place in the 
squatter neighborhoods formed by families fleeing their villages,245 making suicide a 
reality among low-income, internally displaced and violence-struck women and young 
girls. 
 
One factor as influential in the suicides in Batman, and possibly the greater Southeast, is 
the rapid social change as a result of migration from the villages to the city centers.  
Given the armed conflict in the region, this displacement and spontaneous settlement of 
rural families in various cities and province centers has resulted in the disruption of strict 
socio-cultural structures and has changed social expectations.  The differing socio-
economic status of the migrants is so prevalent in Batman, for instance, that the city is 
divided into two separate invisible sections, with the migrant squatters being referred to 
                                                                                                                                                
243  Batman’da Artma Eğilimi Gösteren İntihar Olaylarının Ön İnceleme Raporu [The Preliminary Report 
of Suicides on the Increase in Batman]  (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık, Aile Araştırma Kurumu Başkanlığı, 
Oct. 2000). 
244  Ibid., 14. 
245  Önder, “Batman’da Kadın İntiharları Kolay Açıklanamıyor [No Easy Explanation to Women’s 
Suicides in Batman],” 11. 
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as ‘other Batman’.246  Such slum areas formed by internal migrants are not specific to 
Batman but are widely seen in almost all the centers of the provinces in East and 
Southeastern Anatolia.  In addition to their disadvantage as poor women, these women 
are also in an inferior position given the male-dominant power relations in the region.  
Hence, this resultant rapid social change reveals itself in the gap between the outside 
world and the world of the interior.  At the same time, greater access to television, 
including all the national channels as well as the international ones, has made young 
girls aware of lifestyles and identities very different from their own.  This applies 
particularly to tabloid type TV programs.  With patrilineal pressure inside the home and 
images of a completely different reality outside the home, young girls find themselves in 
contradiction.  All these contrasting phenomena lead to even greater pressure on young 
girls who have a hard time matching the two realities. 
 
Psychiatrists analyzing the situation of the population of Southeastern Anatolia 
emphasize the importance of the change in world-views brought by ideological conflict 
in the region.  People in the region have been torn from their traditional ways of life on 
the one hand, but have not been fully supported by the replacing ideology, on the other.  
Hence, they find themselves in poorer living conditions in squatter neighborhoods, with 
no means of support.  They are unable to live the new emancipations they have been 
promised and thus find themselves in the midst of uncertainty.247 
 
                                                 
246  Batman’da Artma Eğilimi Gösteren İntihar Olaylarının Ön İnceleme Raporu [The Preliminary Report 
of Suicides on the Increase in Batman], 6. 
247  Önder, “Batman’da Kadın İntiharları Kolay Açıklanamıyor [No Easy Explanation to Women’s 
Suicides in Batman],” 11. 
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These women, their families and communities constitute the target group of the 22 
ÇATOMs established in the Southeast.  ÇATOMs, aiming at improving the social and 
economic status of women and eventually the community in the region, are confronted 
with such a population in rapid social change.  The profile of participants and the effects 
of ÇATOM activities on the status of participating young girls and women are evaluated 
in the current chapter. 
 
5.1.5.  Selection of ÇATOMs for Fieldwork 
 
In addition to practical reasons such as proximity to one another, the ÇATOMs that I 
studied for the purposes of the current research were selected based on three main 
criteria.  One was the years of operation of the ÇATOM, which would guarantee an 
observation of the settled impacts of the ÇATOM on the participants, their families, and 
the surrounding community.  A second criteria for the selection was the type of 
settlement in which the ÇATOMs are located.  Of the 7 ÇATOMs I have selected, one is 
situated in a village, 4 are situated in counties [ilçe in Turkish] and 2 in province centers 
[il merkezi in Turkish].  This was a representative spread of the 22 ÇATOMs that are 
operational in the region.  A final criteria was the diversity of the composition of the 
target group in each community. 
 
Uluköy ÇATOM is in a village setting in which the women still work outside as well as 
inside the house.  Given the decrease in the number of animals that are tended in this 
village of Kurtalan town of Siirt province, young girls and women still handle animal 
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husbandry as well as the gardening.  The village is also important as half the families in 
the village earn their money as village guards.248 
 
Of the 4 counties which I selected, Beytüşşebap, a county of Şırnak province, is the most 
isolated from surrounding settlements as it is covered by all sides with high rocky 
mountains.  The inhabitants say that Beytüşşebap was a village with all families from the 
same tribe.  The village then expanded to become a municipality and now it is a county 
of Şırnak.  The whole of Beytüşşebap is now made up of families from two kin tribes.  
Cizre, another county of Şırnak province, is in high contrast to Beytüşşebap as it is a 
vibrant city with its diverse local population.  Being close to the borders with Iraq and 
Syria, border trade in Cizre has made a number of families quite wealthy.  Due to the 
trade of diesel oil and other goods, which used to be more vibrant than it is today, Cizre 
has seen the emigration of a large number of families from other provinces over the 
years.  In the populated city, there are families of Arab origin as well as Kurds who have 
evacuated their villages, along with a small population of non-Muslims.  The most 
striking aspect of Cizre is its kara çarşaflı women, women wearing the black veil.  The 
women say that since the times of Prophet Noah,249 it is the tradition that women in 
Cizre wear the kara çarşaf.  In this sense, the women of Cizre presented one of the most 
interesting combinations in terms of veiled and conservative, but urban and 
economically well off women and young girls.  The target groups in the ÇATOMs of the 
                                                 
248  Village guards are armed villagers who are in charge of the protection of their villages against any 
possible attack by armed militia.  This system is brought by the Turkish security forces as a solution to the 
armed conflict in the region, in which a critical number of men in a strategically important village are 
given arms to defend themselves and their village. 
249  Prophet Noah’s tomb is found in Cizre.  While some legends talk about Mount Ararat [Ağrı dağı in 
Turkish] as the mountain in which Noah was suspended from the great flood, legends originating in Cizre 
believe that mountain to be the one of Mount Cudi. 
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two other counties, namely Şirvan and Kurtalan of Siirt province, were similar in that 
both were situated in communities that were witnessing waves of labor migration of 
male household members to the larger cities of Turkey.  The difference between the two 
was the more settled community of Şirvan ÇATOM as opposed to the migrant 
community of Kurtalan ÇATOM. 
 
The two province centers of Siirt and Batman revealed yet other aspects of women in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region.  The local population of Siirt is of Arab origin with some 
Kurds also living in the city.  With the internal displacement in the region, families and 
communities from the villages have formed migrant settlements in Siirt center.  A 
community referred to as the göçerler, or the Kurdish gypsy nomads form a distinct 
form of the portion of the population, distinguishable in their physical appearances and 
lifestyles.  It is in one of these mixed communities that Siirt ÇATOM is located.  
Batman, on the other hand, is a large and populated city which has attracted a fair 
number of families from the surrounding settlements given its resources of petroleum 
oil.  The armed conflict in the region has resulted in the additional migration of a large 
number of families into Batman center.  Batman ÇATOM is located in a neighborhood 
that is newly formed and is still receiving families migrating from the villages. 
 
In the field study undertaken in these ÇATOMs, my primary aim was an understanding 
of the realities of the women in the region.  I intended to find out the Southeastern 
Anatolian woman’s perception and awareness of her womanhood, her problems as a 
woman, and the solutions she offered to these problems.  In the second part of my field 
research, I investigated how the involvement of women and young girls in the ÇATOMs 
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had affected their lives; what they expected and what they found at the ÇATOM 
environment.  In all the ÇATOMs, it was striking to observe that despite the very little 
difference in education levels of all women, their exposure to the urban revealed critical 
differences among the same group of women. 
 
5.1.6.  Effects of Migration 
 
Migration has become an important factor determining the social and cultural 
development and change in the Southeastern Anatolia region.  Migration, both from 
village to town and from a city in the East to a city in the West, has led to the mélange of 
various dynamics in the region.  Experiences of migration differ for both men and 
women in the region.  Migration has led to changes in nutritional habits, the use of 
languages, household structures, status of women in the family and community, and so 
on.  Despite the unrelenting influence of religion and the traditional social relations in 
the region, exposures to the unknown world, through TV and access to traveling, has 
made young girls and women experience a wide variety of changes in Southeastern 
Anatolia.  The process of migration has affected rural women differently than urban 
women.  I observed, for instance, that gender awareness is prevalent only among the few 
women who have seen and lived in the western parts of the country, which are mainly 
women of urban origin.  It is these women who are also aware of a conception of the 
‘West’ and the ‘East’.   
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5.1.6.1.  Rural-Urban Interactions 
 
After the start of armed conflict in the Southeast, a large number of villagers in the 
region had to leave their settlements in search of safer places to live.  Talking with a 
group of women in a home gathering in Kurtalan, during a cold Ramazan night in the 
winter of 2000, I realized the isolation in which these families were living prior to the 
migration process.  Despite 7-8 years of arrival in the town of Kurtalan, I had the 
impression what most women were still living in the same isolation of their former 
villages.  In the village, women used to work in the fields and tend the animals while the 
men would take care of the marketing of produce in nearby towns or cities.  Even in the 
larger settlement of Kurtalan now, the women go into the marketplace only for specific 
events.  This is usually for an occasion such as the preparation for a wedding.  
Otherwise, the appearance of young girls and women in the public sphere is seen as 
inappropriate by the men in their families and communities. 
 
Because of the isolation of villages, none of the rural women except for the young girls 
were literate.  In most focus group meetings, elder women had no understanding of the 
Turkish language while the women in their 30s and 40s were able to understand but not 
respond in Turkish.  Although most young girls had an understanding of Turkish, they 
were sometimes reluctant to speak Turkish, as they felt insecure with the language.  
They preferred to speak Kurdish while a young girl who was fluent in both languages 
translated. 
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Although not the same situation in the ÇATOMs, in focus group meetings in homes 
where there were women and young girls from the same extended family, the eldest 
women were the most comfortable in their dealings with me.  Even though I wanted to 
keep the conversations informal in which everyone felt free and comfortable to speak 
out, I could sense the authority of the elder women in the family.  The younger women, 
especially the daughters-in-law, placed themselves in a secondary position after the 
mother-in-law, the mother, or the grandmother.  They would wait for the elders to speak 
first before they joined in the conversation.  The eldest women, indeed, would wait for 
this gesture of courtesy.  Similarly, during the translations, the young girl who was 
translating was precautious about giving the eldest the first word.  The daughters-in-law 
were uneasy about talking next to their mothers-in-law, while the young girls felt 
apprehensive about speaking out in the presence of their mothers.  This was an 
indication of a woman’s changing status with age within the family. 
 
While life in the city is easier in many aspects, it is also more difficult.  Women are 
conscious of the fact that they are nutritionally in a much poorer environment in the city.  
They declared that in the village they would always grow fresh fruits and vegetables in 
their gardens.  They had plenty of tomatoes, aubergines, and grapes in their vineyards, 
both for subsistence consumption and to sell in the marketplace.  They used to make 
their own cheese and yogurt from their own sheep and goats, while now they have no 
choice but to pay money for their subsistence food items.  Moreover, they complained 
about the bad quality of the produce they were obliged to buy.  Since their arrival in the 
city, they stated that this situation was getting worse by the year.  In the villages, the 
women had to “work like the men”.  Their workload was heavy as they spent their time 
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both inside the home and out in the field.  Although life in the village was harsh, they 
were happy about the fertility of the soil, abundance of the produce, better chances of 
nutrition, and the relative stability of income.  Women now have less work 
responsibilities in the city setting but most, especially the elder women, still prefer their 
life in the village.  The young girls, who do not even remember life in the village, are 
happy about the opportunities of city life.  Some girls do not want to give up the chance 
of schooling.  Despite the difficulties of seasonal cotton-picking work, these girls are 
happier about living in the city. 
 
Similar to the issue of nutrition, access to health facilities was also stated as a problem.  
Although women are now closer to heath facilities in the city, they complained of not 
having the financial means to go to the doctor.  In the village, the hospital was further 
away but at least at that time, they could sell their wheat, lentils, or barley to pay for 
their treatments in the city.  Now, they neither have their land nor their health.  
 
The migration process has forced a large number of the males in the family to further 
migrate to the western parts of the country.  With Istanbul being the main city of 
seasonal and temporary employment, other cities include Izmir, Mersin, Antalya, and 
some busy seaside resorts.  Hence, most homes in the migrant neighborhoods had at 
least one male in the family who was missing.  As was the case in the village, certain 
tasks are still carried out by the female household members.  For instance, in areas of 
water shortage such as Kurtalan and Uluköy, young girls spend most of their time in the 
collection of water from public fountains.  For the daily household consumption of 20-
30 jerry cans of water in Uluköy, the girls go to the fountain 3-4 times a day, each time 
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spending around 2 hours.  In addition to that, girls help their mothers with the chores 
around the house as well as take care of their siblings. 
 
In a focus group meeting in Siirt, of the 14 women of ages 20-42, 8 were of Arabic 
origin and 6 were Kurdish.  All the Arab Turks were urban and had no problems with 
the Turkish language, while some of the Kurdish women had recently migrated from the 
village.  The difference between the urban and rural women was very clear in this one 
focus group meeting.  The urban women were well dressed with their carefully pinned 
headscarves, while the rural women were still wearing their cotton daily headscarves.250  
The headscarf is a good indication of the level of urbanity, which in turn determines a 
woman’s standing and status with respect to her husband, community, and surroundings.  
Women who have seen the cities of the West, Istanbul and Ankara in particular, are 
conscientious about their physical appearances, namely their headscarves and overcoats.  
The effects of the fashion of Islamic dressing, as revealed mainly in Istanbul, on 
Southeastern women can easily be detected, which is especially the case for young 
veiled women.  These women, however, were extremely small in number, compared to 
the vast majority who had experienced very little positive change as a result of 
migration, either to cities of the East or the West. 
 
The rural women, on the other hand, were also distinct in their clothing.  But maybe 
what is more important is the introversion of rural women.  In general, I found it easy to 
sense among women the gap between the private and the public spheres.  This revealed 
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itself most evidently in the usage of language.  For Kurdish women and young girls who 
could speak only a bit of Turkish, speaking their mother tongue, which is the language 
of the ‘home’, was much simpler than speaking Turkish, which was the language of the 
‘outside’.  Furthermore, Kurdish women who had only very recently left their villages 
lived through even greater difficulties of expressing themselves, even if they were 
speaking in their mother tongue.  For these women, the meaning of the word ‘home’ was 
literal.  Even speaking at the ÇATOM was difficult for these women who were probably 
not very verbal even in their own homes.  Speaking in public, despite in a group of 
women, these women covered their mouths with their cotton headscarves, whereas the 
younger girls would turn their heads in another direction while speaking.  Urban Arab 
women, on the other extreme, were boisterously verbal, both in Turkish and Arabic. 
 
The urban women in the region were better able than rural women to compare 
themselves with the situation of women in the western part of Turkey.  Unlike the rural 
women who still live in isolation in the city despite the move from the village over a 
decade ago, urban women in Siirt, for instance, talked about the positive influences of 
their contacts with the wives of civil servants who were in Siirt on a temporary basis.  
When the wives of security personnel in the same apartment building called these local 
women over for tea or coffee, the women stated that they see and adopt the different 
ways of these ‘western’ women.  As one woman put it: “In this way we are confronted 
with different cultures.  Before it was only Kurd and Arab.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                
250  The white cotton headscarves that women in villages wear (referred to in Turkish as yemeni, yazma or 
tülbent) are now worn by urban covered women only under their non-cotton headscarves.  Urban veiled 
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It was only a few times that the dichotomy between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ was 
brought up by women in conversations.  In all cases, it was urban young women who 
had traveled to Istanbul or Ankara and who had some work experience that made the 
comparison.  Referring to the entire Southeastern Anatolia region, one urban woman 
explained: “The West does not want to see the East.  So much money is being spent, 
we’d like to see some of that money spent on the East.  Yes, there is the GAP project but 
more attention can be paid to the East.  Actually the East has slowly been changing, 
mainly with the help of the GAP project.  For instance, you are here now talking with us, 
which would have never happened before the GAP project.”  However, when the urban 
women talk about the ‘East’, they are in fact not tallking about a homogenous ‘East’.  
This is revealed later in their talks about the different ‘people’ in the region: 
 
The Arabs in the region have always looked down upon the Kurds, 
sometimes because of their accents and sometimes because of their 
physical appearances.  The Kurds who have migrated from their 
villages are all begging now in the city of Siirt.  Once you label them, 
you see them as all the same.  But we mustn’t have contempt for 
these people because in a way they have no other choice.  We all 
share the responsibility for these people.  The situation of the Arabs is 
much better.  They are rich from the family because they are the local 
inhabitants of Siirt.  There is some kind of a mixing with the Kurds 
who live in apartment flats but the Kurds who live in squatter 
neighborhoods are very far from us. (Siirt) 
 
As clearly seen above, urban women in the region are more in command of a particular 
terminology that the rural women are completely unfamiliar with.  Having migrated to 
the western parts of the country and seen the broader opportunities in these cities, these 
women are better situated to evaluate their positions in Southeastern Anatolia.  Their 
awareness of gender issues is also more heightened compared to their rural counterparts. 
                                                                                                                                                
women follow the fashion for Islamic dressing as they pin their headscarves in a variety of fancy ways. 
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5.1.6.2.  Awareness of Gender Relations in the Region 
 
I must admit that I was quite surprised with the level of unawareness of gender issues 
among most women in Southeastern Anatolia.  I realized that these women had never 
thought of themselves as ‘women’.  An identity based on sex is completely unfamiliar to 
the women, as is an identity based on the individual.  As women have always seen and 
known themselves as a member of the extended family and community, the question I 
posed about their womanhood almost always came back to me in the form of blank 
faces.  I could see that the women in front of me had no idea of what I was saying and 
asking.  It was at that first focus group meeting251 that I so severely realized the 
differences in their realities and terminologies.  A phrase that was so clear to me had no 
meaning whatsoever for these women. 
 
When asked about their problems as ‘women’, following a period of hesitation (because 
they were not quite clear as to what I was asking), some respondents emphasized their 
broken up families: “Our only problem is that our husbands are away for work.  We 
want them to come back home so we can be a whole family again.  We want the head of 
the family to be here with us because sometimes we get sick and need to go to the doctor 
or the hospital but we have no man to lead us.”  Following from this, most women had a 
hard time understanding my inquiries on their relationship with their husbands.  For 
instance, I wanted to understand what had changed in the relationship with their spouses 
                                                 
251  My first group meeting was in a home of migrant women in Kurtalan; a home that had still intact the 
strict social structure of the traditional household and the community. 
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as well as in their household structures after the migration process.  As they could not 
understand my question, I was unable to get a reply.  Their only timid response was that 
their husbands were not there with them.  Most others merely stated that nothing had 
changed.  Upon my insistent question of whether women and young girls could more 
freely access spaces outside the home now that the men in the family were away, I 
received only negative replies.  As I tried to make women speak about their general 
status within the family, the women explained to me the social control mechanisms of 
the family and community and the pressures exerted on female household members.  If 
anything, migration further restricted women’s presence in public.  Since they no longer 
have their fields to cultivate and animals to graze, they equally had no reason to leave 
the home environment. 
 
Women’s explanations of the practice of polygamy, for instance, was an indication of 
women’s inferior status within the family and the different dynamics that are present 
within the socio-cultural structure of the GAP region.  I was told by the women 
themselves that polygamy (çok eşlilik in Turkish or kuma getirmek in the more 
colloquial version) was a frequently occurring phenomenon in the region.  Despite the 
jealousies among spouses, a woman explained the peculiar situation of a friend of hers: 
“A friend of mine is unable to have children.  She went back to her village to find 
another woman to be her kuma.252  Now the other woman had a baby, and my friend 
takes such good care of both her kuma and the baby.  They get along very well.  If I was 
to have such a good relationship with my kuma, I wouldn’t mind having one.”  For 
women who are unable to conceive, another advantage of the kuma is cited as follows: 
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“A woman who is unable to have children thinks, if my husband dies tomorrow, all his 
money and his property will be shared among his family and his siblings.253  Instead, she 
chooses or agrees to marry her husband to another, fertile woman, so that the money 
stays with them after the man dies.  For this reason, the first wife treats the second one 
with care and affection.”  The young girls in Siirt, for instance, also confirmed the 
tradition of polygamy in the region, but this was stated to be more a custom of the Kurds 
rather than the Arabs. 
  
Although seen less frequently, another custom that one comes across in the region is 
marrying the woman with her husband’s brother after the husband dies.254  An anecdote 
from the community was recited: “They wanted to marry a widowed woman with the 
younger brother of her husband.  When the boy said he didn’t want his sister-in-law as 
his wife, the man’s family arranged the youngest brother who was away doing his 
military service.  He didn’t really want her either but the family convinced the boy by 
telling him they would buy him a car if he married his sister-in-law.” 
 
In conversations and focus groups with young girls, on the other hand, the experiences 
narrated were slightly different, but a continuation of the same strict patriarchal social 
structure.  I found out that, with a few exceptions, a large number of the girls in the 
                                                                                                                                                
252  Kuma is the name in Turkish given to the other wives that come into the family. 
253  First wives usually do not have official marriages.  Women who later become aware of the dangers of 
unofficial marriages attempt to find such solutions to their problems.  Moreover, there is the high 
possibility that incoming second or third wives who are young and attractive are aware of the advantages 
of official marriages. 
254  As there are no words in Turkish or Kurdish to denote this phenomenon, Yalçın-Heckmann labels this 
occurrence as ‘wife inheritance’, in Tribe and Kinship among the Kurds  (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
1991), 224. 
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region are merely literate with no school diplomas.  Some of these girls had learned to 
read and write at the ÇATOM.  As a result, most girls could speak Turkish although 
some were too shy to do so.  Some girls in Siirt, for instance, said it was their own 
decisions that they did not continue school, but almost all of them said they were 
regretful of this fact.  One girl admitted that even though her mother took her by the 
hand for school registration, she herself refused.  On the other hand, a large number of 
girls said that their parents would not allow them to study further if they wanted to do 
so.  But even if girls are not sent to school, boys are allowed to continue studying for as 
long as the family finances permit. 
 
The fact that daughters are not sent to school revealed itself as a problem during several 
conversations.  For girls who attend school, they are taken out of school either before or 
right after the completion of primary level education.255  Mothers noted that they would 
send their daughters to school to study further if they were given the decision.  Because 
the man is the final decision maker at home, it was not difficult to sense the mothers’ 
feelings of helplessness.  Decisions that will affect the entire family, such as the starting 
up of a new business, are taken solely by the men in the family and the female members 
are reminded to keep quite and not get involved.  One woman reminded me that in the 
region, “everything starts and ends with the man”.  A woman agreed by telling me that 
her husband would kill her if he knew she was there talking with me.  Another Kurdish 
woman stated that she could not give me her name without the permission of her 
husband.  In a focus group meeting with over a dozen women, the others made no 
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comments about her statement.  Another woman stated her hopelessness: “Even if we 
know it is wrong, custom is custom.  This is the way things have always worked around 
here.  There is nothing we can do about it.”  Local traditions also dictate the age of 
marriage of a young girl.  As a mother pointed out: “When a girl reaches 14-16 years of 
age, they say the girl has lost her chances of marriage (evde kalmış in Turkish), so we 
are obliged to marry them off at an early age.” 
 
For younger girls who are more aware of the situation and see the possibility of a light of 
change, some mothers are lenient towards their daughters while some others do not 
accept different attitudes by their daughters.  Even those mothers that are somewhat 
accepting of their daughters stress that certain things must still be done in good manners 
and within the norms of society: “in a well-mannered and submissive way [terbiyeli ve 
uslu bir şekilde in Turkish], without going against their families and future husbands.”  
Hence, when the fathers disagree to a daughter’s demands, the women convince their 
daughters to obey their fathers.  They stress once more that women have to endure all 
sorts of hardship because there is nothing else they can do but accept their situation.  
Women are afraid of divorce by their husbands, otherwise they would be “left alone with 
no resources to live on their own.” 
 
The main focus of conversation with the girls was the pressure exerted by the family as 
well as the surroundings.  They complained about the restrictions on clothing and 
meeting publicly with friends: “It is very difficult to be a young girl here because there 
                                                                                                                                                
255  When compulsory schooling was 5 years, girls noted that it was easier for them to receive at least 
primary school diplomas.  Now that compulsory education is increased to 8 years of schooling, girls 
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is tremendous pressure from the family, the relatives, the neighbors, everyone.  A young 
girl, especially if she has reached the age of marriage, can’t leave her home very easily.  
The decisions are taken mostly by the fathers, uncles (brothers of fathers), brothers and 
sometimes by the mothers.”  It is for this simple reason that many young girls are 
banned from coming to the ÇATOM. 
 
Young girls stated that the neighbors and relatives were usually influential in the 
decisions taken by the family: 
 
The neighbors say, ‘what use is sending your daughter to school; it 
wouldn’t do you any good anyway.’  They say that if the girl starts 
working, she will only be useful to her husband and her husband’s 
family; not to her own family back home.  The son is always esteemed 
and appreciated more than the daughter because when the son grows 
up, he will be looking after his family, whereas the daughter will get 
married and leave the home.  This is one of the reasons why they don’t 
let us go to school. (Şirvan) 
 
Sometimes the fathers can be more lenient and tolerant towards the girls, but it is, in 
fact, the brothers who act as the main guardians of a young girl’s chastity and the 
family’s honor.  As the brother reaches a certain age, the father hands his task over to his 
son(s).  Even if the brother is younger than the girl, he still has an authority over her.  
For instance brothers and fathers do not always allow their daughters, sisters and wives 
to wear pants.  Girls are sometimes not allowed to speak even with their female friends.  
In a situation like this, receiving the greeting of a male friend becomes unimaginable.  
The notion of chastity is so peculiar in most urban settings of the Southeast that it is 
forbidden for a woman to even be seen out in her balcony.  The girls think that, despite 
                                                                                                                                                
mentioned the unfortunate situation of the difficulty of receiving a diploma. 
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the effect of unemployment and low levels of education on gossip within the 
community, customs and traditions are another factor that keep women and young girls 
under such strict social control.  Education is seen as the best possibility for change, 
however, the distance and discretion of families towards other cultures makes change in 
the region tremendously difficult to arise.  
 
I could clearly observe that the urban girls voiced greater freedom and comfort at home 
compared to girls of families recently migrated from the villages.  Girls are mostly 
married off at an early age and marriages are mostly arranged by the family, but the 
urban girls noted that if they do not consent, they are usually taken seriously by their 
parents.  Although to a limited level, parents allow communication between recently 
engaged couples.  The telephone is the most widely used means of communication 
between lovers and engaged couples.  There are even young girls who make marriages 
based on love.  Different opinions were given on arranged marriages between relatives.  
Most young girls are still being married to direct kin, mostly the children of aunts and 
uncles.  In one focus group meeting, girls engaged to relatives noted that this did not 
matter as they were both in love with their arranged partners.  On the other hand, there 
was a high level of awareness concerning the dangers of marriage between close kin and 
a large number of girls said they knew that this was wrong.  They added that a boy from 
outside the extended family tends to treat the girl much better than a boy from inside the 
family.  They recited such cases in which the girls were further exploited by their 
husbands upon support from their relatives.  Despite the fact that girls are now less 
willing to make marriages with close relative boys, all the girls agreed that the will of 
the boy to marry a girl from outside the family was more effective than the girl’s wish to 
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do so.  Girls who are forced to get married against their will sometimes run away from 
their own home to the home of the boy they love.  There was one case of a girl 
committing suicide because her family wanted her to marry a boy whom she did not 
want. 
 
When asked about their opinion on the ideal age for marriage, except for a few girls who 
said 15-16, most girls agreed on 18-19 years of age.  Speaking to the young girls about 
having children made them shy at first.  Except for one girl who said she did not want 
any children, and a few that said 1-2 children, a majority declared they would like to 
have as many as their post-marital finances allow.  When women, on the other hand, 
were asked about the number of children they would have chosen to bear were they 
given the decision, most stated that they were happy with the number of children they 
currently had.  Even a woman with 11 children said she would still want 11 children.  
Given the culture of compliance, obedience and gratitude to God, women had 
difficulties imagining their lives otherwise.  They felt that wishing for things to have 
been differently was a sign of complaint against God’s will, which made most women 
uneasy.  They readily and faithfully accepted their fate as ‘written’ by God.  The number 
of children considered as ‘normal’, however, was given as 4-5. 
 
5.1.6.3.  Health Issues in the Region 
 
Contraception is rarely used in most regions of Southeastern Anatolia.  While some 
methods, such as spirals, are not allowed by husbands, others are not used either because 
they are found too expensive or because they are regarded as ‘sinful’.  Some women do 
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not even go to the gynecologist for the same reasons.  Even though some women know 
beforehand that their children will be born handicapped, they do not allow for medical 
interference on the basis that God will take care of them (Allah rıskını verir in Turkish).  
Mothers and mother-in-laws influence their daughters and daughter-in-laws to give birth 
to a large number of children, using the same line of thinking.  After weeks of sessions 
on mother-child health care training, an instructor nurse at the ÇATOM (who has one 
child herself) described the discouragement she felt upon hearing this comment from 
one of her regular participants: “Does she think she is a woman, with one child?  Let’s 
see her bear 10 children.”  This is an indication that womanhood in the region is 
measured by the number of children a woman bears.  The nurse was especially 
disappointed when she saw that the comment was made by a fairly young woman.  This 
same attitude was conveyed by a number of women themselves in focus group meetings.  
The comments made by women included such statements as these: “We bear a lot of 
children but there is a huge difference between a woman who bears 5 sons and a woman 
who bears 5 daughters.  When the baby is a boy, they say ‘may God keep away the evil 
eye’ [maaşallah in Turkish], but when it is a girl, they say nothing.”  The nurse stated 
that she realized the difficulties of such reproductive health care training in the region 
without an accompanying change in mentalities and world visions.  The mentality of 
women in the region is peculiar with respect to other issues as well.  There are some 
women, for instance, who believe that the money a woman earns is sinful.   
 
The women in the region resort to archaic modes of treatment for their health problems.  
Unhealthy and dangerous means of miscarriage are being used.  When unprotected 
women become pregnant against their husband’s will, they try different techniques at 
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home to give themselves a miscarriage.  A local general practitioner in Cizre stated that 
she has periodic patients who come to her with their miscarriaged babies still inside 
them.  Some women are even unaware of the situation until their bleeding doesn’t stop 
and they come to the local health center for a check-up.  Very unpleasant and disturbing 
stories about women’s health situation were told by some local practitioners in the 
region. 
 
5.2.  Profile of ÇATOM Participants 
 
Given the present situation of Southeastern Anatolian women, ÇATOMs aim to raise 
awareness among women in the region on gender issues and help them ameliorate their 
status as women in the community.  In order to get an understanding of the activities of 
ÇATOMs and the profile of women that they serve, I prepared a questionnaire to be 
distributed to the participants of 5 ÇATOMs.  This, I believed, would give me a fairly 
good idea about the profile of ÇATOM participants and their satisfaction concerning 
ÇATOM activities. 
 
In order to cover a range of different settings and participant profiles, I decided to 
undertake the survey in a total of 5 ÇATOMs; two in the city center, two in the county 
center, and one in a village: 
 
• Beytüşşebap ÇATOM 
• Batman ÇATOM 
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• Cizre ÇATOM 
• Siirt ÇATOM 
• Uluköy ÇATOM 
 
I was careful to select ÇATOMs that had been functional for approximately the same 
time period.  For the group that I selected, ÇATOMs had been operational for about 3 
years.  This created harmony in terms of the internal dynamics of the ÇATOM 
management as well as in the relations of the ÇATOM with local public authorities.  
Participants had been attending ÇATOM activities for a variety of durations but this 
evened out upon the inclusion of a wide range of participants.  In addition to the 
responses given to the questionnaire, the survey helped me in the initiation of topics not 
covered by the quetionnaire.  Responses given to the questionnaire were further 
elaborated through focus group meetings, one-on-one conversations and in-depth 
interviews. 
 
The survey was carried out among a total of 186 ÇATOM participants. 
 
5.2.1.  Age of Participants 
 
ÇATOM Min. age Max. age Mean Median* 
Beytüşşebap 11 37 20.4 20 
Batman 12 35 17.5 17 
Cizre 11 38 17.7 16 
Siirt 14 37 17.9 17 
Uluköy 11 17 14.2 14 
Total 11 38 18.5 17 
*  The median, as another measure of central tendency, is the value for which 50% of the observations, 
when arranged in order of magnitude, lie on each side.  Since the median gives clues about the 
dissymmetry of the range of data, it is considered to be a more informative value than the mean. 
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The age of ÇATOM participants ranges from a minimum age of 11 to a maximum age 
of 38.  Average age of participants is 18.5 and the median is 17, with 95% between the 
ages 13 and 24.  The largest age range of participants was in Cizre, where I observed 
women with children attending activities at the ÇATOM.  This was caused in large part 
to the better income levels of families in Cizre.  Uluköy ÇATOM participants, on the 
other hand, were the group with the lowest average age among participants.  The 
youngest participant in Uluköy was 11 and the oldest was 17.  This was an indication 
that urbanized women are more integrated into the ÇATOM environment compared to 
rural women. 
 
Given the target group of young girls and women of ages 14-50, the statistics above 
indicate an inadequacy on the part of ÇATOMs in reaching the intended range of 
women.  Succeeding meetings and interviews with ÇATOM participants revealed some 
of the reasons behind the low age levels of participants.  The assessments, detailed in 
chapter VIII, evaluate the effects of participant ages on women’s organization and 
community mobilization. 
 
5.2.2.  Education Levels 
 
Education levels of participants (%) ÇATOM 
Illiterate 
(0) 
Literate but 
no diploma 
(1) 
Primary 
school 
(2) 
Secondary 
school 
(3) 
High 
school 
(4) 
 
Median 
of scale 
(0 – 4) 
Beytüşşebap 10.4 20.8 31.2 13.0 24.7 2 
Batman 14.3 14.3 57.1 9.5 4.8 2 
Cizre 21.1 23.7 47.4 7.9 - 2 
Siirt 20.7 20.7 41.4 13.8 3.4 2 
Uluköy 4.8 85.7 9.5 - - 1 
Total 14.0 28.0 36.6 10.2 11.3 2 
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Of the 186 ÇATOM participants that were surveyed, 14% were illiterate women, 28% 
were literate but had been unable to complete primary education, 37% were primary 
school graduates (completed the first five years), 10% were secondary school graduates, 
and 11% were high school graduates.  Interestingly the highest illiteracy rate was in 
Cizre with 21% of the participants, indicating the immense confinement of women and 
young girls to the home environment, despite the relatively better income levels of 
families in the county.  The black veil worn by most women and young girls in Cizre 
was an illustration of the strong religious beliefs and traditions, along with the high level 
of communal activities conducted by religious brotherhoods [tarikat in Turkish].  
Hizbullah,256 for instance, was discreetly stated as having a strong impact on the beliefs 
and practices of most families in Cizre.257  Finally, the fact that one fourth of ÇATOM 
participants in Beytüşşebap are high school graduates is either the result of the peculiar 
composition of the local population or that the ÇATOM is unable to reach the intended 
target group of the most disadvantaged women and young girls.258 
 
 
 
                                                 
256  Hizbullah literally means Army of God.  As indicated by the name, this strictly orthodox Islamic 
brotherhood has a militant arm. 
257  Upon my inquiry as to why there was no female presence in a local restaurant in Cizre, the restaurant 
owner explained to me that even though families were relatively well off, women were never taken out of 
the home, even for purposes of eating out with the family.  The monopoly of the public sphere was still 
strongly in the possession of men.  The restaurant owner went on to explain the sex industry in Iraq for 
truck drivers who would sometimes return home with Iraqi women as second or third wives. 
258  The governor of Beytüşşebap, however, did mention the high rates of school attendance in 
Beytüşşebap compared to the surrounding counties.  Beytüşşebap derives its name from a Northern Iraqi 
tribe from which a small group within a sub-tribe separated, left their tribal lands, and settled in the 
location of present Beytüşşebap, upon their desire to no longer abide by the rules of the main tribe in 
question. 
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5.2.3.  Economic Status of Family of Participants 
 
Status of income of family of participant (%) ÇATOM 
a b c d e f g h 
Beytüşşebap 2.6 20.8 28.6 11.7 - 10.4 11.7 14.3 
Batman 15.8 26.3 15.8 - - 15.8 5.3 21.1 
Cizre 28.9 31.6 5.3 - - 5.3 13.2 15.8 
Siirt 6.9 44.8 13.8 - - 13.8 6.9 13.8 
Uluköy 15.0 30.0 10.0 25.0 20.0 - - - 
Total 11.5 28.4 18.0 7.7 2.2 9.3 9.3 13.7 
 
The codes used in the table above are as follows: 
 
Code Explanation 
a No job 
b Daily, monthly or seasonal work (such as construction worker) 
c Civil servant (such as teacher or municipal civil servant) 
d Village guard 
e Farmer 
f Retired (with pension) 
g Own business (such as a small market) 
h Minimum wage (such as night guard) 
 
 
Among the ÇATOM participants, there are young girls and women who come from a 
variety of backgrounds in terms of economic status.  It is only in villages like Uluköy 
that we found participants whose families were involved in agricultural activities.  
Otherwise, the families of 28% of participants have instable sources of income such as 
daily, monthly or seasonal temporary work.  18% of the participants noted that there was 
a civil servant in the family and 9% of the families were receiving retirement pensions.  
14% of the participants are from families who earn a minimum wage.  9% of the 
responses indicated incomes from own business, while a further 12% stated that there 
were no male members working in the family. 
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5.2.4.  Migration Status 
 
Migration status among participants (%)  ÇATOM 
Not migrated in 
the last 10 years 
Migrated from 
the village 
Migrated from 
another city 
Beytüşşebap 87.0 6.5 6.5 
Batman 90.5 4.8 4.8 
Cizre 71.1 10.5 18.4 
Siirt 86.2 10.3 3.4 
Uluköy 85.7 14.3 - 
Total 83.9 8.6 7.5 
 
Of the young girls and women who attend the activities of the ÇATOM, the families of 
9% have recently migrated from the village.  Another 8% have migrated from one city to 
another, either from a city in the West back to the Southeast or from one city to another 
within the same region, with Cizre indicating highest numbers.  The families of the rest 
of the ÇATOM participants, making up a high majority, have either never migrated or 
have lived through the migration process over a decade ago. 
 
5.2.5.  Attendance in ÇATOM Activities 
 
ÇATOM activities attended by participants (%) ÇATOM 
Literacy Health 
education 
Income 
Generation 
Home 
economics 
Beytüşşebap 7.8 79.2 98.7 6.5 
Batman 28.6 57.1 100.0 19.0 
Cizre 31.6 89.5 89.5 78.9 
Siirt 17.2 93.1 100.0 55.2 
Uluköy 33.3 57.1 95.2 - 
Total 19.4 78.5 96.8 29.6 
 
Of all participants, 19% have become literate as a result of coming to the ÇATOM.  
Literacy courses are the most popular among young girls at the village level.  Since a 
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large number of men are out of town, some completing their mandatory military service 
and some working in another city, the women keep in touch with their husbands, fathers, 
brothers, and sons through the telephone.  But they are also eager to learn how to read 
and write so that they can write to their loved ones who are abroad.  Beytüşşebap, with 
the highest average education level of participants, naturally has the lowest rate of 
attendance in literacy courses at the ÇATOM. 
 
Of all courses at the ÇATOM, handicrafts and other income generation courses are the 
most popular.  The fact that family incomes are low in the region is one reason that 
young girls are interested in learning a skill which they might be able to use later on, if 
and when job opportunities become possible.  Young girls want training courses opened 
according to their skills and interests.  Given the recent economic hardships, families are 
now more flexible about allowing their daughters to attend income generation courses.  
However, one other factor influential in the popularity of handicrafts courses, given 
under income generation, is that most single young girls are only interested in preparing 
their truceau [çeyiz in Turkish] for use after marriage.  Other than that, a small number 
of young girls have interest in income generation.  And that is so mostly upon the wishes 
of their parents for them to attend such courses as kilim weaving.  With 97%, handicrafts 
and other courses on skills for income generation have the highest attendance rate 
among all courses at the ÇATOM.  
 
Health education sessions are also a success among ÇATOM participants.  These 
sessions are particularly popular as the young girls and women have the chance to select 
the health topics that they want to be informed about.  Participatory education sessions 
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draw a large number of attendees to these courses.  However, some ÇATOMs have 
problems in arranging their health sessions on a consistent basis, due to the inadequacies 
in public health personnel at the town or provincial level.  Other than that, as sessions 
take place on a continuous basis, 79% of ÇATOM participants take part in health 
education.  Among topics that receive the highest interest among participants, especially 
young girls, are issues of contraception and health concerns during and after pregnancy. 
 
Home economics courses are given only upon the availability of personnel.  In these 
courses participants learn how to preserve food, increase the nutritional value of meals, 
prepare healthy dishes, and anything else of interest to them.  The instructors for the 
courses also makes a difference in the attendance rates of certain courses.  This became 
very clear in Cizre, for instance, where literacy and home economics courses were given 
by two volunteer instructors, one was the wife of a police officer and the other was the 
wife of a military personnel.259  The volunteer instructors had initially started coming to 
the ÇATOM just to pass time, but as they enjoyed the friendly atmosphere of the 
ÇATOM, the enthusiasm of the girls, and the flexibility of activities, they decided to 
stay on.  The young girls in Cizre paid particular attention to these instructors, as they 
were women who had seen the larger cities of Istanbul and Ankara, and who were 
familiar with a completely different culture than their own.  Compared to themselves, 
these women, who were more independent, empowered, relatively freer in their choices, 
took good care of themselves, and lived a life of aspiration, were almost mysterious to 
the young girls of Cizre.  Spending time with these western women, sharing their 
                                                 
259  The peculiar effects of these volunteer instructors are elaborated in chapter VIII. 
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experiences, and learning from them made the young girls in Cizre more excited about 
some activities more than others. 
 
5.3.  Effects of the ÇATOM 
 
5.3.1.  Effects on the Participants 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on the participant (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - - 1.3 55.8 42.9 4 
Batman - - - 47.6 52.4 5 
Cizre - - - 15.8 84.2 5 
Siirt - - - 48.3 51.7 5 
Uluköy - - 4.8 47.6 47.6 4 
Total - - 1.1 44.6 54.3 5 
 
On the question of the overall effect of the ÇATOM, 99% of the participants declared 
that attending activities at the ÇATOM had a positive influence on them, while 54% 
noted this effect to be very high in terms of personal development.  The positive effects 
felt by the young girls and women result mainly from an agreement between what the 
participants expect from the ÇATOM and what is offered.  If the ÇATOM leader and the 
instructors are good in bringing out the demands at the local level and are responsive to 
the needs of the young girls and women that come to the ÇATOM, they are generally 
also better at keeping attendance and satisfaction levels high.  Failure in keeping this 
close contact between the management level of the ÇATOM and the participants results 
in lower levels of satisfaction among participants.  Hence, a crucial factor that 
determines personal satisfaction is the mutual contact between participants and 
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instructors, support personnel, and the ÇATOM field worker.  This accounts for the 5% 
of participants in Uluköy who declared that the ÇATOM had no effect on their personal 
development. 
 
Another factor affecting the results of the current question was the educational level and 
expectation of participants prior to their attendance in ÇATOM activities.  This was 
striking in the case of Cizre in which 84% of participants noted the very positive effects 
of the ÇATOM, while high education levels in Beytüşşebap resulted in more moderate 
responses.  In Cizre, where uneducated and veiled young girls and women have no 
access to the means of personal expression and development, ÇATOMs are an 
indispensable opportunity. 
 
In addition to the many different skills and practical knowledge that they gain at the 
ÇATOM, the participants are very happy about spending time outside the home in the 
friendly atmosphere they find at the ÇATOM.  This is especially important as girls have 
hardly any other occasion to leave their home environment.  They are satisfied with the 
interactions among each other, their instructors, and the ÇATOM field worker.  The 
attention they receive makes them feel important, particularly when their opinions are 
asked for and they get the chance to participate in the decisions taken at the ÇATOM.  
Becoming a member of the ÇATOM committee, young girls are able to assist in the 
decision making, planning, and implementation of ÇATOM activities.  This, in turn, 
helps plant the seeds of personal initiative and mobilization, a quality that needs to be 
urgently developed in the region. 
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Enthusiasm about the ÇATOM was described by one young participant as follows: 
 
We learn from the ÇATOM things we didn’t know before.  The 
instructors are very nice to us.  We enjoy the health education sessions.  
With the money we make from the kilims, we buy ourselves clothes 
and çeyiz, and other things.  Our parents like it that we are no longer a 
burden on them.  We learn different recipes at the ÇATOM.  We 
learned love, respect, and how to greet others properly.  We have 
changed completely.  I love even the name of the ÇATOM. (Uluköy) 
 
Some participants are so attached to the ÇATOM that they have managed to continue 
despite all the difficulties confronted: 
 
We are 6 siblings.  I am 22 years old and a secondary school graduate.  
I continued the handicrafts courses at the ÇATOM for 2 years.  I have 
learned a lot there and it makes me feel so good, I feel that my status in 
society has changed.  Because I am more motivated than the other girls 
at the ÇATOM, I was elected member of the ÇATOM committee, and I 
started taking an active role within the committee.  To meet my own 
needs and the needs of other girls at the ÇATOM, I would frequently go 
to the bazaar.  Slowly my relatives and some acquaintances started 
feeling uncomfortable about this.  These people complained to my 
uncle’s (brother of father) son about me.  He came home one night and 
beat me in front of everyone at home.  He forbade me to go to the 
ÇATOM.  But because I was a member of the committee and I knew 
my responsibilities towards my friends, I secretly continued going to 
the ÇATOM.  For a while, because our house was very close to the 
ÇATOM, I continued classes from my window to the window of the 
ÇATOM.  I did not give in.  I bought a sewing machine, I cut models 
from books and stitch almost everything.  Wherever I am stuck, I go to 
the ÇATOM and get help from my instructors.  My mother does not 
want me to disobey my uncle’s son.  She keeps repeating that I have to 
comply with their rules, and wants me to do house work all day long.  
But they can’t stop me.  I just need time.  Maybe I can become a 
teacher at the ÇATOM.  Then I can get rid of the stress and pressure at 
home. (Beytüşşebap) 
 
In addition to the intended impacts of the project, a participatory method of assessment 
revealed other benefits of the project that were not foreseen.  Young girls in the region 
are under immense pressure from the family, mainly the father and the elder brothers.  
Lack of educational and other opportunities, along with restricted mobility create 
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additional stress for the young girls and women in the region.  Talking with the 
participants about the ÇATOM environment unraveled the importance of the center in 
the psychological healing of young girls and women.  Young girls who come to the 
center admit that one of the most crucial aspects of the ÇATOM is its friendly and cozy 
atmosphere, a place where women and young girls can talk about their problems, share 
their experiences, and thus partially alleviate stress.  For some of them, coming to the 
center to learn how to weave a kilim or how to stitch a skirt is only an excuse to escape 
the depressing home environment.  Hence, psychological healing becomes an essential 
outcome of the ÇATOM project, an outcome that was initially not planned or intended: 
 
After I started coming to the ÇATOM, I went on trips with my friends 
at the ÇATOM.  I had never left Beytüşşebap before.  The house used 
to be like a prison for me.  I learned nice things after coming to the 
ÇATOM.  I have a skill now, but even if I don’t do anything at the 
ÇATOM, I let off some of my stress here.  I find people here that I can 
talk to about my problems.  We share wonderful things here with the 
instructors that we don’t share at home.  For example we celebrated my 
last birthday here at the ÇATOM.  It was great. (Beytüşşebap) 
 
The positive effects of the ÇATOM are also felt by mother participants: 
 
I am 35 years old and my daughter is 15 years old.  My daughter and I, 
we both come to the ÇATOM.  My daughter has been coming for 1.5 
years but I started only this year.  I have 4 children and I come to the 
literacy course.  I have also improved my stitching skills here.  I earn 5-
10 million for each piece that I stitch and thus keep the family going, 
because my husband is unemployed.  The ÇATOM is like our family.  
My daughter is trying to get her secondary school diploma here at the 
ÇATOM.  Ever since I started coming to the ÇATOM, I have better 
relations with my children.  I listen to the problems of my daughter.  I 
don’t like sitting alone at home.  The ÇATOM environment attracts me.  
I love it here. (Batman) 
 
Apart from the participants themselves, the mothers have also made comments on the 
positive effects of the ÇATOM on their daughters: 
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We recently migrated to Beytüşşebap from the village.  There are 7 
children at home.  One of my daughters is deaf.  It is very important for 
me that my daughter is happy and that she does not feel inferior next to 
other girls.  The ÇATOM has helped her achieve this.  At the ÇATOM 
she has made lots of friends.  She is happy and better now when she 
comes back home.  This makes me very happy as well.  She knows 
what is going on around her.  She has also started being useful inside 
the house since she started going to the ÇATOM.  She has changed a 
lot.  She speaks to people now, she matured, and she has become more 
tidy.  We have money problems but because the girl likes it so much, 
we try to send her to the ÇATOM as long as finances permit. 
(Beytüşşebap) 
 
5.3.2.  Effects on the Family of the Participant 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on the family (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - - 19.5 62.3 18.2 4 
Batman - - 14.3 47.6 38.1 4 
Cizre - - - 47.4 52.6 5 
Siirt - 3.4 17.2 51.7 27.6 4 
Uluköy - - - 38.1 61.9 5 
Total - 0.5 12.4 53.2 33.9 4 
 
13% of the participants have noted that the ÇATOM either has no effect or a bad effect 
on their families.  The remaining 87% declared that their own participation in ÇATOM 
activities and courses has a positive effect on their families.  This is crucial in terms of 
the broader impact of the ÇATOMs, as most participants then carry the knowledge 
gained at the ÇATOM into their home environment.  A good example is provided by the 
health sessions.  Young girls and some women that come to the family planning and 
health education sessions at the ÇATOM feel content about having learned the various 
methods of contraception in addition to other practical knowledge they can use in their 
homes.  In most ÇATOMs, however, this education is mostly attended by young girls of 
pre-marital age.  Mothers are usually unable to attend these sessions as they are busy 
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with the children and the house chores.  Some ÇATOM instructors have found a solution 
to educating those women who are unable to attend the courses during the daytime.  For 
these women, educational sessions are undertaken during the night time when a few 
women are able to get together in a house. 
 
Another way of reaching these women is through the indirect flow of knowledge from 
the participants to their family environments.  Although participants do not always make 
direct use of the knowledge they gain at the ÇATOM, they transfer it to family members 
in the household.  For instance, the young girls educate their sisters, sisters-in-law, their 
mothers and other relative women on issues of health.  For women in the region who are 
timid about consulting medical staff, especially male staff, receiving essential health 
knowledge through their daughters becomes highly critical.  As young girls are lectured 
on the importance of health facilities where appropriate, girls are also influential in 
convincing family members to make more frequent use of the health services, including 
the use of mid-wives at child birth.  If I were to retrieve data merely on the results of this 
education inside the ÇATOMs, I would not have been able to realize the potential of the 
ÇATOMs.  Using the participatory approach of attending the night sessions inside the 
homes, talking to young girls, their mothers, other community members, and the 
instructors, I was able to see the holistic picture of the process of health care education 
and its subsequent effects on the young girls and the women in their respective families. 
 
The transfer of knowledge was explained by a young participant: 
 
Whatever I learn at the ÇATOM, I go and tell everyone at home.  
Although my mother sometimes gets embarrassed about the things I 
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say, everyone is interested.  The neighbors want me to keep on talking 
and they like what I tell them.  For example, we learned about child 
care, I told my sister-in-law [yenge in Turkish] all about it.  We also 
learned about family planning.  I told my mother about it, and after she 
listened to me, she went to the health center to have her ovaries tied. 
(Siirt) 
 
Other effects on the family and friends was explained by one girl as follows: 
 
I come to the ÇATOM to learn new things for my çeyiz and I help my 
family by doing this.  This makes my parents very happy.  Also, when I 
learn something different and new, I make my friends and relatives 
presents from what I have learned at the ÇATOM.  We make 
decorations for the house.  Everyone likes them.  I sometimes teach 
what I have learned to friends and relatives.  I like teaching others.  For 
example, I taught macramé to a friend who was not allowed to come to 
the ÇATOM. (Batman) 
 
5.3.3.  Effects on the Community 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on the community (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - - 22.7 44.0 33.3 4 
Batman - - 23.8 23.8 52.4 5 
Cizre - - 2.7 35.1 62.2 5 
Siirt - - 20.7 69.0 10.3 4 
Uluköy - - 5.0 70.0 25.0 4 
Total - - 16.5 46.7 36.8 4 
 
The participants have noted that on average, the effects of the ÇATOM on the 
community are the same as the effects on their families.  A woman explained the 
changes: 
 
I come to the ÇATOM together with my daughter.  She learns 
embroidery and I learn how to read and write.  I am very happy with the 
ÇATOM.  I learned a lot about family planning, and told the other 
women and my neighbors about what I learned.  They were all very 
happy with this information.  The effects are felt in the neighborhood.  
My relatives and neighbors ask me; they want to learn.  In the 
beginning, women used to forbid their daughters to go to the ÇATOM 
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but now they allow it.  There are actually a large number of girls who 
want to attend on a regular basis but their homes are far away and they 
can’t always come because of other work in the house.  Unfortunately 
women don’t come to the ÇATOM; they say ‘it is past us now’ and 
instead send the younger ones at home to the ÇATOM. (Batman) 
 
The primary school director of a school building close to a ÇATOM declared that the 
fathers in the region leave their homes early in the morning and return late at night.  
They pay no attention to their daughters.  For this reason, he stressed that the ÇATOM is 
essential in the neighborhood.  The fathers’ responses on the effects of the ÇATOM on 
the community were as follows: 
 
We don’t know the GAP or the ÇATOM.  ÇATOM responsibles had 
previously come to my house to speak with my daughter.  I believe they 
offer stitching and embroidery courses.  I wouldn’t care if my daughter 
wanted to attend such courses.  But the ÇATOM has no effect on the 
community.  It also doesn’t do anything for the neighborhood.  The 
ÇATOM can’t make itself heard.  More activities can be implemented, 
for example, in the garden of the ÇATOM; trees can be planted, the 
animals can be prevented from entering the garden.  When the governor 
came to visit the ÇATOM, I went especially to talk to him and asked 
him that maybe the activities of the ÇATOM can be multiplied.  He 
said okay but nothing ever happened. (Siirt) 
 
It is interesting to note that the comments made above were about the perception of 
ÇATOMs in the community, rather than a mutual relationship between the two.  Instead 
of the effects of the ÇATOM on changes in the community such as grassroots 
organizing and local mobilization, comments were made about the community’s 
perception of the ÇATOM and its activities. 
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5.3.4.  Changes in Attitudes of Families towards Participants 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on attitudes of families (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - 6.6 21.1 46.1 26.3 4 
Batman - - 19.0 28.6 52.4 5 
Cizre - - - 26.3 73.7 5 
Siirt - 3.4 44.8 31.0 20.7 4 
Uluköy - - 19.0 52.4 28.6 4 
Total - 3.2 20.0 38.4 38.4 4 
 
I decided to pose a question to the participants on the changes in the attitudes of their 
families in order to find out whether any of the girls and women had lived through 
changes to an extent that this would be noticed by their families.  This, I believed, would 
give me clues as to whether some challenges on issues of gender were in fact taking 
place.  Of all the replies given to all the questions posed in the survey, this question 
received the highest replies on the bad affects of the ÇATOM.  Although this percentage 
is small with 3% on average for all ÇATOMs, this is nevertheless an indication that 
some challenges are taking place.  20 out of 100 families are indifferent about their 
daughters coming to the ÇATOM, while 77% of the families are happy about seeing a 
daughter, sister, or wife attend activities at the ÇATOM.  Two young participants, one in 
Cizre and the other in Batman, explained the changes: 
 
Before coming to the ÇATOM, I would never speak with my mother.  
Since I started coming, we are more like friends.  I tell her everything 
now.  My parents become happy when they see what I am capable of 
doing.  My younger sister has started taking me as an example.  She 
wants to come to the ÇATOM as well but there are lots of things that 
need to be done inside the house.  She stays to help my mother.  My 
father also treats me nicely now.  He lets me do some things which he 
didn’t before.  He tells me that if we were in Istanbul, he would take me 
to watch football matches.  Sometimes we discuss football.  My family 
has started trusting me now. (Cizre) 
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In the beginning my parents would not let me come to the ÇATOM.  
But then they saw how I changed; how I became attached to life.  And 
after seeing the cozy atmosphere of the ÇATOM, they now support me 
in coming here.  Before they would never let me go outside the house.  
Now I am more free.  When someone in the family needs to be taken to 
the hospital, I take them.  I take care of problems at home.  Now my 
family really trusts me. (Batman) 
 
In addition to the trust gained in the family, some participants explained that their 
families started respecting them when they were able to earn some money after attending 
the activities of the ÇATOM: 
 
In tailoring, I earn 3 million per skirt, 2 million per shirt, and 6 million 
for every suit that I stitch.  The person who gives the order brings me 
the cloth of her choice.  I get orders mostly from civil servants in Cizre 
and my neighbors.  I give a large portion of the money I earn to my 
family.  With the rest, I buy food.  Sometimes with a bit of the money I 
buy myself some clothes and sometimes I save it.  Some of my friends 
buy golden earrings or necklaces for investment.  Since I came to the 
ÇATOM, I have not been receiving any money from my parents; 
instead I earn my own money with the orders I get.  Sometimes I am 
even able to give small allowances to my younger siblings.  My family 
has started respecting me because of this. (Cizre) 
 
However, I realized that the age of the participant was directly influential in the attitudes 
of the parents towards their daughters, rendering ÇATOM attendance and earning 
money irrelevant: 
 
My parents would not let me come to the ÇATOM in the beginning.  I 
would run away from home to learn how to weave a kilim at the 
ÇATOM.  Now my family does not say anything about me coming 
here.  I have even started earning money, but there is no change in the 
family.  My parents still find me too young and don’t include me in any 
of the decisions taken at home. (Uluköy) 
 
The setting (rural in the case above) and the perceived needs within the family are also 
effective in attitudes towards daughters that attend ÇATOM activities.  Although some 
girls earn money through the ÇATOMs, their families have sometimes displayed 
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uneasiness about this, while others have had to accept this fact given the family’s urgent 
need for extra revenue.  Hence, financial problems have become important factors 
leading to the acceptance, albeit sometimes reluctant, of young girls gaining skills and 
earning money.  This, in turn, has helped in the young girl’s exposure to the domain of 
the public. 
 
My daughter attends the income generation courses and I want her to 
get a diploma.  If she gets a diploma, she might later have the chance to 
become an embroidery teacher.  Then she can stand on her own feet.  
Her father does not allow it, but I let her go.  But my daughter leaves in 
the morning and she does not come back until night time; she’s at the 
ÇATOM from 8 in the morning to 6 at night everyday.  I am scared that 
her father will find out.  If he does, he will get angry at both of us.  
Because their father loves them, he does not want to let the daughters 
go.  If our financial situation were better, he would never let the girls 
go, but because we need money, he sends them to the kilim weaving 
course.  My husband is a worker at the municipality and he started 
sending the girls to the ÇATOM because he has not been getting paid 
for a year. (Siirt) 
 
The mothers and fathers have usually had different stances with respect to their 
daughters’ attendance of ÇATOM activities: 
 
Our sons do not want the girl to leave the house, but because her 
mother wants her to go to the ÇATOM, they try to keep quiet.  If it was 
up to them, they would never let the girl go.  The ÇATOM is good 
because they learn some things for themselves, as well as for us.  My 
daughter has stitched me a shirt.  She also makes things for her brothers 
and her mother.  She even makes them for the neighbors.  But if the 
girls open up too much, then they start going against traditions.  They 
start putting their noses into everything; they like themselves too much.  
Women’s hair is long but their minds are short.260 (Cizre)  
 
As seen above, the fathers were more interested in preserving traditional gender roles 
and the inferior status of women.  Another father made similar comments noting that 
men would never attend the educational courses and activities at the ÇATOM simply 
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because “men are not interested in such topics.”  But fathers relent to their daughters 
attending ÇATOM activities for the mere reason that they “learn how to make their 
çeyiz.”  Traditional gender roles are further perpetuated: “I don’t send my daughters to 
the Public Training Center [Halk Eğitim Merkezi in Turkish] because all the instructors 
there are men.  There was also some gossip about the girls who attended courses there.  
The ÇATOM is better; there is no problem at the ÇATOM.” 
 
Some families see the ÇATOM as a workplace where girls go only to earn money.  
Families in Uluköy, where participants are able to earn money from the kilims they 
weave, talked about the ÇATOM as if they were talking about an employer: 
 
Our daughter is still the same; nothing has changed since she started 
going to the ÇATOM.  We send her so that she makes use of her free 
time.  The kilim weaving course is no good because it has not 
guaranteed her a future.  It does not bring much money.  Our daughters 
are being exploited there.  Moreover, the girls are not given a diploma 
for having completed the course.  It would be better if there was a 
stitching course.  They would make things for the family and they 
would make things for their çeyiz.  We are satisfied with the instructors 
but there is not much going on at the ÇATOM.  The GAP 
Administration must not leave the ÇATOM alone here in Uluköy. 
(Uluköy) 
 
5.3.5.  Feelings of Self-confidence among Participants 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on feelings of self-confidence (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - 1.3 5.3 51.3 42.1 4 
Batman - - 4.8 19.0 76.2 5 
Cizre - - - 24.3 75.7 5 
Siirt - 3.4 10.3 44.8 41.4 4 
Uluköy - - 23.8 42.9 33.3 4 
Total - 1.1 7.1 40.2 51.6 5 
                                                                                                                                                
260  This is direct translation from a Turkish proverb frequently used to belittle women.  
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Over half of the ÇATOM participants stated that the ÇATOM environment has been 
very helpful in the gaining of their self-confidence, with a total of 92% positive replies.  
8% of the participants have declared either no change or a change for the worse in terms 
of feelings of self-confidence.  This is how the participants explained the change: 
 
I am married.  I was very shy about leaving the house and going 
outside.  I would feel that everybody on the street was staring at me.  I 
would turn completely red.  But now I feel less scared about being 
outdoors; I don’t let anybody bother me.  Before I couldn’t even go out 
to the bazaar.  Now I am even able to pay the bills.  The ÇATOM has 
an incredible effect on me.  I go to the post office to make phone calls 
when I have to.  Before I was so shy that I didn’t enjoy being in a 
crowd, but now I amuse myself in different settings.  I am much more 
comfortable about going to the doctor.  The ÇATOM has given us all a 
sense of self-confidence. (Siirt) 
 
I am 32 years old and the mother of 5 children.  I come to the ÇATOM 
for the literacy course.  I always say, I wish the ÇATOM had opened 3-
4 years ago, it would have been so much better.  My husband used to be 
embarrassed of me because I was illiterate.  Now that I come here, I 
have learned how to read and write.  A friend of my husband called one 
day from Istanbul.  My husband wasn’t home so I wrote down the 
number and gave it to my husband after he came home.  He was very 
happy about this.  It pleased and amused him tremendously.  I felt very 
good about myself.  I have a proposal that a room in every school 
building should be turned into a ÇATOM.  If ÇATOMs are multiplied, 
more and more women like me will read and learn. (Cizre) 
 
A younger participant recited her experiences as follows: 
 
I am not shy about talking to boys anymore.  I was very shy but now I 
have opened up.  Coming to the ÇATOM, learning new things, talking 
with friends have all helped me gain some self-confidence.  Now I can 
shake hands with boys.  I couldn’t trust myself with anything; I would 
go out to the bazaar with my mother.  Now I am scared of no one; I can 
be tougher. (Cizre) 
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5.3.6.  Feelings of Self-expression among Participants 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on feelings of self-expression (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - - 7.9 46.1 46.1 4 
Batman - - 4.8 33.3 61.9 5 
Cizre - - - 29.7 70.3 5 
Siirt - - 20.7 58.6 20.7 4 
Uluköy - - 15.0 25.0 60.0 5 
Total - - 8.7 41.0 50.3 5 
 
To the question of whether the ÇATOM was influential on the improvement of their 
self-expression, the responses given were similar to the responses of the previous 
question on feelings of self-confidence.  Participants said that they express themselves 
more easily now in the family environment as well as in other gatherings.  The changes 
were also felt in the ÇATOM environment, as participants were initially very timid 
about asking questions in class.  As time went by, with the help of the instructors, 
participants became more comfortable and freer to express themselves and ask questions 
during educational sessions at the ÇATOM.  Participants have even stated that they can 
go against their instructors when they feel that they are right or when there are things 
they want changed.  A participant recited her experience: 
 
I never used to talk with anyone before.  I was always grumpy and 
couldn’t stand anything.  After coming to the ÇATOM, I learned how 
to talk and be patient with people.  There have been enormous changes 
in my thoughts and I can express them much better now.  My mother 
used to be angry at me because of my behavior.  After this change in 
me, she is no longer resentful. (Batman) 
 
Further conversations with the girls in addition to the questionnaire revealed an 
important function of the ÇATOMs.  Given the enormous pressure that is felt in the 
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family, mainly from the male members of the household, and the scarcity of places like 
the ÇATOMs where participants are given the chance of self-expression, young girls and 
women rarely get the chance of expressing their views and opinions.  Hence, 
psychological healing seems to be an essential outcome of the ÇATOM project. 
 
If you had come here right after I had started coming to the ÇATOM, I 
would not have been able to tell you any of these things, because I 
wouldn’t know how to speak then.  I would be too shy and timid to talk.  
I was scared that I would say the wrong things.  But now I am able to 
talk comfortably everywhere, with everyone. (Cizre) 
 
5.3.7.  Prospects for the Future 
 
Effects of ÇATOM on participants’ prospects for the future (%) ÇATOM 
Very bad (1) Bad (2) No effect 
(3) 
Good (4) Very good 
(5) 
Median 
of scale 
(1 – 5) 
Beytüşşebap - - 6.9 51.4 41.7 4 
Batman - - 15.0 25.0 60.0 5 
Cizre - - - 26.3 73.7 5 
Siirt - - 20.7 37.9 41.4 4 
Uluköy - - 9.5 23.8 66.7 5 
Total - - 8.9 37.8 53.3 5 
 
Asked whether they were optimistic about their future, 53% of the participants 
responded that they were very positive about their future.  Only 9% of ÇATOM 
participants noted that the ÇATOM had no influence on how they regarded the future.  
Factors that made the participants optimistic about their future included their ability to 
earn money as a result of newly gained skills, the possibility of earning money (even if 
they do not already do so), and the prospects of becoming instructors at the ÇATOM (as 
some participants have already done).  Young girls were happy about the fact that the 
ÇATOM gives them some sense of direction in life.  As participants noted: 
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At the ÇATOM we learned what sorts of things we can do in the future.  
We wouldn’t have known if we were just sitting at home all day.  
Before I used to only think of getting married and having children.  
Now I want to learn more and have a job.  I learn more and more every 
year.  In case of financial problems, I know I will be able to work and 
stand on my own feet.  I would have never imagined that I was going to 
feel this way, but now I know that everything is possible. (Beytüşşebap) 
 
My mother encourages me about learning stitching.  She says that as 
women, our future is very insecure.  She wants me to gain a skill which 
will later help me stand on my own, if I need to.  I want to open up a 
tailoring shop and stitch my own clothes to earn money.  We looked for 
some shops but the rents are about 1.5 billion per year.  I don’t have the 
means to do this now but my dream is to open a tailoring shop one day. 
(Cizre) 
 
Some other participants, on the other hand, were not as enthusiastic about their future: 
 
My sister and I, we go to Bursa and Manisa for seasonal work.  We stay 
there until late autumn.  We would like to become businesswomen but 
our dreams will never come true.  We never stay in the ÇATOM 
courses long enough to learn anything new.  The only thing that is 
possible for us is to gather girls together and be the organizers of 
seasonal work and go to Manisa.  We can’t do anything else. (Batman) 
 
5.4.  ÇATOMs and Social Change in the GAP Region 
 
Talking to women and young girls about prospects for the future was the hardest part of 
the empirical research carried out in the region.  Although less so for the young girls, 
married women had no vision of how they would like to see their lives changed in the 
future.  Talking about their dreams and how they would envision an ‘ideal’ life did not 
mean anything to most participants, as they could not grasp what could possibly be 
meant by this query.  I realized that the scope of their current lives limit the scope of 
further imagination concerning these lives.  For instance, hardly any women had 
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knowledge of the GAP project.  Their seclusion from the outside world was limited to a 
much smaller area than their districts. 
 
The young girls, however, were slightly more vocal in the imagination of alternative 
lifestyles, which was especially the case in Cizre.  Although girls were wearing the kara 
çarşaf, the fact that many had relatively wealthy families and had traveled to Mersin, 
Gaziantep, and even cities in the western parts of the country, widened their scope of 
imagination.  Many others spoke of stories they had heard about lifestyles in other parts 
of the country.  Of the young girls who had seen others parts of Turkey, almost all of 
them dreamt of leaving their current settlements for the larger cities of the west.  Again, 
it was only those girls that had seen a city in the west who were able to imagine a life 
there.  Friends or relatives in the west constituted points of reference for these young 
girls who were left behind: 
 
Some of the girls in Uluköy have gone to Istanbul or Ankara either for 
health purposes or for visiting relatives.  And they all liked it very much 
there.  We don’t like village life.  Life is hard in the village; there is too 
much work to do, both inside and outside the house.  The village also 
has water problems, so we spend lots of time everyday in getting water.  
It is also hard to go cotton-picking every year.  Life in the city is more 
comfortable and there is more freedom.  We can’t travel around or go 
anywhere here in Uluköy.  We are not free.  In the city we would have 
more rights.  We would make new friends in the city, we would go 
traveling and we would find new places and ateliers to work.  I have an 
acquaintance that got married and is living now in Istanbul.  She is very 
happy there. (Uluköy) 
 
Again, young girls in Cizre were particularly articulate in narrating the lifestyles they 
saw on TV.  They would explain to me how they enjoyed watching TV shows like 
Televole and how beautiful they thought all the women were.  They smiled about 
lifestyles like the ones they saw on such shows and repeatedly mentioned how the lives 
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of women in Istanbul were so different from their own.  Girls in Cizre were intrigued by 
these ‘beautiful’ women and imitated them in some aspects.  Veiled girls would come to 
the ÇATOM and once in the ÇATOM, they would take off their black veils and feel 
very much at home.  Some of the girls would have tight shirts and pants on, clothing that 
some other young girls would not even be allowed to wear in their own private sphere.  
The relative wealth of these girls was evident in their clothes and the make up material 
they would bring to the ÇATOM.  Girls were interested in learning how to put on make 
up, which was one of the popular pastimes among young girls in Cizre ÇATOM. 
 
5.4.1.  Adhering to Local Traditions 
 
These same girls, who were so excited about the stylish lifestyles that they saw on their 
TV screens of the nightlife scenes in Istanbul, were at the same time intimidated by such 
lifestyles.  Voicing the concerns of their parents and others in the community, they 
mentioned that these girls were in fact leading a decadent life; at times displaying 
gestures of pity for these women.  They gave the impression that they would like to be 
as pretty as them but never as indecent.  Turning more to the practical aspects of life in 
Cizre, asked about whether they would not like to get rid of the black veil, to my 
surprise, young girls stated that they were happy with their veils because it made them 
‘free’.  Freedom was defined as the ability to walk around in the streets of Cizre without 
being noticed by the father, brother(s), or any other male relative that might have control 
over the young girl.261  Hence, despite their knowledge and imagination of diverse 
                                                 
261  The black veils in Cizre are worn in a way that the face, including the eyes, are concealed, rendering 
women completely invisible in public. 
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lifestyles, these young girls in Cizre were limited to the ‘freedom’ of their black veils.  
They had no other choice but to restrict themselves to the conditions of their 
surroundings and the limited opportunities offered by these circumstances.  The 
boundaries of personal development were pre-defined.  In the case of Cizre this was the 
black veil. 
 
Young girls in other ÇATOMs were not as explicit in their imaginations as the girls in 
Cizre.  In any case, however, it was always the younger participants who were better 
able to imagine what they would like for their life in the future.  Talking about the 
number of children they would prefer, for instance, some girls specifically stated that a 
small number of children would enable them to lead a less burdensome life.  With the 
experience of their mothers and the large number of children in their own families, they 
said that having to take care of a large number of children wears off a woman too 
quickly.  Some stated that they would prefer to spend more time for themselves rather 
than just on their families.  This was an indication of the increasing importance of 
individual values as opposed to the determining role of the family and community.  
Albeit the increasing awareness of individualism observed among some young girls, 
they were still not very assertive about their desires for more individualistic behavior.  
They were still not self-confident enough to pursue their dreams on their own, and were 
still highly accepting of traditional gender roles.  As the same girl continued: “I want to 
be happy with my husband in the new life that we will start together.  I want us to get 
along very well.  I want us to raise our children together.  But if things don’t turn out the 
way that I would like, then I have no choice but to accept the situation.” 
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Other social, cultural and especially religious traditions imposed on women further 
prevent them from accomplishments they would otherwise be able to achieve.  Even 
though some young girls were aware of the scant possibilities of a different lifestyle for 
themselves, they were still insistent on some behavioral practices such as their religious 
obligations.  Despite the desire and self-perceived ability of higher education, young 
girls stated anxiety about the sacrifices they will have to make upon the pursuit of 
certain goals in life.  For instance, in a joint program of the Kurtalan Governorate and 
the Directorate of Public Training, young girls who have certificates from Public 
Training Centers are able to start work as instructors in these centers, on the condition 
that they have their high school diplomas.  The problem voiced by some girls was that, 
despite the good intentions of the program, a large number of girls were automatically 
exempt from this opportunity.  Although a girl had nearly 10 years of experience in 
kilim weaving, she was unable to ever become an instructor due to the fact that she was 
wearing a headscarf.  Her reluctance to adjust to official policy on the issue of the 
headscarf placed this young girl and many others in a complex situation: 
 
They try to uncover the heads of girls who attend schools and the 
Public Training Centers.  Especially during these last two years, 
including the stitching classes and the handicrafts courses, there is a 
reaction against girls whose heads are covered.  No girl’s parents would 
send their daughters to such places under these conditions.  For this 
reason, there are parents who do not send their daughters to schools or 
training courses, although they would like to.  For instance, we are a 
group of friends whose grades at school are quite good and we would 
like to take the university entrance exam, but we are not sure anymore 
because we will have to uncover our heads at the university.  We don’t 
know what to do.  This is sincerely a greater obstacle for us than the 
university entrance exam itself.  We are confident that we will enter a 
university.  But it is after the exam that worries us.  We have been 
wearing head scarves since we have known ourselves.  For example I 
have been wearing it for 11 years and uncovering seems so hard, no 
matter how much you want it.  And I have hundreds of friends like 
myself, they are all in the same situation, living through the same 
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worries.  It is really difficult to make concessions.  Some see it 
differently, they say we do it for political reasons, but we have always 
worn head scarves; this is what we have seen in the family; this is how 
we know ourselves; and this is what we think is right. (Kurtalan) 
 
5.4.2.  Narrow Imaginations for Work Possibilities 
 
As is the case in all aspects of social life, traditional gender roles in the economic sphere 
mostly go unchallenged.  The belief that men are the bread-winners and financial 
providers of the house were confirmed by most women in the Southeast.  Although they 
were unhappy about their husbands and sons being away for work, their solution to the 
economic hardship in the region was, nevertheless, the sole employment of their men.  
Some young girls noted, conversely, that the economic destitution in the region has led 
some families to be more flexible about allowing their daughters to work.  Therefore, 
young girls want training courses to be opened according to their skills and interests.  
However, the girls made it clear that there are conditions on the types of places in which 
they can work.  As girls themselves stated: 
 
We will work in any job for which we are fit, but there are women’s 
jobs and men’s jobs.  We will do anything as long as it is women’s 
work.  We would like to work especially if it is a job with a consistent 
income.  We learn some things at the ÇATOM but we are not able to 
earn money as there are no workplaces.  In the west [of Turkey] there 
are ateliers, such as textile ateliers, in which women work.  Because 
there are plenty of jobs, all women can find work.  But here it is 
different.  Because job opportunities are limited, employees hire the 
most highly qualified girls.  This means that girls must obtain the 
proper training and certificate for the few jobs that are available.  
Nobody says this girl is in need of work, let’s give her a job. (Kurtalan) 
 
Young girls and women who had never been exposed to a condition in which women are 
employed could not imagine the sorts of environments they would want to work as 
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women.  The most enthusiastic responses to work prospects were given by some young 
girls in Şirvan.  The Şirvan Governorate had constructed a building to be hired as a small 
textile atelier in the county.  A businessman from Şanlıurfa equipped the inside of the 
building and girls worked there until the atelier went bankrupt after three months.  A 
number of the girls that I interviewed had worked there and earned a small amount of 
money.  Because of such an experience, the girls in Şirvan were more creative about 
possible prospects for work.  Insufficient family income in most households in Şirvan 
was said to lead a large number of families to consider sending their daughters to work 
outside the home.  Nevertheless, the girls themselves said they would not work without 
certain restrictions: “We are willing to work as long as it is a closed, sheltered workplace 
not too far from home.”  Similarly, young girls in Uluköy stated that they would like to 
work as long as they do it from inside the house. 
 
As work alternatives, the young girls in Şirvan came up with options such as kilim 
weaving ateliers, carpet weaving ateliers, and hairdressers.  Although some girls were 
able to imagine work possibilities, as stated earlier, the control of the men on female 
household members is extended to the economic sphere.  Despite the difficulties of 
making ends meet, a large number of men were not in favor of allowing their wives and 
daughters to work outside the home.  A 19 year-old illiterate young women who recently 
got married had been working in a factory for 7 years in Istanbul before she was 
involuntarily sent to Siirt for an arranged marriage.  Although her husband had a hard 
time finding work and worked only on a daily basis, he did not let her step out of the 
house without his permission.  She expressed feelings of helplessness in the face of this 
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situation.  A number of other newly married young women complained about similar 
strict controls exercised by their husbands. 
 
Attending seasonal work such as cotton or hazelnut-picking does not necessarily bring 
about a change in the position of young girls within the family.  Only a few number of 
girls reported that such work gave them a degree of autonomy in terms of spending their 
own money.  On the other hand, there were some girls who were desperate to challenge 
gender roles only if the opportunities were given:  
 
I don’t want to sit at home.  Sitting at home is boring anyway, there is 
nothing else to do except house work and handicrafts.  Me and my 
friends, we are active people, or at least we see ourselves like that, but 
there are no appropriate jobs for us.  It would be great if they were 
created.  For example there are no such possibilities in public 
workplaces.  Here we are talking about our problems and possible 
solutions to these problems, but don’t you have any opportunities you 
can present to us?  I say that we are also human and we want to achieve 
something and earn some money with our own means.  I think this is 
our right, our most natural right.  We know that nowadays women who 
earn their own money are in a very different standing.  I say all these 
but I don’t really expect a solution.  I just wanted to say them, that’s all. 
(Kurtalan) 
 
Like the young girl quoted above, there was at least one woman or young girl in every 
gathering that stood apart from the rest of the group, although these young women were 
no doubt a staggering minority.  One such urban woman from Siirt summarized well the 
situation of women in the region: 
 
I am now 23 years old.  I completed primary school.  After 7 years of 
marriage I recently divorced my husband.  I live in my mother’s house 
with my 2 children.  We are 7 siblings at home.  I was married off with 
an arranged wedding when I was 14 years old.  My husband and I, we 
migrated to Istanbul due to financial problems here in Siirt.  It is very 
difficult to leave a slum neighborhood [varoş in Turkish] and live in a 
metropolis.  I realized we had nothing here in Siirt.  Once you end up in 
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a metropolis, that is when you really start living.  You have to catch up 
with the pace of the big city and the job possibilities there are really not 
that easy.  My husband started working as a taxi driver there and I 
would work as small daily jobs came along.  But you have to be 
continuously working there because you pay money even for the water 
you drink.  The lifestyle makes this the rule.  If you don’t work one day, 
you are hungry that day.  My husband was constantly working; earning 
money became his only struggle.  This led to the disruption of the 
harmony in our family.  Even though we were husband and wife, we 
came to a point in which we were no longer sharing anything.  In such 
hardships, both the love and respect between us withered away.  A man 
who goes there from the East starts seeing the many different facets of 
life.  His own family environment is no longer satisfying.  As you see 
here, most women are covered, but over there, women are freer.  You 
find all sorts of women in the big city and the men that go there lose 
control.  While he starts living more freely there, I can’t because I still 
have my community, my neighbors, and my relatives there.  People 
start talking about how so-and-so’s daughter-in-law changed. 
 
Now I am divorced.  I am in Siirt and even though I wasn’t covered 
before, now I am [she wears a headscarf and an overcoat; has make up 
and looks quite stylish] because everyone said, ‘look at how free she is 
even though she is divorced.’  So I had to cover up.  My family also 
wanted it; they don’t want to hear rumors from the neighbors.  Of 
course I have to think of my family as well.  When there is a rumor 
about one person in the family, the whole family gets the blame.  I have 
to think of the future of my sisters, so it is important that I cover up to 
stop drawing attention to the family and myself.  But this has changed 
nothing inside me.  It has taken nothing away from my ideas.  I still feel 
the pressure of the community and the relatives, but I am lucky in one 
thing: at least I don’t have any brothers.  At least I don’t feel their extra 
pressure. 
 
I want to do good for society.  I don’t want to depend on someone for 
the rest of my life.  I am sure I am full of treasures, and I would like to 
bring them out to the surface.  I don’t like the community’s outlook 
because they say how can a divorced or a widowed woman work?  But 
at a time when even university graduates are not able to find work, what 
can I do as a primary school graduate?  The community is slowly 
changing, for example, we have gotten over these as a family, but not 
everyone is like us; they still like to talk about others.  I see myself as 
having made progress, but it is really very difficult to live in the East.  
You probably won’t be able to understand this; we live in a strongly 
patriarchal society here.  I would have loved to do something good, 
even something with little pay.  But everyone asks, is it worth the 
hassle for 30-40 million a month?  I think it definitely is. (Siirt) 
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5.4.3.  Limitations of the ÇATOM 
 
Despite the many positive aspects of ÇATOMs for the women in the GAP region, their 
span of operation is usually not very wide.  The location of the ÇATOM building is very 
important for the girls to come and attend the activities.  Hence, it is only the close 
surrounding within the community that the ÇATOM is able to serve.  Almost all the 
girls and women emphasized that the location of the ÇATOM must be in a ‘secure’ and 
‘sheltered’ place for it to attract participants. 
 
I observed during the surveys, focus group meetings, and informal conversations with 
the young girls and women that the more deprived and illiterate participants have noted 
the highest levels of satisfaction of the ÇATOM.  Some girls welcome the ÇATOM like 
arid lands welcoming the rain.  But young girls and women who have attained a certain 
level of knowledge and education are in search of something more from the ÇATOM.  
They have reached a level in which they are ready to mobilize themselves in the attempt 
for further personal improvement, but lack the know-how.  The ÇATOM, however, is 
unable to assist these young women in reaching their full potentials.  This is due to the 
fact that after a certain point of activity, the ÇATOM field workers and instructors are 
unable to utilize their own potentials, which in turn highly affects the trickling down 
process of benefits to the lower level of participants.  Although the ÇATOM field 
workers do receive periodic training on essential issues such as gender awareness, 
women’s empowerment, and participatory development, this knowledge does not 
necessarily percolate into the grassroots level.  Most young girls and women are still 
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highly unaware of the imbalances in gender roles.  Because there is not much scope for 
imagination among the women and even the young girls in the region, it is clear that 
other techniques must be developed and utilized for raising awareness, grassroots 
participation and local mobilization. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
THE STATE’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE ÇATOM PROJECT 
 
6.1.  The Turkish Military 
 
6.1.1.  Views on Development Assistance 
 
Given the national importance of internal and external security concerns, Stockton 
points out the ‘authoritarian approach’ to the resolution of internal conflicts and 
subsequent humanitarian relief assistance as opposed to ‘participatory distribution 
systems.’262  In Southeastern Anatolia, the Turkish military has an understanding of 
development that is relief oriented, based on the ‘mercy approach’ rather than the right 
to development or the ‘justice approach.’263  Excluding or ignoring the notion of human 
rights, or rather cultural rights, the development process of the Southeast is under close 
surveillance by the Turkish armed forces.   
 
                                                 
262  Stockton cited in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond: Introduction,”  in 
World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, ed. J. N. Pieterse  (London: 
MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998), 8-9. 
263  DeMars cited in Pieterse, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 8. 
 183 
 
Now that at the end of the decade armed conflict in Southeastern Anatolia has declined, 
the Turkish military pays more attention to relations with the people in the region.264  
They now focus on economic, social and psychological healing in the region.  They 
realize that Turkey can develop only with a ‘happier’ society and this is the general 
attitude with which the armed forces approach the Southeast.265  In terms of 
humanitarian assistance to the Southeast, Turkish armed forces personnel go to the 
region with a qualified team of people, including health personnel, sociologists, lawyers, 
and so on.  With the support of the Regional Governorate, they carry out a variety of 
projects in the region.  Doctor Selma Şardan, for instance, is a senior lieutenant who 
visits mountain villages in Southeastern Anatolia to teach women how to read and write 
while informing them on issues of family planning.  There are many other female 
military personnel in the region, and like Doctor Şardan, they are dedicated to ‘educating 
the mothers.’ 
 
Other significant activities of the armed forces in the Southeast make up the ‘Embracing 
the Citizen’ [Vatandaşla Kucaklaşma in Turkish] campaign.  During the year 1999, 
these activities have included literacy courses to 19,770 people, university preparatory 
courses to 2,412 students, computer courses to 1,216 students, foreign language courses 
to 980 students, distribution of school stationary to 1,108,920 students, official 
marriages to 2,760 couples, circumsicion to 4,895 boys, tours to visit the large cities of 
the west to 340 students, health check-ups to 1,936,597 people, distribution of medicine 
                                                 
264  Necati Özgen, Paper presented at the Conference on “The Problems facing East and Southeastern 
Anatolia and Possible Solutions,” Ministry of Interior, Ankara, Turkey, Nov. 23, 2000. 
265  Yalman cited in Fikret Bila, “Orgeneral Yalman’ın Çağrısı [The Call of General Yalman].”  Milliyet 
Gazetesi,  May 28, 2000, 16. 
 184 
 
to 269,005 people, teeth scanning to 99,242 people, distribution of clothing items to 
160,443 students, 85 km. of electricity lines to 77 villages, 158 km. of water pipe lines to 
112 villages, 7,416 km. of roads to 1,028 villages, the repair of 155 damaged school 
buildings, the repair of 114 health centers, distribution and repair of 5 radio and TV 
reflectors, 2 drinking water projects, 1 carpet weaving project, and the plantation of 
2,500,000 oak trees and 1,500,000 saplings.266 
 
Proud of their extensive activities and projects in the region, senoir General Yalman, in a 
press release during the year 2000, called out to the Turkish society and civil society 
organizations to come to the region: “I would like to make this call especially to civil 
society organizations.  Associations working for civilization, namely education, health, 
and family, must include the Southeast in their fields of operation.  They undertake very 
good, very successful activities.  Some examples are the Foundation of Education 
Volunteers [Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı in Turkish] and the Family Planning Foundation 
[Aile Planlaması Vakfı in Turkish], among other similar organizations.  The Southeast 
needs activities like these.  Civil society organizations should take us as an example.”267 
 
Talking about their achievements in Southeastern Anatolia, members of the Turkish 
armed forces portray the relationship of the soldier with the villager in highly positive 
terms.  As Necati Özgen, a retired army corps commander who served in the East and 
Southeastern parts of the country, recited: “In Digor268 there was a village that provided 
support to the militants of the PKK during their attacks.  We went to this village and 
                                                 
266  Ibid., 16. 
267  Ibid. 
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asked the headman about the problems in the village.  He stated his most urgent need as 
the lack of water in his village.  We went there, a brigade commander, a colonel, a 
sergeant, some soldiers, and myself.  We managed to provide the village with running 
water.  On our last day, we were greeted with joy and a large number of flags.  We 
received hugs from the villagers upon our departure.  Now this village in Digor is the 
most nationalist village.”269  It is precisely this relationship and dynamics that the armed 
forces want civil society organizations in Turkey to take as good examples of 
development in East and Southeastern Anatolia. 
 
The peculiar structure of vertical relations within the local community, as well as with 
respect to outsiders has resulted in the use of a specific language in the region.  The 
patron-client relations in the region coupled with the presence of the armed forces in the 
same region during the last two decades has resulted in the further endorsement of the 
ever-present strong vertical relations in Southeastern Anatolia.  So much that it has 
affected the terminology of the local population.  For instance, when talking about the 
governor or the village schoolteacher, locals would refer to them as ‘Vali Paşa’ or 
‘Komutanım’.  Both paşa and komutan are labels used for high-ranking military officers 
in the Turkish armed forces.  Hence, some locals colloquially used these labels when  
refering to the province governor or the teacher at their village school.  Because of such 
relations, during the interviews and daily conversations with the community members, 
some of the locals, thinking I was a civil servant or some other outsider to whom they 
had to pay due respect, would refrain from answering questions, or they would conceal 
                                                                                                                                                
268  A town in Kars province in Northeastern Turkey. 
269  Özgen, Paper presented at the Conference on “The Problems.” 
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certain things by telling me that I would know better than them.  I realized how the local 
population has always been subservient to the elder members of the community, as well 
as anyone coming into their community from outside, and they are not at all used to 
answering questions about themselves.  The political fragility in the region, 
undoubtedly, adds to the precaution of daily conversations with outsiders. 
 
The fact that the local inhabitants call the governor ‘Paşam’, on the other hand, is 
pointed out by members of the armed forces as a sign of compliment to military 
personnel who comment on the situation of the locals in Southeastern Anatolia.  The 
high regard of members of the armed forces for their own deeds was recited by General 
Özgen with pride: “There was a boy from a village in Uludere.270  He had been taken out 
of school by his parents when he was a young boy.  He ran off to Northern Iraq and 
fought against the Turkish armed forces for 3-4 months.  Upon his return to the country, 
I said ‘let’s educate this boy.’  ‘Of course paşam’ Ünal bey replied and we called for the 
Director of National Education at Uludere.  The boy was sent to the west [of Turkey] 
and his full funding was supplied by the Turkish armed forces.  We then transferred him 
to a boarding school on the Black sea coast.  He is now a respectable young man, much 
more useful for his country.”271  The military also deals with activities of mass 
circumcision for the boys in the region.  Military personnel talk about such vital needs in 
the region, with a harsh tone: “There are fellows who have reached age 20 and are still 
not yet circumcised.  This is unacceptable.”272 
 
                                                 
270  A town in Şırnak province in Southeastern Turkey. 
271  Özgen, Paper presented at the Conference on “The Problems.” 
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Hence, it is evident that the Turkish military views the inhabitants of the East and 
Southeast as ‘grateful children’ rather than ‘angry adults.’273  With similar delusions, 
members of the Turkish military view most nongovernmental activity in the region as 
dubious and threatening rather than useful, complementary and accommodating.  The 
situation of civil society organizations in the Southeastern parts of the country is 
particular given the continuation of strong military presence within Emergency Rule 
procedures and the high politicization of the region.  The details of the problems 
confronted by civil societal initiatives in the Southeast in particular were described in 
chapter IV. 
 
6.1.2.  Views on ÇATOMs 
 
In terms of the specific relations with ÇATOMs, while a small number of military 
personnel make the effort to work cooperatively with the local ÇATOMs in their 
vicinity, most observe these centers from a distance, and maintain the privilege of 
having full control over the activities of the ÇATOM.  Two extreme examples illustrate 
the varying attitudes of military personnel in locations where ÇATOMs are situated. 
 
The senior lieutenant of the gendarmerie in the Beytüşşebap county of Şırnak was aware 
of the significance of the ÇATOMs and believed the particular approach of the ÇATOM 
project to be appropriate for the characteristics and needs of women and young girls in 
                                                                                                                                                
272  “Doğu’da 20 yaşına gelip de sünnet olmamış herifler var.  Olacak şey değil.” in Turkish. 
273  Walker cited in Pieterse, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 9. 
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the region.  He was further encouraging of the ÇATOM in Beytüşşebap by declaring that 
the ÇATOM had not yet reached its full potential within the community. 
 
We have almost become one with the ÇATOM here in Beytüşşebap.  
The Public Training Centers [Halk Eğitim Merkezleri in Turkish] have 
market-oriented goals through the development of occupational skills, 
while we know that the ÇATOM is more concerned about educating the 
citizen and improving their capacities.  The ÇATOM is definitely a 
must in the region, but their activities are insufficient.  Activities must 
be multiplied and varied.  There must be a diversity and strength in 
terms of financial revenues for the ÇATOM.  There is also a greater 
need for people with leadership qualities.  There should be greater 
coordination among institutions.  We will continue our assistance to the 
ÇATOM building. (Senior Lieutenant of the Gendarmerie, 
Beytüşşebap) 
 
It is clear from the above interview that, despite the full support provided by the 
gendarmerie to the ÇATOM, the armed forces make sure all activities are transparent 
and are organized upon the supervision of the local armed authorities.  Although the 
ÇATOM field worker in Beytüşşebap is in very good terms with the senior lieutenant of 
the gendarmerie, she recited an appalling story of a humiliating interrogation she faced 
during a trip she organized for ÇATOM participants.  On the way back from a day trip 
to Silopi, another county in Şırnak near the Iraqi border, she was stopped with a group of 
ÇATOM participants at a control point and nearly tortured by the security officers on 
guard and held captive overnight.  The wife of a military officer happened to be one of 
the organizers and participants of the trip and she was also closely interrogated.274  The 
ÇATOM field worker later found out that the trip organizers had carelessly chosen the 
day before Nevruz, a signal of the coming of spring and a time of festivities for most 
                                                 
274  The wife of the military officer, who has now an active role in the ÇATOM, talked about her 
husband’s initial reservations about her going to the ÇATOM and mingling with the local population.  
This is an indication of the mistrust and suspicion that military officers bear for the locals in the region.  
They are also not in favor of socializing with the local population as they regard themselves culturally 
different, in most cases superior. 
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people in the region.  The incident took place in March 2001, a time when PKK attacks 
were no longer a threat to the security of the region. 
 
An extension of this is the other extreme in which the army commanders and other 
military officers had no other relations with the ÇATOM except for regular informal and 
sometimes inconspicuous visits in order to ensure that all activities are put into practice 
as foreseen.  An incident was witnessed in one of the training sessions for ÇATOM field 
worker girls which took place in the social facilities building of the Atatürk Dam in 
Şanlıurfa.  After a hard day’s work, in an informal gathering one evening, the participant 
girls sang local songs in both Turkish and Kurdish.  We were all enjoying the warm 
atmosphere of a sincere get-together when a tough, hard-faced young man leaned to one 
of the NGO instructors and notified him that the provincial army corps commander was 
waiting to speak to him.  Upon provocative questions to the NGO instructor as to what 
they thought they were doing, the commander was told by the instructor that the aim of 
the ÇATOMs and the assisting NGOs was to ‘help spread democracy at the grassroots 
level’.  The army corps commander reminded the instructor that he was well aware of 
the activities of both the ÇATOMs and NGOs, and that all their activities were under 
close scrutiny. 
 
In general, I could see that the ÇATOMs in smaller settlements had an overall easier 
time with the members of the armed forces.  Except for occasional unpleasant 
incidences, ÇATOM field workers did not complain about their relations with military 
personnel.  In one case where the ÇATOM building was too close to the command 
headquarters of the gendarmerie, the ÇATOM field worker complained that many 
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families were reluctant to send their daughters to the ÇATOM specifically for this 
reason.  She talked about the families’ persevering reservations about military, 
gendarmerie, and police personnel and stated the advantages as well as the 
disadvantages of being too close to the building of the gendarmerie commandership.  I 
realized that the smaller the settlement and the more supervision they have over the 
activities of the ÇATOM, the more cooperative and helpful the armed forces are in their 
dealings with the ÇATOM.  The fact that the ÇATOM is a well-reputed institution in a 
particular settlement, and that the wives of some personnel of the security forces attend 
the activities of the ÇATOMs helps ease the tension between the ÇATOM and the 
armed forces in the region.  This is especially true for local authorities as the armed 
officials in larger institutions keep more of a distance with the ÇATOM and maintain 
more aggressive relations, if any at all.  This relationship is perpetuated by the fact that 
most ÇATOMs in larger settlements such as province centers are located in migrant 
neighborhoods which are perceived by the security forces as spots of tension. 
 
In addition to these observations, it is hard to miss the peculiarities of the terminology 
used by military personnel.  As picked out from the above interview with the senior 
lieutenant of the gendarmerie in Beytüşşebap, the lieutenant confirmed their close 
connection with the ÇATOM, implying stringent supervision in addition to assistance.  
Although ÇATOMs are initially designed for the women in the region and mainly serve 
for the needs of these women, the senior lieutenant prefered to use the words ‘citizens’ 
and ‘people’ while talking about the target group of ÇATOMs.  He reminded me, in his 
gender-neutral word choice, that the ‘people’ in this region, irrespective of sex, are the 
‘citizens’ of the republic.  He refused to recognize the gender-specific project of the 
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ÇATOMs, while at the same time verifying that the people in the region are members of 
a unitary nation, hence revealing the strong ideological load in his words.  He refused to 
see or to emphasize the political implications and dimension of the ÇATOM project. 
 
The lieutenant’s main concern, irrespective of the project at hand, was the “education of 
citizens and the improvement of their capacities” again as citizens of the republic, 
hinting at the adoption of the same objectives and top-down means inherited from the 
times of the Empire and the republic.  Through his words, he was helping propagate the 
same vertical structures of decision making, as he stated his belief in a greater need for 
‘people’ and not ‘women’ or ‘young girls’ with strong leadership qualities.  Instead of 
valuing the ÇATOMs for their ability to raise awareness and mobilize the young girls in 
the community, the lieutenant in Beytüşşebap was more concerned about the limited 
financial resources of the ÇATOM.  Finally, the senior lieutenant re-emphasized the 
gendarmerie’s paternalistic relation to the ÇATOM and gave the guarantee that he 
would be providing full infrastructural support to the ÇATOM building for the activities 
to come. 
 
Despite the negative and off-putting attitudes displayed by members of the Turkish 
armed forces, they were nevertheless in an effort to bring NGO activity into the region.  
Realizing and stressing the importance of humanitarian and development agencies in the 
region, it was reported that, within the National Security Council275, there was a project 
                                                 
275  The military has a special positioning with respect to politics in Turkey.  Historically, the military has 
been an essential component of the Ottoman state structure.  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the 
republic, was a member of the military.  The Turkish military has traditionally been considered a 
stabilizing factor in politics and the guardian of Kemalist principles.  The influence of the military in the 
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in progress for the possible coordination of NGOs that intended to be active in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region.276  In addition to possible good intentions, it must be 
considered that the motives behind such an encouragement of NGOs and a coordination 
initiative might go back to the same old intentions of the strict supervision, filtration and 
control of nongovernmental activity in the region, as well as national and international 
publicity, and a way to garner additional international funding for development that are 
available only through NGOs. 
 
6.2.  Public Administrators 
 
6.2.1.  Public Institutions and Social Services 
 
Most local administrators in the region possessed views similar to those of military 
personnel.  Despite the fact that ÇATOMs are registered under the supervision of 
province governors, it was again these governors that portrayed the most negative 
feelings about ÇATOMs and their operations.  Perhaps the one interview that reflects so 
well the general attitude of public administrative personnel is the one with the governor 
of Siirt about his views regarding the ÇATOMs and their activities in the province of 
Siirt: 
                                                                                                                                                
political system is constitutionally supported.  The National Security Council, as the institutional form of 
the military in Turkish politics, was established by the 1961 constitution.  In practice, it is not only matters 
of internal and external security that are the concern of the National Security Council, but all aspects of 
societal life.  Policies of ‘national security’ include a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from economics to 
health and education.  For further details look at Gülistan Gürbey, “Türkiye’de Bir Sivil Toplum 
Oluşumunun Önündeki Siyasi ve Hukuki Engeller [The Political and Legal Obstacles to Civil Societal 
Formations in Turkey],”  in Ortadoğu’da Sivil Toplumun Sorunları [Problems of Civil Society in the 
Middle East], eds. Ferhad Ibrahim and Heidi Wedel  (Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 1997), 118-119. 
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The GAP Administration has many diverse projects in Southeastern 
Anatolia.  ÇATOMs are institutions that have been created by 
intellectuals [enteller in Turkish] sitting in classy and snobbish coffee 
houses, taking decisions about the women in this region.  For 40 years 
there is an established system utilized by Public Training Centers, and 
these Centers can operate much more effectively with their highly 
qualified instructors.  The system is perfect, but we are unable to 
operate optimally given the drawbacks of limited financial resources.  
For instance, telkari silver handicrafts and the oltu handicrafts of 
Erzurum were developed and marketed for the first time by Public 
Training Centers.  The Kurtalan kilim course was an initiative of the 
Public Training Center.  The only difference of the ÇATOM is that the 
staff members get paid more money than those of the Public Training 
Centers.  There are only two staff members who belong to the ÇATOM.  
The rest are personnel from Public Training Centers, the Health 
Directorate, or the Directorate for Agriculture.  In my opinion, even if 
the ÇATOM fails to exist, Public Training Centers will always be there, 
and we will not notice the absence of ÇATOMs. 
 
In our Community Centers [of the Social Services and Child Protection 
Agency; Toplum Merkezleri in Turkish], we have pre-school education 
and we have opened a selling point for the handicrafts produced there.  
Such a system is far better than the ÇATOM.  In our Community 
Centers, we provide essential courses on citizenship.  We teach the flag, 
unity and solidarity, and the essentials of the republic.  We also have 
literacy courses for adults, courses on religion, and everything else.  
Under a progressive system, Kur’an courses could be enormously 
effective in the Community Centers. 
 
ÇATOMs survive merely through publicity.  They get good publicity 
because they were designed by the GAP Administration.  There is 
absolutely nothing special about the ÇATOMs; they are nothing more 
than a waste of public resources.  The GAP Administration makes it 
sound as if the ÇATOM is a new invention.  Like I said, there is an 
established system that has been operational for 40 years, but the GAP 
Administration wants to create something new out of this.  The GAP 
Administration is trying to make it appear like a grandiose project, just 
because the ÇATOM has the name of the GAP.  Ankara uses well the 
current sensitivity towards the Southeast in its decision making 
mechanisms.  It is nice that you have come to carry out research on the 
ÇATOMs, but why don’t you do the same for the Community Centers 
or Public Training Centers and prefer the ÇATOMs of the GAP?  The 
GAP Administration is not an administrative agency, it is not a 
planning agency, it is not an education or health specialist.  People are 
more disturbed of the GAP than appreciative of it.  In Siirt I am going 
to close down the ÇATOM and convert it to a Communty Center, 
because I am very uneasy about the government’s resources being 
divided up and wasted.  There is no need to re-discover America.  We 
                                                                                                                                                
276  Özgen, Paper presented at the Conference on “Southeastern Anatolia.” 
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can open up evening courses at the Public Training Center.  Instead of 
creating more ÇATOM buildings, we must come up with a system in 
which we can provide more support to the already existing Public 
Training Centers. 
 
Pelin hanım [the field worker of Siirt ÇATOM] is a successful, 
enthusiastic, hard-working, and a qualified person, but the ÇATOM has 
started repeating itself.  For this reason, Community Centers are far 
better than the ÇATOM.  Actually we can’t say the ÇATOM is a 
failure.  With the special efforts of Pelin hanım, some activities are 
being carried out, but if I were to move Pelin hanım to the Public 
Training Center, she would be producing much more. 
 
In the Community Centers, during the time when the girls are busy with 
kilim weaving, we give them an hour of useful courses.  Also during 
the literacy courses, we provide the participants with some essential 
messages that we want them to absorb.  The girls that first started 
coming to the kilim weaving courses were backward and untamed, 
whereas in my later visits I couldn’t tell which ones were the students 
and which ones were the instructors.  I was surprised by how much 
these girls had changed; they were all dressed very well and they had 
become refined.  I am planning on providing internet access to the girls 
so that they become better aquainted with the outside world.  The girls 
are going to be able to chat with others through the internet. (Governor, 
Siirt) 
 
The most striking aspect in the words of the governor was the immense competition 
perceived between the governorate and the GAP Administration.  The governor of Siirt 
drew a large distinction between the established public institutions for social provision 
such as the Public Training Centers and the Community Centers, and the more flexible 
ÇATOMs.  Despite the fact that all three centers are indeed public institutions, the 
governor made a sharp contrast between ÇATOMs and the other two institutions.  
Although he half-heartedly accepted the success of the ÇATOM project, the governor 
had nothing positive to say about them and rather emphasized that ÇATOMs merely 
‘survive’ through ‘good publicity.’  While he illustrated his full confidence in the Public 
Training system and Community Centers, he vulgarly dismissed the structure of the 
ÇATOMs and their modes of operation.  He drew a sharp dichotomy between ÇATOMs 
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and their personnel being too distant from their target group, while at the other extreme 
he provided examples of the close contact between public personnel and local 
participants in Public Training Centers and Community Centers. 
 
The governor of Siirt was highly protective of these two public institutions, possibly due 
to two reasons.  On the one hand, he might be perceiving as a threat the larger 
involvement of women in the ÇATOM project, while on the other hand, he might not be 
too content about private and semi-private funds being channeled through ÇATOMs, 
whereas public social services remain slack and under-funded.  Despite his awareness of 
the current ineffectiveness of such public institutions, he drew attention to the lack of 
financial resources, while not mentioning the inefficiency of the operation of state 
offices and their bureaucratic institutions. 
 
The Siirt governor was not aware of the semi-civil character of ÇATOMs and the 
involvement of NGOs in the project.  He did not realize that ÇATOMs worked more 
flexibly and less bureaucratically than the other two institutions of Public Training and 
Community Centers.  It was precisely because of these inefficiencies that some NGOs 
prefer to work in the region through ÇATOMs as opposed to working through Public 
Training Centers and Community Centers.  Despite Siirt ÇATOM’s operation in the 
province center for over 3 years, the governor had not visited the center and was hence 
unaware of the personal changes and transformations witnessed by most young girls and 
women attending the activities of the ÇATOM.  He was blinded to the benefits of 
ÇATOM activities due to his intense reaction against the GAP Administration.  This 
detestation was further heated by his own ignorance of the status and functioning of the 
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GAP Administration.  In spite of its equally public character, the GAP Administration 
was surprisingly regarded and treated as otherwise. 
 
In the words of the Siirt governor, we are again confronted with the terminology of the 
official ideology.  The governor proudly spoke of the courses on citizenship in which 
kilim weaving girls are taught about the significance of the Turkish flag, the unity and 
solidarity of the Turkish nation, and the essentials of the Turkish republic.  The governor 
gave hints on the official policy of using religious sentiments and the Kur’an for the 
enforcement of republican and nationalist ideology.  The legacy of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and his understanding of development linger in the state officials’ views on the 
locals as ‘backward and untamed’.  Progress is regarded only as a manifestation of the 
exterior, as observed in the Siirt governor’s understanding of good clothing and a 
‘refined’ look as an indicator of and essential to progress and development. 
 
Similar to the comments of the governor of Siirt, the deputy governor shared parallel 
ideas about the uselessness of ÇATOMs.  Although the deputy governor stated the 
higher number of participants in the ÇATOMs and admitted the ineffectiveness of the 
Public Training system, he still lacked positive views about the ÇATOM.  In fact, the 
deputy governor was highly negative of both the participation profile and the approach 
of the ÇATOM towards its participants. 
 
I don’t believe the ÇATOM serves its true purpose.  We were told that 
there are a total of 80 participants, but when I visited the building, there 
were no more than 20 participants.  All ÇATOMs do is create a chaos 
in the provision of social services.  If the Public Training Center sends 
instructors to the ÇATOM, then this is a Public Training course.  For 
example, this is the case for the stitching and embroidery courses.  All 
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institutions are in the scene for a show.  I am absolutely not of the 
opinion that ÇATOMs are useful.  Similarly, when I visit the courses of 
the Public Training Center, I see no more than 3-5 people.  In that 
sense, we need, in fact, a reform both in the Public Training Centers 
and the Community Centers.  The ÇATOM uses health personnel from 
the Health Directorate, and other staff from other institutions.  
Community Centers are the same.  In Siirt, the carpet weaving courses 
of Sümer Carpet are going well, but if we generalize, the number of 
participants for these is also not very high. 
 
The GAP Administration has no concrete investments in this region.  
For this reason, people are fed up.  When officials from the GAP 
Administration come here, they do nothing but talk and tell us what to 
do.  But we already know the problems in the region and the solutions 
to these problems.  All we need is financial support; not people telling 
us what to do.  The TOKAP project [Toplumsal Kalkınma Projesi, 
Community Development Project of the Siirt governorate during the 
office of the previous governor] was a flawed project because it made 
the people in the region get too used to receiving something for free.  
Everyone is so used to it, they all expect something from us.  We call 
the girls to come over to learn kilim and carpet weaving, the families 
say they won’t send their daughters unless we give them something.  
And there is no difference between the TOKAP and the ÇATOM.  I 
now have a system in which girls who come to the kilim and carpet 
ateliers to weave and earn money also have to take 10 hours of home 
economics courses per week, environmental health, and other topics 
that are important for them.  We are already trying to do the best we can 
for the region.  ÇATOM does not bring an alternative approach to 
social services. (Deputy Governor responsible for ÇATOMs, Siirt) 
 
The contradictory words of the deputy governor of Siirt reveal the confusion with 
respect to the provision of social services in general.  Even though the deputy governor 
realizes that a reform is needed in terms of institutions of social sevices, he talks about a 
system that the Siirt governorate has developed in which girls who work at the kilim and 
carpet weaving ateliers of Sümer Carpet are obliged to take certain hours of classes.  The 
governorate has developed such a system since Public Training Centers and Community 
Centers are unable to attract participants.  Through this system, the genuine aim is not 
the provision of social services, but the instruction of young girls.  Given the fact that 
ÇATOMs do not explicitly support and help perpetuate the essentials of official 
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ideology, they are regarded by dedicated public administrators as unsuccessful and 
useless. 
 
Some authorities that criticized the GAP Administration’s mode of operation stated their 
belief that this deficiency of the GAP had its reflection on the workings of the 
ÇATOMs.  This was a good example for understanding the confusion that state officials 
had in terms of organizational structures.  On the one hand, ÇATOMs were criticized for 
being left unattended and on their own, and suggestions were made that they needed 
supervision from the top.  This implied that they were not too happy about the 
decentralized operational structure of ÇATOMs.  On the other hand, they also seemed to 
be in favor of a more decentralized mode of operation in which experts spend more time 
and energy in the field, instead of taking decisions at the top level, from their offices in 
Ankara.  Finally, however, the terminological confusion culminated in the Cizre 
governor’s statement that ‘centers’ should be created in the ‘localities’. 
 
I fully agree with the aims and objectives of ÇATOMs as they appear 
on paper, but we are confronted with a different sitution when it comes 
to implementation.  ÇATOMs have to be supervised on the spot and 
qualified people are needed for the coordination of the project.  
Voluntary agencies and the GAP must work together in a missionary 
spirit and in an efficient manner.  The best communication with the 
local population is created out in the streets, so activities have to be 
planned and implemented not from the center but through field studies 
and working on the spot.  It is essential that psychologists and 
sociologists come to the field and work for at least a month.  A rotation 
of this kind can be arranged within the GAP.  The Administration ought 
to establish its center in the locality to which it relates.  For this reason, 
the GAP Administration must definitely be re-structured.  The most 
important sections of society are children and the youth, therefore the 
target group must be correctly selected.  Qualified academicians must 
work in the region and directly in the field.  The ÇATOM must be more 
active. (Governor, Cizre) 
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As observed in the comments above, among state officials, in general, one of the most 
frequently made comparisons was between the ÇATOMs and the Public Training 
Centers.  The ÇATOMs were sometimes recognized as a positive initiative for the 
women in the region, while others emphasized that Public Training Centers have a wider 
range of beneficiaries, are more disciplined, and their infrastructure is more established.  
Irrespective of whether the comments were encouraging or discouraging of ÇATOMs, 
most comments about the two institutions were confused. 
 
6.2.2.  ÇATOMs and the Provision of Social Services 
 
This tension between ÇATOMs and Public Training Centers was also confirmed directly 
by the related state officials, namely the directors of Public Training and National 
Education.  Some Public Training directors who regarded ÇATOMs as an extension of 
their own institution conveyed the opinion that they had to keep ÇATOMs under their 
supervision.  This, in turn, created problems with respect to certificates provided by 
Public Training Centers.  They believed the lack of expertise among ÇATOM instructors 
to make cooperation among institutions difficult. 
 
We have placed the ÇATOM into its current building.  [The building 
that the ÇATOM uses is the old building of the Public Training Center.]  
We need to regularly monitor the ÇATOM because they have problems 
with certificates.  It is not possible to issue certificates without a 
permission from the Directorate of National Education.  The ÇATOM 
has problems with expert instructors but we still try to ignore their 
deficiencies [alttan alıyoruz in Turkish] and cooperate with them in the 
provision of certificates.  But the ÇATOM must remember that the 
instructors have to be qualified and they must be selected carefully.  In 
any case, it is encouraging to know that they don’t do anything without 
notifying us.  There is mutual trust between us. (Director of Public 
Training, Beytüşşebap) 
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As noted in the words of the National Education director in Beytüşşebap, ÇATOMs 
have in fact brought positive competition in an environment where Public Training 
Centers were traditionally the sole providers of such social services: “The courses and 
activities at the ÇATOM are successful but there is competition between the two 
institutions because the ÇATOM took over the courses of the Public Training Center.”  
The fact that ÇATOMs have encroached into the region with aims specifically designed 
for women and a more flexible and active team of field workers, Public Training 
personnel are confronted with competition that they are unpleasantly aware of.  Despite 
the positive effects of this kind of competition between the two institutions, vertical 
relations of power and control are still maintained within and among institutions.  
Instead of the recognition of positive interaction, Public Training authorities are eager to 
establish and maintain a decisive role over the ÇATOMs: “There are tendencies to open 
up new courses without acknowledging the Directorate of Public Training.  When 
instructors are to be appointed at the ÇATOM, the views of the Public Training must be 
consulted.  Our Public Training Centers are disciplined whereas ÇATOMs lack this kind 
of discipline.  In fact, there is really no need for ÇATOMs.” 
 
Despite the generally negative attitudes of Public Training and National Education 
directors, some other directors and field personnel such as those working for the 
Directorate of Health generally displayed a more positive picture of the ÇATOMs.  One 
of the reasons for this was the similarities in the approach of the ÇATOMs and the 
Directorate of Health: 
 
As an institution [meaning the Directorate of Health] we are used to 
regularly working directly in the field.  For this reason, we highly 
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appreciate the approach of the ÇATOM and their relationship with their 
target group.  For the health education sessions at the ÇATOM every 
Friday, we organize the classes upon demands coming from the 
participants.  These sessions are designed and given in a way that they 
attract the full attention of participants.  So much that sometimes there 
are 85-90 participants gathering in one session to listen to the class.  In 
terms of the approach to participants and the quality of the sessions that 
are given, the ÇATOM is much better than the Public Training Center.  
The best example of this is that the opinions of participants are taken 
with the help of the field workers.  I can assure you that the quality and 
the content of the health sessions have increased as a result of demands 
coming from the participants.  The courses are different from those 
given at the Public Training Center; they are richer and more diverse.  
When their interest is tapped, participants are enthusiastic and ready to 
learn; there is an enormous potential. (A Nurse at the Directorate of 
Health, Beytüşşebap) 
 
Similar to the comments of the doctors and nurses at the Directorate of Health in 
Beytüşşebap, the only NGO field worker I came across in the region made similar 
remarks concerning the ÇATOM’s mode of operation in Siirt and its difference with 
other public institutions with similar objectives. 
 
Actually the activities of the ÇATOM are more extensive than what we 
do at the Willows Foundation; we work only on family planning.  I find 
Pelin [field worker of Siirt ÇATOM] successful in a number of aspects, 
for instance, she raises awareness about health issues and convinces 
people that going to the health center is essential.  I have seen girls who 
started earning money from weaving kilims at the ÇATOM and girls 
who have earned certificates for literacy.  I know that at the ÇATOM, 
people are consulted prior to the start of an activity or a course, because 
different communities have different interests and demands.  I know 
this as a person who is constantly in the field.  Solidarity among girls at 
the ÇATOM is high and the participants are able to comfortably convey 
their problems.  A Public Training director can’t see the work of the 
ÇATOM in the same way as I do.  We constantly work in the field and 
we know what this means.  Pelin works very well in this respect.  They 
don’t understand the meaning of this at Public Training Centers because 
they look at development from an official viewpoint. (A Field Worker 
of the Willows Foundation, Siirt) 
 
In addition to this, I came across other positive attitudes concerning ÇATOMs.  Those 
who were optimistic about ÇATOMs were eager to bring constructive criticisms.  These 
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were comments resulting from more sober understandings of the importance of 
cooperation among institutions for a better provision of social services.  As the governor 
of Beytüşşebap stated, “there must be dialogue between the two institutions.  The two 
must be able to complete each other’s deficiencies.  Coordination must be established 
between the two in order to prevent the waste of resources utilized in different projects 
and activities.” 
 
Similarly, some public administrators were well aware of the alternatives brought by 
ÇATOMs to the region in terms of the provision of social services and eventual social 
development.  Despite an awareness of the bottom-up approach of the ÇATOMs, they 
still found the actual operations of ÇATOMs in the field insufficient and ineffective: 
“There are places where the ÇATOM field worker is unable to reach.  The field worker 
needs to organize more visits to homes in the community and raise more awareness 
among the families in the community.  The closer you are to the community, the more 
successful you will be.  The best way to reach people is to listen to their problems and 
learn their needs.” 
 
Other positive reactions were confronted in the field during interviews with local 
authorities who pointed out the various benefits of ÇATOMs in the region.  Some, for 
instance, stated the greatest advantage of the ÇATOMs as their ability to attract a higher 
participation of young girls and women within the community.  These officials 
acknowledged, albeit reluctantly and in a patronizing manner from time to time, the 
more positive aspects of ÇATOM activities, their mode of operation and more 
importantly, their potential for improvement: 
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Participation in the ÇATOM is higher compared to participation in the 
Public Training Center here in Beytüşşebap.  One of the reasons for this 
is that the ÇATOM has a better reputation among the community 
members.  The ÇATOM is very similar to the Public Training Center, 
but Public Training is official and disciplined, whereas the other is 
flexible; so flexible that in a way, the ÇATOM is like a woman’s coffee 
house [kadın kahvehanesi in Turkish].  This kind of a discipline, 
created by the women themselves, is better than school discipline.  I am 
here for two years and have been observing the ÇATOM.  In the 
beginning there was no planning, there was a kind of randomness in 
their activities.  But now this year they are better.  In the beginning the 
ÇATOM did not really have an effect on the target group, but now they 
work with more experience and consequently there is more 
participation from the community.  Again in the beginning, the 
activities were not really suitable for the target group.  In general there 
is a tendency for improvement. (Governor, Beytüşşebap) 
 
While some state officials complained about the deficiencies and lack of expertise of 
ÇATOM field staff, others conveyed the opinion that ÇATOMs were successful merely 
due to the exclusive efforts of its field staff.  Instead of associating the efforts of field 
workers to the entire philosophy and organizational structure of the ÇATOM, they 
tended to see the success of the ÇATOM as the product of a single individual: 
 
I find the ÇATOM highly successful.  The flexibility and success of the 
ÇATOM is a result of the good work carried out by its field staff and 
personnel.  Batman ÇATOM is equivalent to Şükran hanım [the field 
worker of the ÇATOM in Batman center].  Ankara channels lots of 
funds to Batman but our main problem is that we are unable to make 
efficient use of these funds.  I give these funds and other additional 
support to Şükran hanım because she is very good at making excellent 
use of the available funds and she is successful in making the ÇATOM 
a functional institution, unlike our own institutions. (Governor, 
Batman) 
 
This revealed the fact that ÇATOMs are sometimes the sole initiative of individuals 
rather than a participatory project based on joint planning, organization and action.  The 
fact that some NGO representatives also spoke about the outstanding efforts of 
individual field workers unraveled the peculiar organizational structure of ÇATOMs in 
 204 
 
which individual efforts are the primary mobilizers of ÇATOM activities.  Some 
comments of related local administrators revealed the inability of ÇATOMs to 
encourage local participation at the community level and mobilize the grassroots.  This 
lack of institutionalization was in fact a characteristic that I observed even within the 
NGO structure and organization, which I analyzed in the following two chapters of the 
current study. 
 
It was clear from the interviews that ÇATOM existence and activity was highly 
dependent on the personal tendencies of the local administrators, with the province and 
county governors being especially determinant.  This was evident in the comments that 
while some of the local authorities noted the unfortunate absence of financial resources 
of ÇATOMs, others claimed that the only factor influential in the success and 
effectiveness of the ÇATOMs were their abundant resources.  In any case, I was able to 
conclude that the dependency of ÇATOMs on respective governorates for resources and 
financial support decreases their chances of sustainability.  The words of the Batman 
governor was highly revealing in this respect: 
 
I am unable to obtain funds for the ÇATOM through the Special 
Administration [Özel İdare in Turkish] but through the Directorate of 
Village Affairs [Köy İşleri in Turkish].  The support that is given to the 
ÇATOM depends largely on the attitude of the governor.  I am in favor 
of and willing to help the ÇATOMs but the governor after me might not 
be so cooperative.  The ÇATOM has to somehow secure its resources.  
An organization with possibilities of production and marketing 
becomes very important.  A more professional approach to trade must 
be developed among the people of this region.  For instance, we have 
farmers who are ashamed of going to the market place to sell their 
produce.  Marketing possibilities must be discussed and implemented. 
(Governor, Batman) 
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6.2.3.  Attitudes of Public Administrators 
 
To summarize the results of the data collected from local state authorities in locations 
where the 7 ÇATOMs are situated, several points became visible.  None of the 
interviewed state officials, including province and county governors, mentioned the 
importance of a holistic outlook on issues of development.  Almost all authorities were 
absorbed in their daily dull workloads and spoke within the framework of their narrowly 
defined understandings of social provision and development.  Similarly, the role of 
nongovernmental activity and civil society organizations was barely acknowledged and 
mentioned.  The words of the governor of Batman was typical of state authorities in the 
region: “Every institution carries out activities on literacy and health education, but this 
is no simple matter.  People in Turkey believe social projects and activities like the ones 
carried out by Public Training Centers to be the easiest of all tasks.  Vakıfs and 
associations come here for such projects but this is a difficult task.  There is plenty of 
publicity around this matter but this is the kind of work that necessitates dedicated 
voluntarism.” 
 
The words of the Batman governor continued to once again typify most local state 
authorities’ understanding of the actors of development and cooperation among these 
actors: “In reality, the ÇATOM is an unnecessary institution because there are already 
institutions that do the same kind of work as the ÇATOMs.  In fact, in addition to 
agencies such as the Social Services, the Directorate of Health, and the Directorate of 
Public Training, there is also the Gendarmerie and the Security Forces that are involved 
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in the same sort of activities with the same objectives as the ÇATOM.”  As clear in the 
preceeding quotation, local state officials in Southeastern Anatolia have tended to 
normalize the involvement of the armed security forces in issues of development. 
 
On the issue of gender awareness, only one public administrator mentioned the 
importance of and the need to tackle gender imbalance in the region and the specific 
approach of the ÇATOM project in this regard.  Despite an awareness of gender issues, 
however, women are still seen as an extension of the family rather than an individual in 
her own right. 
 
The women in the region lack behind in terms of education and culture.  
For this reason it is highly important that we educate our women.  
Compared to the Public Training Centers, the activities of the ÇATOM 
are more diverse, and the education given to the women is more 
extensive.  Woman is the foundation of the family, but unfortunately 
we have women at the lowest levels of society.  These women have to 
be educated in topics such as family planning and child care.  This is 
highly important for a peaceful and secure family environment. 
(Director of Agriculture, Siirt) 
 
Despite the interpretation of women in the region as possessing a ‘low’ and ‘backward’ 
culture, and the need to educate them within the understanding of republican ideology, it 
was nevertheless heartening to find a male state official mentioning the deprivation of 
women in the region. 
 
The second important observation concerning ÇATOM relations with local state 
authorities was the functioning of ÇATOMs in a highly tense environment.  There was a 
general failure among local state authorities for the understanding and recognition of the 
approach and working philosophy of ÇATOMs.  Even the governors did not bother to 
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understand the different dynamics and approach of ÇATOMs.  Perhaps due to the local 
absence of NGOs and their representatives, the semi-civil character of ÇATOMs was 
completely missed.  Because of their failure to understand these dynamics, most public 
administrators made confused comments about the ÇATOMs.  Some praised their 
decentralized and flexible work mode while others condemned the lack of discipline. 
 
Perhaps most important was the observation of the difficulties faced by ÇATOMs with 
respect to cooperation with institutions of the state.  The highly negative atmosphere in 
terms of the existence of several institutions with similar objectives made cooperation 
almost impossible in the eyes of local public officials: “If resources are provided and 
courses are opened in every community, then ÇATOMs will be active in places where 
Public Training Centers are passive.  But if Public Training Centers are active, 
ÇATOMs are doomed to be passive.”  This reveals the mentality that no two institutions 
are able to function collaboratingly side by side, but that one institution eventuals 
withers away in the powerful existence of another.  The vertical power relations inherent 
at the bureaucracy level was possibly one of the reasons behind such a conception of 
social provision.  Horizontal relations and modes of operation seem to be inconceivable 
among local state authorities. 
 
Perhaps the most peculiar relationship of ÇATOMs with the related public 
administrators was in the province of Siirt.  There was a particularly negative attitude on 
the part of the governorate and related directorates in Siirt towards the ÇATOM and its 
staff members.  The lack of incentive for cooperation was especially prevalent in Siirt 
where I realized that the large scale TOKAP project, the Community Development 
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Project of the previous Siirt governor, refused to collaborate with the ÇATOM despite 
the similar intentions of community development.  The Education director of Siirt 
explained that the fundamental reason that ÇATOMs lagged behind in development was 
the promotion of Community Centers under the TOKAP project: “Plenty of funds were 
channeled from various provinces to Siirt specifically for the TOKAP project.  The 
governor at the time focused on Community Centers [of the Social Services and Child 
Protection Agency] but showed no interest for the ÇATOMs.  The ÇATOM seems very 
passive because it has insufficient resources and staff.  The ÇATOM has no team and no 
vehicles.  The Center even applies to the governorate for its fuel during the winter 
months.  The ÇATOM can operate better if it is provided with resources and qualified 
staff.”  However, the same authority seemed unaware that it was largely in the hands of 
the governor to decide how active the ÇATOM in Siirt would become. 
 
Despite the many signs of appreciation for ÇATOM field workers, there was 
nevertheless an incomprehensible reaction against the ÇATOM in Siirt, as in many other 
locations.  In spite of such negativities, there were some local administrators in Siirt who 
argued that the ÇATOM had, in fact, set an example for the TOKAP project: “It seems 
to me as if the objectives of the ÇATOM and the TOKAP were initially the same 
although changes appeared later on during the implementation of the project.  In fact, I 
believe the TOKAP project was created by taking the ÇATOM as a model.” 
 
The director of the Security Forces in Siirt confirmed the same assertion: “With the 
TOKAP project, the previous governor actually wanted to do the same things as what 
Pelin hanım [field worker of Siirt ÇATOM] is doing now in the ÇATOM.  So logically, 
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the governor should have been more than eager to cooperate with the ÇATOM under the 
TOKAP project; especially when there is a personnel like Pelin hanım who works with 
incredible sacrifice and hardship, but unfortunately some administrators don’t want to 
see it this way.”  Finally, the Siirt representative and field worker of the Istanbul-based 
Willows Foundation made similar comments: “The previous governor in Siirt started the 
TOKAP project which was in fact the same project as that of the ÇATOM on paper, but 
in implementation things turned out differently.  With the distribution of food packages 
to families, the governor announced that the TOKAP project had helped people develop.  
Now people are used to this kind of an approach and still expect the same kind of 
treatment from every institution that comes in to help them.” 
 
It was only the directorate of Health in Beytüşşebap that exhibited the willingness for 
cooperation: “A joint conference was organized by the ÇATOM and Directorate of 
Health in Beytüşşebap.  It set a great example to coordination among institutions.”  In 
addition to the mainly negative attitudes and several positive signs of cooperation, other 
opinions were of a neutral character, stating the indifference of ÇATOM existence in the 
community.  Opinions were given on ÇATOMs not yet setting an example in their 
respective communities: “The ÇATOM has not reached the point where it sets an 
example or a model to other institutions.”  However, there was in fact one clear case of 
the ÇATOM setting an example and influencing the activities of other institutions.  The 
director of Public Training in Cizre explained the effect of the ÇATOM on their work: 
 
We work very closely with the ÇATOM; we open exhibitions together 
and we help them in planning and organizing their activities.  The 
group workshops at the ÇATOM attract particular attention.  For 
instance, the 8 March International Women’s Day festivities were 
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especially successful.  The ÇATOM was the first to celebrate 8 March, 
and then we decided to organize a second event.  There is great interest 
for the ÇATOM but if there was a service bus, there would be a larger 
number of participants coming to the ÇATOM.  In fact, the ÇATOM 
building should be more in the center of the city so that more girls can 
attend the activities. 
 
6.3.  GAP Administrators 
 
6.3.1.  Understanding of Development 
 
I was confronted with a completely different approach to issues of development after 
having contacted the administrators of the GAP project, both in the headquarters in 
Ankara and the regional administration in Şanlıurfa.  The authorities at the GAP 
Administration were highly atypical in their views and understandings of development 
and gender issues compared to other public administrators and members of the military 
active in the GAP region.  The initial major difference I observed was the positive 
attitudes of GAP administrators towards NGOs and their eagerness to integrate the local 
population into the development process, as opposed to the more top-down approach of 
conventional developmentalists.  Unlike the approach to development as foreseen and 
adopted by almost all local state administrators active in Southeastern Anatolia, all GAP 
administrators acknowledged the values of and advocated a more people-centered 
approach to development in which more egalitarian relations are strived with the target 
group and the beneficiaries of projects.  This importance attached to a participatory 
approach to social development was prevalent in almost all the interviews carried out 
with GAP personnel. 
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Members of the GAP Administration demonstrated their awareness of women and 
gender issues in the region: “One of the main problems concerning women in the region 
is that, both rural and urban women are limited to the spaces in their homes.  They do not 
easily leave the private space of the home.  It is really difficult to reach the women in the 
region.  They have a large number of children, and their workload is tremendous – both 
inside and outside the home.”  In terms of their understanding of the local community of 
women as their target group, their participatory approaches to development and their 
eagerness to encourage cooperation, the assistant to the Social Programs coordinator at 
the GAP Administration recited the following words: 
 
Our main concern was, how do we help women leave their home 
environments, how do we get in touch with women?  For this purpose, 
we came up with the idea and model of a ÇATOM.  We thought that we 
could only reach the people in the region again through people from the 
same region.  We thought of a space in which we could provide 
services designed for the needs of the women in the region.  The person 
to reach this woman would again be a local from the region.  Who can 
do this sort of thing?  We thought of women who could act as a model 
for the other women, someone who can attend educational seminars and 
has the capacity to develop herself. 
 
In the determination of the programs to be implemented, we had direct 
contact with the target group, focus group meetings, and so on.  Not 
only the women but we also had meetings with the husband, the 
mother, the father, neighbors and so on.  We determined on the one 
hand, their needs, their potentials, and what we can offer on the other.  
We prepared a program in which all these aspects met.  And then we 
figured out from where we can get what support: what can local 
municipalities provide, what can local administrators provide, what can 
local NGOs provide, what can international organizations provide. 
 
Concerning the more specific issue of the ÇATOM project, GAP personnel at the Social 
Programs Coordination were aware of the common comparisons of ÇATOMs with 
Public Training Centers.  GAP administrators were quick to response by a comparison 
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of the modes of operation of the two respective institutions, namely the GAP 
Administration for the former and the Directorate of National Education for the latter: 
 
People say that ÇATOMs are no different from Public Training 
Centers.  This is not at all the case.  The main difference between the 
two is that in the ÇATOMs, women themselves decide what kind of 
activities they want.  But in Public Training Centers, the curriculum is 
pre-set and there is more of a centralized planning and operation.  One 
other major difference is the ÇATOM committees [made up of 5-7 
members, of which 2 are instructors and the others are participants] in 
each center.  Women and young girls get a chance to have a say in the 
decisions that are taken at the ÇATOM.  Without letting us or TKV 
know, they can organize small scale projects such as trips to nearby 
sites of interest, because every ÇATOM has a monthly budget.  
Through the committee, participants get a chance to make plans, 
implement them, as well as organize the ÇATOM budget.  These are 
important developments for the region because these are ‘seeds of 
mobilization’.  Whereas young girls were never involved in any such 
organization, they have collectively started doing something for 
themselves.  Another important outcome of the ÇATOM is that once 
the girls have started producing something at the ÇATOM, mostly 
handicrafts, they are able to market them on their own.  They sell them 
to neighbors, friends, and relatives.  Some girls even get orders from 
villages and other neighborhoods.  This becomes essential when you 
consider that as ÇATOMs, we have reached 47,000 women and young 
girls as of the end of 2001. 
 
Administrators of the GAP project were eager to describe the peculiar positioning of 
their organization compared to other state institutions and their relatively different 
understanding and mode of operation.  Aware of the gap between the state and the 
people in Turkey, the GAP administrators defined their role as ‘a bridge’, attempting at 
covering this gap between the top and the bottom.  They believe in their capacity to play 
this role given their ‘flexible, comfortable and unbureaucratic working system’ at the 
Administration and their ‘high capacity to maneuver’.  GAP administrators clearly 
defined their ‘mission’ of development as “the creation of values centered on the 
environment and the human.”  They stated their vision as “global thinking and 
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sustainable human development within the framework of local resources and 
conditions.”  GAP officials revealed the main instigators of such alternative approaches 
to development: 
 
We are very different compared to the organizational structure and 
working philosophy of other state institutions.  Our managers have an 
international vision and this is important in giving us direction.  The 
rest of the personnel and staff within the GAP Administration are all 
familiar with this vision.  The fact that we are in close collaboration 
with international agencies such as the UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, WHO, 
and UNFPA, facilitates our access to both national and international 
literature on development which we constantly review.  For instance, 
the GAP project started off as a program for the development of water, 
soil and other natural resources, but through the influence of the 1992 
Rio Summit, sustainable human development became an objective of 
the GAP project.  It was slowly realized that people must be placed at 
the center of development efforts.  So now, instead of infrastructure as 
the focal point, the development of human resources is the focal point. 
 
Our main philosophy is an integrated approach to development, and we 
also take care that the projects implemented are sustainable.  The 
projects are not just for today.  We are also interested in creating 
models, which is another factor of sustainability.  Equality is another 
essential principle in our activities.  We never think that A should be 
getting more than B.  Similarly, we don’t focus on one group.  We deal 
with all the disadvantaged groups in the region. 
 
It was clear that the administrators of the GAP project viewed themselves very distinct 
from other state officials.  One official made this very clear in her words: “Despite the 
fact that we are a state institution, we work with a ‘civil’ spirit.”  There was clearly the 
influence of personal contacts and prior work experience in NGOs for some public 
officials of the GAP Administration.  GAP officials went on to explain their sharp 
differences with other civil servants: 
 
The fact that we have highly qualified staff here at the GAP 
Administration is one of the determining factors of why we are 
different.  Although our headquarters is in Ankara, we work a lot in the 
field.  We don’t produce at the table but out in the field.  We don’t work 
from 8.30 in the morning to 5.30 in the evening.  We also work on the 
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weekends.  We think professionally but work with an amateur spirit.  
We all have faith in our projects, in what we are doing.  And we always 
think collectively as ‘the GAP Administration’, never as I or he or she.  
We don’t work for money here because after all we get paid the same as 
all the other civil servants.  The only difference here is that we 
definitely have occupational satisfaction.  For example, me, as a 
sociologist, I feel that this is the best place I could be working.  Being 
stuck with a fixed time schedule, I think, kills all creativity. 
 
In further explanations for this difference in vision and approach, GAP personnel 
mentioned the importance attached to training opportunities: 
 
Another important difference of the GAP project is that training is 
given top priority.  We attend plenty of educational seminars and 
training sessions because we are open to improvement as an institution.  
We have access to technology that other state institutions don’t have.  
For instance some public personnel still don’t have access to the 
internet.  As an institution, we are open to the outside world, which 
helps us expand our vision.  We attend many different international 
conferences.  We are encouraged to prepare papers for presentation.  
But we also take initiatives as personnel.  If we see problems 
somewhere, we are encouraged to propose suggestions, and design 
project proposals as we like.  There is always support and 
encouragement from the managers for this kind of initiative.  There are 
no restrictions, we are encouraged to communicate with any other 
institution we like.  In that sense, we are very flexible. 
 
6.3.2.  Views on the Role of NGOs 
 
In the light of their vision and mission, GAP administrators confirmed their priority for 
the inclusion of NGOs in their activities and programs.  As a result of this policy, the 
Administration receives technical and educational assistance for the ÇATOMs from the 
Development Foundation of Turkey or Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı (TKV) in Turkish.  The 
NGO is responsible for the maintenance of certain personnel in the ÇATOMs and also 
for the periodic training of the ÇATOM field worker girls, including topics such as the 
preparation of reports, planning and implementation of projects, and access to the target 
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group through appropriate communication skills, hence helping build a bridge between 
the state and the community. 
 
GAP staff boasted about having attracted other NGOs to the region: “Until the last 2 
years, no international or national NGO had done anything in the region concerning 
assistance to women.  An important outcome of the ÇATOMs is precisely this; that 
NGOs have started focusing on women-centered development in the region.”  In addition 
to creating a space in which NGOs can freely get together with public officials and 
institutions for the development and implementation of projects, GAP administrators are 
also proud to have pulled into the region the interest of the private sector in Turkey.  
Through the ÇATOMs, private initiatives have started taking shape in Southeastern 
Anatolia: “ÇATOMs have started attracting the attention of the private sector.  The first 
such initiative is taken by Procter and Gamble.  They approached us with 15,000 USD 
which we used for the establishment of Siverek ÇATOM in Şanlıurfa and the company 
will support its operation for a one year period.” 
 
The GAP staff’s understanding of global development was tied to the progressive 
approach of the GAP Administration as an institution.  The critical outlook on issues of 
development was such that the coordinator of Social Programs even noted the 
insufficiencies of NGOs in Turkey: “When you look at the development of NGOs in 
Turkey, especially in the GAP region, there are very few ‘volunteer’ organizations in the 
true sense of the word.  In terms of volunteer work there is not much activity in the 
region.  It is concentrated more outside the region, in Istanbul and Ankara; the roots are 
there.  A lot of NGOs are still in the tendency to work very much like commercial 
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organizations; there aren’t very many volunteers.  They undertake projects in exchange 
for funds; quite like a business company.” 
 
On the same issue, further criticisms were made of NGOs in the Southeastern region as 
well as the whole of Turkey: 
 
NGOs in Turkey have the tendency of working like an extension of the 
state; they work as long as resources are provided.  Instead of 
mobilizing certain social and communal resources and working for a 
social domain, they are in the tendency of receiving funds from the 
state and providing a service in exchange for this funding.  Some NGOs 
are in the status of organizations of ‘public interest [‘kamu yararına 
kuruluş’ in Turkish].  They can receive funds from public institutions 
and from the state’s investment program.  For instance, TKV is in the 
status of a ‘public interest’ organization.  When such NGOs are 
financially in trouble, they can ask for funds from the state.  For 
example, in the ÇATOM project, TKV in no way uses its own funds for 
this project.  They don’t go searching for funds.  Their funds are met by 
the state.  So they work like our extension.  In reality, a lot of NGOs are 
in the same situation in Turkey.  When they work like this, they intend 
to organize like a public institution.  When you look at a lot of NGOs, a 
lot of them really do have this bureaucratic public organizational 
structure; this hierarchical structure. 
 
In interviews with GAP administrators, sophisticated comments were made on the 
historical development of state-society relations in Turkey and their reflections on issues 
of development today.  The role of NGOs was recited by a GAP personnel: 
 
When we look generally at NGOs in Turkey, it is more in the form of 
an intellectual movement.  Intellectuals in Turkey have problems which 
are based in history.  Because there are no connections with the 
grassroots, they look at problems from the top.  This is why they are 
like extensions of the state; there is the idea of ‘enlightening the 
masses’; the idea of ‘modernization’.  Hence, the notion of looking 
from the top downwards is very common among NGOs in Turkey.  
When you look from the top, you are unable to fulfill your task of 
mobilizing the grassroots.  The main task of NGOs in Turkey should be 
the representation of those whose voices are not heard; to be these 
voices; to defend these voices.  But here we see the opposite because 
this is an intellectual movement, and intellectuals have historically been 
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interested in the enlightenment and the modernization of society.  This 
approach has revealed itself in the form of intellectuals traditionally 
being insensitive of and disregarding certain sensitivities within society 
for the aim of creating ‘modernity’ in the form of the adoption of 
western ideologies.  In this regard, I believe that NGOs have a hard 
time in establishing organic bonds with the society in Turkey. 
 
To what extent these criticisms of NGOs have foundations in reality is the subject matter 
of the following chapter, based on an analysis of 9 NGOs that are directly or indirectly 
involved in the ÇATOM project of the GAP Administration. 
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CHAPTER VII: 
NGOs’ PERSPECTIVES ON THE ÇATOM PROJECT 
 
The fieldwork of the thesis included in-depth interviews and meetings with 
representatives of various NGOs that have links with the ÇATOMs.  These were the 
Development Foundation of Turkey, Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı (TKV), Mother-Child 
Education Foundation, Anne-Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı (AÇEV), Foundation for the Support of 
Women’s Labor, Kadın Emeğini Değerlendirme Vakfı (KEDV), Association for Support 
to Contemporary Life, Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (ÇYDD), Turkish 
Foundation for Education, Türk Eğitim Vakfı (TEV), Tuvana Foundation for the 
Education of Motivated Children, Tüvana İstekli Çocuklar Eğitim Vakfı (TOÇEV), 
Foundation of Education Volunteers, Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı (TEGV), 
Women’s Center, Kadın Merkezi (KAMER), and Ana Kültür277.  Apart from KAMER 
which is based in Diyarbakır in the Southeast and TKV which is based in Ankara, the 
remaining NGOs have their headquarters in Istanbul.  For all NGOs that were 
interviewed, their activities in the ÇATOMs and the Southeast in general is being 
handled from the headquarters.  This is the case even for ÇYDD who have field offices 
in the region.  Only TKV has an operational branch office in Diyarbakır from where 
they partially handle activities related to the ÇATOMs. 
                                                 
277  Ana Kültür does not have an English translation because the word ‘ana’ in Ana Kültür stands for the 
‘ana’ in Anatolia as well as the meaning of ‘main’ and ‘mother’ or ‘matriarchy’ in Turkish, with ‘kültür’ 
referring to the ancient cultures of Anatolia.  Given the matriarchal structure of most ancient Anatolian 
civilizations, the name of Ana Kültür has a particular connotation with a feminist statement.  
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I gathered the names of NGOs active in the ÇATOMs during my visits to these centers 
as well as through my interactions with GAP officials, both in Ankara and in Şanlıurfa.  
Although I visited these NGOs in the hope of finding out about their activities in the 
ÇATOMs, at the end of my meetings and interviews with the respective NGOs, I was 
surprised to realize how little information I had in fact gathered related to these 
activities.  In addition to Ana Kültür and KAMER who were working specifically on 
women and gender issues only in the Southeast, the two other NGOs aware of women’s 
realities in the Southeast were TKV and KEDV.  Ana Kültür was the only organization 
working specifically on gender issues in the Southeast with activities only in the 
ÇATOMs.  TKV, as responsible for the periodic training of the ÇATOM field workers, 
was able to provide the most extensive information and evaluation of the ÇATOMs 
given the organization’s longest involvement in the ÇATOMs since the very beginning 
of the design of the project.  Although KEDV dealt closely with the mobilization of 
women particularly in the Istanbul area, no KEDV projects were yet realized in the 
ÇATOMs.  Similarly, TEGV was still in the discussion phase of a possible collaboration 
with the ÇATOMs.  Apart from a one-time connection with the ÇATOMs, KAMER, an 
advocacy association278 working for women’s rights in the Diyarbakır area, had no other 
contacts with the ÇATOMs.  ÇYDD, TEV and TOÇEV have relationships with the 
ÇATOMs based solely on convenience. 
 
                                                 
278  KAMER is in fact registered as a private enterprise and not as an NGO, due to reasons given in 
chapter IV. 
 220 
 
It was surprising to find out that except for the two NGOs, namely TKV and Ana Kültür, 
all the other organizations had only a superficial relationship with the ÇATOMs.  
KAMER had the potential of becoming a conscious actor in the move to a gender 
balanced development, however, activities in the ÇATOMs had been highly random.  I 
saw that none of the other NGOs were in reality acquainted with ÇATOMs and the 
realities of women in the region.  Most NGOs were not able to provide me with a 
conceptualization of the ÇATOM idea.  During my visits to these 9 NGOs, I heard 
plenty about the problems of children and the youth in Turkey and the Southeast, and 
projects targeting school aged children, including pre-school aged children in some 
cases, but much less when it came to issues of gender.  Although Ana Kültür was one of 
the two NGOs that was consciously working for a gender balanced development, the 
NGO, at the time of the study, was going through financial problems which had already 
started stagnating the organization’s activities in the ÇATOMs.  Other NGOs, including 
ÇYDD, TOÇEV and to a lesser extent AÇEV were indirectly involved in a gender 
balanced development through their activities for young girls and women in general, 
including the provision of scholarships, assistance to formal and informal education and 
training. 
 
7.1.  Approaches to Development 
 
According to a classification used among scholars and field workers alike, NGOs in the 
field of development are categorized into 6 main types, although the boundaries of 
organizations are generally not strictly defined and NGOs can also be characterized as a 
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mixture of the given types.  These 6 types or schools of NGOs are given as ‘advocacy 
groups and networks’, ‘relief and welfare agencies’, ‘technical innovation 
organizations’, ‘public service contractors’, ‘grassroots development agencies’ and 
‘popular development organizations’.279 
 
To attempt a short description of the above-mentioned organizations, advocacy groups, 
as the name implies, are involved in lobbying activities for a particular issue.  One of the 
main areas of concentration for relief and welfare agencies are the distribution of relief 
items for those in need.  Technical innovators are those that have an area of 
specialization and are involved in the development of new ideas and approaches on the 
issue.  Public service contractors act as extensions of the state, carrying out activities 
that are conventionally handled by state institutions.  The main concern of grassroots 
development agencies is the activation of organization at the grassroots level, providing 
support and capacity building opportunities for grassroots mobilization.  Finally, popular 
development organizations are those that are formed by the local community and are 
involved in local development activities. 
 
Prior to an analysis on the basis of this categorization, perhaps it would be more 
appropriate to note some of the specific features of the NGOs that I studied for the 
purposes of this research.  One of the most visible distinctions in the working 
philosophies among the NGOs in the study was their standing with respect to the 
principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the conception of çağdaşlaşma as described in 
                                                 
279  John Clark,  Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations  (London: Earthscan 
Publications Ltd., 1991), 40-41. 
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detail in chapter III.  In the interviews and meetings I had with the members of NGOs, I 
was able to clearly observe the positioning of each NGO within the spectrum of 
republican ideology. 
 
The most evident was obviously Cağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, as the name 
clearly suggests.  Literally translated as the Association for Support to Contemporary 
Life, ÇYDD is highly closely dedicated to the ‘preservation and extension of Atatürk’s 
principles and reforms’.  As stated in chapter III, the word çağdaş which refers to 
‘catching up with the times’ has strong connotations of a development project 
implemented from above.  It was a word used intensely during the early years of the 
Republic when the grand project of modernization was put into practice.  ÇYDD almost 
gives the feeling of continuing the same process of modernization with the same 
principles and tools.  Similar to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s combined project of nation-
building and modernization, ÇYDD defines its objective as the support to the çağdaş life 
of çağdaş individuals and eventually a çağdaş society through çağdaş education.  As the 
rural programs coordinator explained: 
 
We say that we must preserve and build upon Atatürk’s principles and 
reforms; this really is very very important.  Atatürk has really done a lot 
of important work for this country but it is our duty to further build 
upon his work.  Atatürk developed these rules in 1923; in the Turkey of 
the 1920s; to modernize [çağdaşlaştırmak in Turkish] Turkey during 
the 1920s; to help Turkey leap into the contemporary era [çağ atlatmak 
için in Turkish].  We are now going to preserve these rules which are 
Atatürk’s ultimate aim of modernization [çağdaşlaşma in Turkish].  But 
we also have to build upon these rules; we cannot preserve them as they 
were developed in the 1920s.  By building upon these rules, our aim is 
to reach the contemporary individual and the contemporary society 
through contemporary education. 
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The highly secular character of the organization and the fear of religion and irrationality 
were clear in the descriptions of the organization’s projects and activities.  The members 
of ÇYDD gave very well the essence of ‘Ataturkian modernization’ [Atatürkçü 
modernleşme in Turkish] based on the intellect and rationality: 
 
A contemporary individual is one who is rational [aklını kullanan in 
Turkish]; one who rationally processes the information and knowledge 
given to him; one who questions; one who is aware that he must not 
live only for himself but that he must also be useful for the society he 
lives in; one who is sensitive to art, sensitive to the environment, 
sensitive to the human; one who is respectful of human rights and 
respectful towards universal values.  This is the kind of individual that 
we are aiming for as ÇYDD. 
 
ÇYDD viewed development through the mere lens of Atatürk’s principles and reforms, 
of which secularism clearly takes undefeated primacy.  Their strong dedication to the 
preservation of secularism was often repeated: 
 
ÇYDD was established in 1989.  In the years following 1985, as you 
know, there was an increase in anti-secular attitudes in Turkey.  As 
ÇYDD, we give high importance to the preservation of Atatürk’s 
reforms, of which secularism takes the highest priority.  We are an 
Islamic country, but compared to other Islamic countries, we are 
somewhere much much higher.  We owe this, although some of us 
might not be too happy with it, to the secularism principle of the 
Republic which Atatürk established.  For this reason, we must deep-
heartedly preserve this very important principle [olmazsa olmaz ilkeyi 
in Turkish].  Why?  Because religion is manipulated very easily; 
because our people are ignorant and illiterate.  It is very easy to 
degenerate them [yozlaştırmak in Turkish] under the guise of religion.  
This is why we give high priority to the principle of secularism.  The 
increase in anti-secular attitudes after 1983-84 created discomfort 
among intellectuals and university instructors who felt some 
responsibility towards their country, as well as others who love their 
country and their people.  It was this discomfort that led to the 
establishment of ÇYDD.  These people saw that something was going 
wrong in this country, believed that something must be done to correct 
these wrongs; they said this country is ours and no more wrongs must 
be done in this country.  These were sensitive, academic-rooted people. 
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The responsibility felt by ‘sensitive’ and patriotic intellectuals in Turkey for the 
education of the ‘ignorant and illiterate’ masses is clearly evident in the words of ÇYDD 
personnel.  Religion is condemned because of its potential for the manipulation and 
‘degeneration’ of the masses.  The ‘love for the country and its people’ is the motivating 
force behind the development projects planned and carried out by ÇYDD. 
 
TEV is another example where we see the continuous replication of the rhetoric and 
tools of the republican cause.  The conservatism of TEV was obvious even prior to any 
contact with the deputy director of the organization, a lady in her 60s, who had been in 
that particular position since 1967.  The NGO was located in a large multi-floored 
building and reminded me of a public office.  Indeed, the tables all had small Turkish 
and TEV flags each with portraits of Atatürk in every room and lots of pink government 
files stacked up in tall shelves.  Even in the entrance of the building there was a large 
Turkish flag, hinting at the philosophy and approach of the organization. 
 
TEV has been providing scholarships to youth at high school and university level who 
are in need of financial assistance.  Of secondary importance, TEV is also involved in 
the construction of primary school buildings and dormitories.  Similar to ÇYDD, TEV 
portrays characteristics of a welfare agency together with the qualities of a public service 
contractor.  There was no questioning of the current approaches to and policies of formal 
education in Turkey.  Official policies and approaches are fully supported in NGO 
projects.280  
                                                 
280  Adopting the rhetoric does not automatically necessitate a full adoption of the tools and means of 
republican ideology.  Beyaz Nokta Vakfı is such an NGO where all members are supportive of the 
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Perhaps one of the most striking elements of NGOs in this category was their view of 
altruism as a duty.  This republican quality of citizenship is reflected in the following 
words: 
 
Together with our friends, we try to do something for our beautiful 
country.  Thinking that everyone who is born in this country, studies in 
the schools of this country, and becomes employed after having studied 
in the schools of this country, has a responsibility towards this country, 
we create the time from our private lives and from our leisure in order 
to carry out our duties for this country.  This is not a luxury; this is a 
duty, but it is also an excitement in our hearts. (ÇYDD) 
 
It is very important to remember that the east, west, north, and the south 
of our country, we are unitary and we are one.  No matter where a 
person lives, he/she is the person of this country.  We are obliged to 
love the people of this country because we live together.  The more we 
approach them with love, the more they will approach us with love.  
This is the theme I always emphasize in opening ceremonies and other 
events.  If you ask about the Southeast and the people of Batman, they 
are attached to us with great love.  The reason for this is our warm 
attention and love. (TEV) 
 
TOÇEV carried out activities similar to that of ÇYDD and TEV, except for the main 
difference that republican values played less of an essentialism in their project contents 
and approach.  TOÇEV was involved in the support of children who were willing to 
attend school but were unable to do so due to the financial limitations of their families.  
Apart from providing monetary input, the organization supplied assistance in the form of 
school stationary needs, clothing, food, health provisions and supplementary social 
activities during the weekends.  Of the 300 children supported in Istanbul, another 350 
were supported in the Marmara earthquake area and an additional 300 children were 
                                                                                                                                                
principles of the republic but are also interested in creating alternatives.  Although the subject matter is 
formal education and not an overtly political issue, the NGO nevertheless aims at structural changes 
within the system, thus working like an organization of technical innovation. 
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supported in the Southeast.  Eligible children for the project were either found through 
personal contacts or the children themselves applied to the organization for assistance.  
Since all activities were coordinated from the headquarters in Istanbul, in regions outside 
of Istanbul, the organization received help mainly from governorates, education 
directors and school teachers. 
 
The other extreme was NGOs with an advocacy quality.  They challenged government 
policies either with respect to the stronghold of patriarchy or the hegemony of national 
and cultural homogeneity or both.  Ana Kültür and KAMER were both feminist 
organizations, with the former based in Istanbul and the latter based in Diyarbakır in 
Southeastern Anatolia.  While both ÇYDD and TEV only barely hinted at the tensions in 
the region, the other two organizations overtly mentioned the harsh conditions witnessed 
by the local people in the Southeast.  The suffering of women in particular and their 
confrontations with armed conflict were made explicit.  The most distinct statements of 
overt expression of the tension in the region were made by KAMER in which the 
representative pronounced the word ‘Kurdish’ as well as ‘Kurdish women’. 
 
Despite their positions as lobby organizations, what was interesting was the emphasis of 
both organizations on their remoteness and detachment from politics.  Although both 
Ana Kültür and KAMER stressed their concerns for being strictly ‘apolitical’, both had 
different conceptions of the notion.  While acknowledging a Kurdish reality, the former 
NGO voiced their discomfort in the use of ethnic identities such as ‘Kurdish’ and 
‘Assyrian’ for the collection of project funds, while the other freely spoke about the 
reality of Kurdishness and Kurdish women’s rights.  What made these two NGOs stand 
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apart from one another were their different definitions of ‘apolitical’.  Ana Kültür 
displayed an attitude similar to the standing of official ideology with respect to 
minorities and nationality in Turkey.  Germany based NGOs including the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, Adenauer Foundation and the Friedrich Neumann Foundation were 
discreetly disapproved for their emphasis on the cultural rights of minorities and diverse 
identitites.  Ana Kültür claimed to be operating apolitically by downplaying ethnic and 
religious differences and concentrating on the Southeastern Anatolia region as a whole.  
This seems to be a strategy on their part to keep their distance equally from all political 
parties in the country, even the highly secularist institutions.  On the other hand, 
although KAMER explicitly emphasized their ‘Kurdishness’, they too were wary about 
not ‘getting involved in politics’, defining politics in the more strict definition of party 
politics. 
 
Although these two organizations were mainly advocacy groups, they also acted as 
welfare agencies through the provision of assistance items on a random basis.  As needs 
arose and the NGOs were notified by the target group, personal connections helped in 
the meeting of needs such as clothing, books, computers, sewing machines and medical 
treatment of individual cases in Istanbul in the case of Ana Kültür.  Hence, even lobby 
NGOs had difficulties in the concentration of their projects purely on matters of 
advocacy.  They had expanded their projects to include relief and other activities. 
 
Perhaps the most impressive in terms of mission and approaches were the several NGOs 
that had a more holistic look at the issue of development.  TKV, KEDV and TEGV were 
particularly distinctive as organizations closest to the typology of grassroots 
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development agencies.  Although they all had completely different target groups, their 
understanding of and approaches to development were based on their motives of the 
mobilization of the grassroots.  Unlike ÇYDD or TEV, these 3 organizations were well 
informed of the dynamics of NGO activity on a worldwide scale, the most recent 
developments of the terminology in their fields of operation, and the importance of the 
local participation of the grassroots.  All these factors contributed to their integrated 
outlook on the various aspects of social development.  Ana Kültür, on the other hand, 
also had some qualities of a grassroots development agency through their awareness 
raising activities on issues of women’s rights among women in the Southeast through the 
ÇATOMs. 
 
With the effect of cooperation with NGOs in Europe since the late 1970s, TKV had been 
familiar with development terminology and was already implementing various 
specialized techniques in the field.  In time they became familiar with the concepts of 
participation, sustainability, human centered development, community-based activities, 
income generation activities and so on.  TKV believed itself to be the only NGO 
currently in Turkey systematically applying these approaches in the field.  It was in fact 
the familiarity of TKV with these concepts and applications that created the basis for 
cooperation between TKV and the GAP Administration. 
 
The second most distinctive NGO was KEDV.  Given the ultimate aim of women’s 
empowerment through their local organization and mobilization, KEDV was particularly 
distinctive in their relations with the target group and their general approach to low-
income women’s empowerment in squatter neighborhoods.  Their main projects 
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involved the creation of income generation activities with the women in centers 
established by KEDV.  To enable such women to gain skills for the generation of 
income, the NGO had developed a system in which children were placed into day care 
centers run by the women themselves.  Once these women had guaranteed that their 
children were in safe settings run by women in the same community, they were then 
encouraged by KEDV to initiate activities that were empowering and would generate 
income.  Through the realization of the full potential of its target group, KEDV had been 
establishing a fruitful communication with vulnerable and disadvantaged women for 
their self-empowerment. 
 
Thirdly, TEGV, since its establishment in 1995, was working mainly with school aged 
children and their families to a lesser extent.  Their aim was to help children make 
effective use of their time outside school hours.  The development of mental and 
physical capacity was encouraged primarily through alternative mind games, physical 
education and creative drama techniques.  In this way, TEGV provided support to and 
supplemented the curriculum of formal education given in schools.  The skills given to 
7-16 aged children included the development of their capacities to think freely, to 
question and to demand.  The activities at the centers of the TEGV also prepared 
students for tolerance.  In order to inform local communities about the activities of the 
organization and to encourage from below such a demand for the construction of TEGV 
centers, the NGO notified the use of mobile units in the name of ‘Hope 2000 Buses’, a 
project which was started after the earthquake in the Marmara region.  Through these 
mobile units which TEGV regarded as the ‘forces of innovation’, local communities 
were given a flavor of TEGV activities.  Only upon the introduction of activities and 
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subsequent demands from the local community does the organization decide for the 
construction of TEGV educational units and parks. 
 
Finally, AÇEV stood out in particular in terms of their highly specialized, technical 
nature and approach.  AÇEV was the only NGO that could be classified as an 
organization of technical innovation.  AÇEV was established in 1993 for the aim of 
promoting and protecting the right to education for all through the assistance of children 
and adults in fulfilling their potential.  The NGO pursued its mission through its two 
areas of expertise, namely early childhood education and adult education.  In order to 
improve and expand the quality of early childhood and adult education services across 
the country, AÇEV has been developing programs and education models and providing 
training for the expansion of these programs.  While the state provides the framework of 
such education in Turkey, AÇEV had taken on the task of contributing directly to these 
efforts through one-to-one cooperation with the respective authorities.  More 
specifically, AÇEV had developed a new program that was being widely used by the 
Public Training Centers under the Ministry of National Education.  It was this ministry 
that AÇEV had the most direct links with.  In addition to working at the policy level, 
AÇEV was also involved in the training of public instructors on child and adult 
education programs developed by the organization.  At the time of the study, the NGO 
was in the process of officializing the adoption of this model by the Ministry of National 
Education.  In spite of an acknowledgement of the difficulties of this cooperation, 
AÇEV believed to have nevertheless developed positive relations with the respective 
authorities in terms of the improvement of education programs and models. 
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AÇEV, with its commitment to social development on a more global scale, had also 
taken part in regional networks and similar collaborative programs.  Since 1997, the 
organization has had a leading role in a number of networks such as the Consultative 
Group on Early Childhood Care and Development in which AÇEV was the acting 
representative of the Central Asian region.  Additionally, the NGO was appointed in 
1999 as the Early Childhood Cooperation Center for Central Asia within the UNESCO 
Early Childhood Partnership Program.  AÇEV prided itelf on providing and 
disseminating the knowledge and know-how on child and adult education in the Central 
Asia region through the models it developed. 
 
7.2.  Relations with the Target Group 
 
As inherited from the Kemalist project of modernization, there is the continuation of a 
one-way communication between NGO representatives, made up of the intellectuals and 
academicians of Turkey, and their target group.  In their projects, ÇYDD personnel, for 
instance, “mingle with the local population” [yöre halkıyla bütünleşiliyor in Turkish].  
Similar to the ‘intellectual’ profile of the republican era, who is responsible for the 
education of its people, the members of ÇYDD were dedicated to educating the illiterate 
and righting the wrongs of the country.  This was all done with the passion of the love 
for the country and its people.  This attitude was also prevalent in the organization’s 
Urban-Rural Youth Hand-in-Hand project [Kent-Köy Gençliği Elele projesi in Turkish].  
The NGO takes “students who are studying in the main universities of main cities to any 
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village or county in any part of Anatolia and have them prepare projects for281 the people 
in the region.”  Projects were prepared for instead of with the people. 
 
In all their projects, the mere aim of ÇYDD was the creation of qualified individuals 
who would be able to further extend the principles and reforms established by Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk.  Since this was the main drive behind the design and development of 
projects, ÇYDD had come up with projects in preparation for the 100th year of the 
Republic: 
 
In Turkey there are Regional Boarding Primary Schools [Yatılı 
İlköğretim Bölge Okulları, YIBO in Turkish] whose number is around 
500.  There are nearly 200,000 students in these YIBOs.  These are 
children in the age group 7-15.  In the year 2023, in the 100th year of 
our Republic, they will be in the ages 29-37; in other words, they will 
be the adolescents of this country.  Myself and my peers, we might not 
be around, but we must be supportive of these children in their 
childhood.  We have to prepare and develop these children in a way that 
we want to see them in 2023, in the 100th year of our Republic.  We 
think of this often and hence pay regular visits to the YIBOs.  We 
detect their needs, what they are missing, and the level of development 
of the children.  The reality we confronted during these visits signaled 
to us that we must immediately plan a project for the YIBOs.  As you 
know, children in the age group 7-15 are still play children, but in the 
YIBOs these children have no other access except for the school, 
dormitory and the dining hall.  They don’t even have a swing or a 
playing ladder with which they can play when they feel the need to.  
Therefore, we urgently brought together 25 YIBO school directors in 
Ulukışla in Niğde, with the organization of the county governor.  The 
project we came up with was the Support to the Citizens of the 100th 
Year of the Republic in their Childhood [Cumhuriyet’in 100. Yılının 
Yurtdaşlarına Çocukluklarında Destek Olma projesi in Turkish]. 
 
The way ÇYDD kept contact with the target group was through letters.  Girls wrote to 
the headquarters in Istanbul, explaining their happiness in receiving the scholarship 
while boys wrote telling about the girls in their classrooms who were beneficiaries of the 
                                                 
281  Italics are added for emphasis. 
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Contemporary Girls of Contemporary Turkey project [Çağdaş Türkiye’nin Çağdaş 
Kızları projesi in Turkish].  When the boys saw these girls showing off as the 
‘contemporary girls of contemporary Turkey’, the boys wrote to the headquarters 
indicating their desire to become ‘contemporary boys of contemporary Turkey’.  The 
hundreds of letters that were received by the headquarters were carefully considered and 
thus projects were developed.  The Contemporary Girls of Contemporary Turkey project 
was being sponsored by the private company Turkcell and aimed to reach 5,000 girls all 
over the country, providing educational assistance to girls who were unable to attend 
school due to their families’ financial problems.  During the interviews, it was indicated 
that ÇYDD was trying to find sponsorship for those who wanted to become 
contemporary boys of contemporary Turkey.  All other projects were derivatives of 
these letters from the children. 
 
As clearly seen above, ÇYDD keep their philosophy alive with the names that they give 
their projects and they regard primary and secondary school teachers as their local 
representatives.  They use these teachers, school directors, governors and sometimes 
military units in the selection of their beneficiaries.  This philosophy and approach was 
very similar to those of other NGOs visited for the purposes of this study.  Both TEV 
and TOÇEV made use of local authorities in order to initiate and maintain their relations 
with the target group.  TEV selected its students according to the inputs of school 
directors and university deans.  They wrote letters to these authorities explaining their 
conditions and requested them to select students for scholarship qualifications.  The 
progress of students was then monitored in individual files at the headquarters in 
Istanbul upon receipt of students’ final grades.  Similar to ÇYDD, TOÇEV visited some 
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of the children it supported through occasional visits to the region.  Letters were also an 
important means of communication between the organization and its beneficiaries. 
 
Ana Kültür, on the other hand, had a similar approach to communication with the target 
group.  Perhaps naturally, given the coordination of activities from the Istanbul office, 
the modes of communication with the target group in the Southeast were through 
telephone calls, letters, and occassional visits to the region.  Ana Kültür was critical of 
other NGOs for their one-time presence in the field, arguing that these organizations did 
nothing more than build up expectations through promises that they did not keep.  They 
viewed other NGOs as lacking a follow-up process while Ana Kültür itself also lacked a 
professional approach to monitoring their activities.  Telephone calls, letters, visits to the 
region, and conversations with the women in the field [hal hatır sorma in Turkish] were 
regarded as sensitivities towards the region as well as sufficient tools for follow-up.  Ana 
Kültür criticised ‘secularist’ NGOs for their one-way communication with the target 
group and regarded a reciprocal communication with the target group as enriching for 
both sides.  However, this was more a personal enrichment and this philosophy did not 
demonstrate itself on an institutional level or on the basis of projects. 
 
To indicate the other extreme, the relations of KEDV and TEGV with their target group 
were particularly impressive.  KEDV stressed the interaction between the two parties in 
which both learn from one another, thus bringing a new approach to the unidirectional 
modes of communication mainly used by NGOs.  The responsible for fieldwork 
coordination at the KEDV recited how these relations were maintained. 
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The relationship we have with the women is an extremely horizontal 
relationship.  We are not in the position of teaching and instructing.  
We learn from them and they learn from us.  We work with the 
mentality that they have something at hand and we have something at 
hand which we then share.  This is the fundamental approach of KEDV.  
This is an organization that undertakes extensive work in the field, 
directly with the women. 
 
The top three priorities that TEGV listed as the most definitive of their work was 
accountability, transparency, and the encouragement of the participation of the local 
community and local elected offices.  Indeed, the most innovative aspect of TEGV’s 
work was their strong emphasis on the promotion of volunteers for the activities in their 
educational units and parks.  All TEGV facilities were handled by volunteers that were 
encouraged from the locality.  TEGV emphasized the fact that no officially appointed 
personnel could be confronted in any of their educational centers, thus describing their 
style of operation as strictly “civil”. 
 
Even if there are no TEGV units in a particular region, we don’t open 
up units there just because it is missing in that region and we think units 
should be opened up there.  If there is a formation there; a formation or 
a group that wants TEGV to be there, then we are inclined to open up a 
unit there.  What does this mean?  This means an initiative has been 
formed there.  We work hand in hand with this initiative.  This initiative 
generally comes from the community leaders in that particular locality.  
We attach high importance to teaching people how to fish rather than 
giving them the fish.  We want the people in the region to make our 
educational units their own. 
 
TEGV sets a good example of how NGOs can integrate the global trends in development 
approaches with the realities of the local in Turkey. 
 
The sociological character of the Southeastern region is important.  
How do they see your projects?  This is very important.  And we have 
to be very sensitive, an invisible rule which we do not mention in our 
books or while introducing ourselves.  Yes, there is initiative and there 
is a formation of some sort, but we always have to keep in mind the 
sociology of the region.  What you call creative drama might be like a 
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swear word to a man in the region.  Even for younger children, the boys 
and the girls can’t hold hands.  For children from different aşirets, they 
are told to not hold hands.  You wouldn’t believe the kind of things we 
are confronted with in the field.  We do have such limitations but 
NGOism [vakıfçılık in Turkish] does not have a recipe; we learn these 
things by living.  There are examples in the world, and I am well aware 
of them, but this does not interest me so much.  I carry out my activities 
in Turkey.  Of course I get some ideas from diverse projects worldwide, 
but this is Turkey; we have to work differently.  We don’t enter the 
internet and say ‘so this is how things work’ and then apply that to 
Turkey.  We work entirely with inputs that come from the field. 
 
7.3.  Activities related to the ÇATOMs 
 
7.3.1.  Involvement of NGOs in the ÇATOMs 
 
It was surprising to find out that none of the NGOs interviewed had intentionally started 
working in the ÇATOMs.  In most cases, NGOs already had their activities in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region, and the ÇATOMs merely provided an additional space for 
the implementation of certain projects and activities.  The only exception to this was 
TKV who had been involved in the ÇATOMs since the very early stages of research and 
action planning for the foundation of the ÇATOMs.  The long-standing involvement of 
TKV in development issues, their holistic approach to development as well as their 
extensive experience in the field were factors that contributed to their early involvement 
with the GAP Administration and the ÇATOM project.  The fact that TKV is an 
‘established’ NGO also facilitated its cooperation with the GAP Administration. 
 
ÇYDD’s involvement in the ÇATOMs was through their annual ‘education and culture 
festival’ which started upon the warm welcome of the county governor of Idil in Şırnak 
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province.  Festival activities were undertaken in the ÇATOM building due to the mere 
fact that no other space was available in the county.  It was after the design of the above-
mentioned project that ÇYDD needed a space to carry out the activities such as 
discussions, seminars, and children’s activities including painting and theater events, 
ceramics, story writing competitions, folkloric dancing and so on.  Only then did the 
ÇATOM come into the picture.  Additionally, within the scope of the Support to 
National Education project, ÇYDD prepared booklets for adult women on topics 
including women’s reproductive health, children’s health care, communication within 
the family, cooking and nutrition, among others.  These booklets, while distributed to 
public institutions of education, were also distributed to all ÇATOMs in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region. 
 
The sole involvement of TEV, on the other hand, was their construction of a ÇATOM 
building in Batman.  After the news of increasing suicides among young girls in 
Batman, TEV decided to do something about the problem.  Upon an appointment with 
the Batman governor, a meeting was held in the governor’s office with a number of 
other semi-governmental organizations, and the decision was taken to “have something 
done to keep the girls busy, to help them gain skills, and to keep their minds off of 
suicide”.  It was decided that if TEV constructed a community center, “these young girls 
will learn something, and then by selling the items that they have produced, they will be 
able to buy for themselves what they want and do what they want.  Hence, they will be 
happy.”  The reason that this new community center would be handed over to the 
ÇATOM field worker was due to her popularity among the governor and the local 
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administrators in Batman and the NGOs active in the ÇATOMs as well as her reputation 
as a hard-working young woman. 
 
Ana Kültür, working differently from ÇYDD and TEV, initially had a diverse approach 
to the issue of women’s rights and gender balanced development.  The founders of the 
organization, made up of academicians and feminist activists, had gone to the Beijing 
Conference on Women in 1995 and upon their arrival in Turkey, established an Equality 
Monitoring Committee to follow the implementations on a national level of the Beijing 
Convention and other related international agreements and blueprints such as the 
Agenda 21 of the Rio Conference.  These feminist activists continued such gender 
lobbying until one day in 1997 they read in the newspapers about Sevil Gök who was 
murdered in Şanlıurfa as a result of an honor crime [namus cinayeti in Turkish].  The 
women decided to convert their attention and activities to such cases of a more practical 
nature and thus started getting directly involved with the women that they represented. 
 
AnaKültür decided to go to Şanlıurfa for the first court trial of the case of Sevil Gök in 
order to carry out a demonstration.  It was during this visit that Ana Kültür became 
acquainted with the ÇATOMs and since then, the organization’s main activities are 
carried out in the ÇATOMs.  In this sense, Ana Kültür is an organization with a 
specifically ‘gender’ agenda that works only in the Southeastern Anatolia region.  The 
members of the organization define their main role as the raising of awareness among 
women in the Southeast on honor crimes and other issues of the violation of women’s 
rights.  Ana Kültür thrives for “women in the Southeast and particularly in the ÇATOMs 
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to become individuals, citizens, and participants in the process of sustainable 
development through the awareness and acknowledgement of their rights as women”.   
 
Despite Ana Kültür’s long-standing engagement with the women in the region, the 
organization’s involvement with the ÇATOMs was purely arbitrary.  The founder and 
president of the NGO explained the process: 
 
Our involvement in the ÇATOMs was purely coincidental.  I asked 
around before going to Urfa in 1997, telling people that I intended to 
carry out some projects there.  They told me that the GAP 
Administration would be helpful in the region.  I visited a number of 
other institutions in the region but the one organization that was really 
helpful and opened up the path for our activities was the Regional 
Directorate of the GAP Administration.  The local development experts 
there are really idealist and hard working people who are working 
whole-heartedly for their own region.  By then, there were only 5 
ÇATOMs and they had been open for one year.  1-2 years later I got 
acquainted with the Community Centers of the Social Services Agency, 
but the bureaucracy and hierarchy was so much more determinant that 
it was much easier to carry out our activities through the ÇATOMs.  In 
5 years we carried out 17 festivities.  This would not have been possible 
in the Community Centers.  With the ÇATOMs, we were able to act 
more freely.  Also, you can’t underestimate the number of young girls 
and women that come to the ÇATOMs.  I can’t think of any other way 
we would be able to reach such a large number of women so quickly.  It 
is also a fact that you can’t organize women in the region if you are not 
cooperating with ÇATOMs or the Community Centers.  They [the 
authorities] don’t allow it. 
 
The involvement of TOÇEV in the region was also completely arbitrary.  Through the 
persuasion of personal acquaintances, TOÇEV started supporting children in Tunceli in 
Southeastern Anatolia.  When the organization decided to expand in the region, NGO 
staff contacted the GAP Administration which provided them with the telephone 
numbers of the ÇATOM field workers.  As a result, TOÇEV started reaching its target 
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group through the assistance of ÇATOMs, among other intermediaries such as teachers 
and education directors in the region. 
 
In terms of AÇEV’s involvement in the ÇATOMs, the representatives of the 
organization had been on a one-time mission to the GAP region and had carried out their 
child and mother education program in two ÇATOMs.  This was undertaken as a trial 
and there were considerations of further activities being carried out within the 
organization’s larger program of operation in the Southeastern Anatolia region.  
Although talks of such cooperation between AÇEV and the GAP Administration had 
been ongoing for quite some time, no results had yet been materialized.  Similarly, there 
were still discussions going on of TEGV’s possible cooperation with the GAP 
Administration.  Finally, KEDV had been discussing the approach of a cooperation with 
the Administration, but problems had arisen due to varying opinions on the design of a 
memorandum of understanding between the two agencies. 
 
7.3.2.  Role of NGOs in the ÇATOMs 
 
TKV, as the NGO with closest ties with the GAP Administration due to an extensive 
agreement between the two institutions, gave the most detailed overview of the role of 
NGOs in the ÇATOMs.  TKV defined the role of NGOs within the ÇATOM project as 
the creation of a ‘bridge’ between public institutions and the GAP Administration on the 
one hand and the local community on the other.  Once the ÇATOM building is supplied 
by local administrators or the municipality, and the equipment are provided by the GAP 
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Administration, the organization and operationality of the ÇATOM is handled  primarily 
by TKV as well as other interested NGOs.  The way TKV in particular establishes this 
bridge is their provision of training programs for girls on topics such as gender balanced 
development, communication and management skills, monitoring and evaluation, 
reporting and so on.  The field workers in the ÇATOMs are regularly invited to other 
training seminars and similar events by other NGOs, which sometimes takes place 
outside the region.  Other means of establishing this bridge include TKV’s role in the 
regular assessment and evaluation of the ÇATOM project which is then shared with 
GAP officials for purposes of feedback from the field.  In addition to this role of creating 
a bridge between the top and the bottom, TKV believes that the ÇATOM project plays 
the second important role of setting an example for state-NGO cooperation in Turkey.  
TKV personnel argued that while Turkey displays an administration and planning that is 
strictly centrally organized, the ÇATOM case has demonstrated the possibility of state-
NGO cooperation is possible in Turkey.  TKV members view this as significant in that it 
has the potential of bringing new perspectives on state institutions, NGOs, development, 
and participatory democracy in Turkey. 
 
With respect to its role in the ÇATOMs, Ana Kültür’s definition of itself as an 
‘intermediary’ is taken both from a macro-level and micro-level perspective.  Ana 
Kültür sees its role as intermediary between the women in the region and the GAP 
Administration, between the field workers and the GAP Administration, as well as the 
macro level of the ‘west’ and the ‘east’, refering to the two separate parts of the country.  
Ana Kültür believes that it has helped establish a connection between the two parts 
through the initiation of friends to become acquainted with the region, the provision of 5 
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million US dollars for the survival of the ancient site of Zeugma in Gaziantep, and 
through Adalet, a ÇATOM field worker who was sent by Ana Kültür to New York for 
purposes of education without even having seen the larger cities of Turkey prior to her 
departure to New York.  The more specific, field-related role of Ana Kültür in the 
ÇATOMs was explained. 
 
The girls in the ÇATOMs talk to us easily because we are outsiders.  If 
they talk to someone in the community, their family members or their 
friends, this quickly turns to gossip.  They can’t establish this kind of a 
communication with GAP personnel because they are the state.  They 
don’t trust the state as much as they trust us.  In that sense, we are 
intermediaries. 
 
Other NGOs that were not directly or systematically involved in the ÇATOM project or 
the Southeastern Anatolia region were not in a situation to evaluate the role of their 
organization with respect to ÇATOMs, the local community, the GAP Administration, 
or other related institutions of the state. 
 
7.3.3.  Success and Failures of the ÇATOM Project 
 
In almost all cases, the success of the ÇATOM was associated with the success of the 
field worker.  This was especially the case for the Batman ÇATOM run by Şükran, a 33 
year old young woman from the locality.  TOÇEV, for instance, viewed the specific 
ÇATOM field worker as an excellent partner for the selection of children for their 
projects. 
 
There is Şükran hanım at the ÇATOM; an incredibly talented and sweet 
lady.  We are with her every time we go to Batman.  We talk to her on 
the phone every 2-3 days.  She is a lot of help to us in Batman.  She 
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helps us in the distribution of items and in the selection of our children.  
And we know that whatever she says, it is ninety percent the best we 
can do because she sacrifices herself; she is truly altruistic. 
 
Deliberating on their choice of ÇATOMs as centers of operation, TOÇEV staff 
explained the swiftness and flexibility of the ÇATOM structure.  The fact that TOÇEV 
did not get tangled and delayed with bureaucratic procedures while working at the 
ÇATOMs was one of the greatest points of attraction. 
 
ÇATOMs definitely get things done much more quicker.  Because of 
their more simplistic way of looking at things they find absolute 
solutions to everything.  Things get done right away.  How does this 
happen?  I am talking about the people who are at the head of the 
ÇATOM.  I suppose they know the real motives and objectives behind 
the ÇATOMs.  I mean they know that the real purpose is helping the 
people there.  They think, if someone is bringing us help, then we must 
absolutely make sure it reaches the right place.  Done.  It’s as simple as 
that; it gets resolved right away and it’s finished.  This is an absolute 
relief for organizations that want to work in the region. 
 
The failures of the ÇATOM project mentioned by NGOs were mostly related to 
problems of the workings of the GAP Administration.  The effect of centralized 
structures and policies on the workings of the GAP Administration and the ÇATOMs 
was viewed by Ana Kültür as a problem for the whole of Turkey.  The statement was 
made that even though the GAP Administration does “possess the rhetoric of 
participatory planning and participatory decision making, they are unable to follow up in 
the field, because instructions from above are too determinant”.  Even if this mechanism 
was changed, this would not suffice to end the multi-faceted problems in the region.  
“There is also the problem of the aşiret as well as the problem of the presence of 
security forces in the region”.  Despite these realizations, Ana Kültür made the 
interesting claim that “because Ankara, particularly the GAP Administration, is unable 
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to trespass the aşiret system, NGOs are willing to cooperate up to a certain point”, 
indicating an expectation from the GAP Administration to clear the way in the region for 
NGO interventions and cooperations.  Another expectation of Ana Kültür was that the 
GAP Administration take into consideration and act upon the studies carried out and 
conclusions reached by Ana Kültür as a result of their visits to the region.  Ana Kültür 
was highly resentful of not being paid attention to, as recalled by the president of the 
organization. 
 
In a report I wrote in 1998 - because I used to write reports every time I 
went to the field which I don’t do anymore because people are either 
angry with what I write or they don’t read them – the first thing I wrote 
when I visited the region in August 1998 was that the ÇATOMs are 
urgently in need of psychiatrists and guidance counselors.  Then we 
saw what happened in the year 2000.  The suicides were in fact nothing 
new at the time and they continue today.  When I look at the issue from 
this angle, I am very pessimistic.  We were really very sincere and we 
did not demand a single penny from the GAP Administration, but they 
did not pay attention. 
 
TKV criticized the GAP Administration for being strongly influenced by political 
motives depending on the Minister responsible for the GAP Administration.  It was 
argued that instead of attaching high priority to demands coming from the locality, the 
GAP Administration sometimes became a tool of political interest.  The decision on the 
establishment of a ÇATOM building, its location, and the number of personnel 
employed are taken by authorities at the top.  This, in turn, has the potential of 
hampering the Administration’s cooperation with NGOs, as regarded by TKV.  On the 
other hand, although some personnel within TKV acknowledged this aspect of 
ÇATOMs, they were nevertheless satisfied with the results, such as the employment of 
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field workers who had become highly successful in their positions.  The eventual 
positive results were pointed out. 
 
Of course, political influences have been effective, especially in the 
Mardin area.  But we were lucky in that the girls that came through 
political connections turned out to be very good in their capabilities.  
Nevertheless, they were girls from the locality and they were girls who 
were sincerely willing to work for that particular locality.  
Supplemented with the educational and training sessions of TKV, the 
results were highly satisfactory at the end.  And we especially wanted 
them to be high school graduates.  And we are now happy with the 
decision we took that they should not be university graduates.  Because 
in this way they are better at establishing contacts with the local 
women; they do not look down at the participants from the top.  It was 
also important that they knew the language. (TKV) 
 
Interestingly, neither TKV nor Ana Kültür, as the two NGOs most directly and 
systematically involved in the ÇATOM project, evaluated the success and failures of 
ÇATOMs on community organization and grassroots mobilization through the women 
in the region.  It was as if both organizations had not seriously pondered upon the 
genuine aims and long term objectives of the ÇATOM project. 
 
7.4.  Relations with the State 
 
In general, all the NGOs that I visited and interviewed were in good terms with the 
Turkish state.  No harsh criticisms were made by NGOs, although the two organizations 
closest to the ÇATOMs did have something to say about the GAP Administration.  
Overall, while describing their relations and interactions with the state, NGO staff 
mainly mentioned the practical aspects of cooperating with the authorities and 
institutions of the state. 
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It was clear from the interviews that NGOs preoccupied with the replication of 
republican ideology chose to especially work with local and regional administrators 
appointed by the state, while those more concerned with the mobilization of civil society 
preferred to cooperate with the municipalities.  In the first group are also NGOs that did 
not have the conscious aim of mobilizing elements of civil society.  Thus, in all cases 
without exception, NGOs reported of their direct links with local state administrations 
and their institutions, namely the governorates and directorates.  Only the TEGV 
stressed their efforts in working together with the ‘elected’ instead of the ‘appointed’.  It 
is only when municipalities are mobilized that one is able to create access for the 
mobilization of the community TEGV argued.  While some organizations did not make 
a sharp distinction, others such as AÇEV especially noted their preference to not work 
with municipalities due to their reservations of political interest. 
 
In most cases, working with local and appointed administrators merely facilitated NGO 
activities in the region, province or county of operation.  TOÇEV mentioned the 
importance of ‘recognition’ by the governorate, which makes quite a difference in a 
region of emergency rule, organization members stated.  Most NGOs mentioned that 
operating in a region where authorities are highly suspicious and careful of all sorts of 
activities was not an easy task: 
 
Two weeks ago we were in the Southeast visiting 7 provinces.  We 
went there together with a theater group from Istanbul.  The simple act 
of a theater play becomes an incredible procedural event in the region.  
The text of the play, names of the actors, information on the theater 
group, individual criminal records of actors and a whole list of other 
formalities are demanded.  Establishing good relations with the 
 247 
 
governorate facilitates these procedures to a large extent.  Cooperating 
with the province and county governors really does take care of the 
bureaucratic obstacles that we face with respect to projects. 
 
The procedural problems and other obstacles that are solved by governorates during 
project implementation have a wide spectrum.  For example, upon demand from 
teachers in a school in Adıyaman province, TOÇEV designed a training program on 
psychological training for students.  Despite initial demand, the NGO later confronted 
reactions from some of the teachers due to internal problems in the respective school.  
The governor was helpful in resolving the problem.  In all cases, the approach to the 
solving of problems was stated by NGOs as top-down, through the involvement of the 
related state authorities.  No examples were given of conflict resolution based on direct 
NGO-target group relations. 
 
The reason NGOs gave for not having a representation in the Southeastern Anatolia 
region was the difficulties confronted in the OHAL governorates.  “Establishing an 
office outside the region is already hard enough because of the regulations pertaining to 
vakıfs and associations (derneks)” an NGO representative noted and continued, 
“therefore we are not willing to risk our existence due to problems that might arise in the 
OHAL region.  The smallest mistake can have serious percussions leading to the closing 
down of the vakıf.” 
 
Given the fact that NGOs do not have branch offices in the region, they are forced to 
find themselves partners for cooperation.  In most cases these partners are governors, 
directors or the teachers in a given locality.  TOÇEV mentioned its cooperation with 
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local NGOs in the region where it operates, naming the Chamber of Industry and Trade 
and the Association of Young Businessmen.  These local NGOs are chosen as partners 
due to their convenience in the possible provision of logistical support during project 
implementation and their assistance in terms of local human resources.  For this reason 
they are chosen from ‘strong’ NGOs in the locality, as a TOÇEV member declared.  
TOÇEV added that they needed such organizations in order to “run around” for them.  
What was interesting about the noted partnership was that it was not an arrangement in 
which both parties were empowered as a result of the relationship.  There were no 
concerns of grassroots development on the part of TOÇEV.  What was established was a 
mere partnership of convenience in cost sharing.  The reason TOÇEV found itself a local 
organization in addition to the governorate was that although local administrators were 
useful in taking care of bureaucratic obstacles, they were usually unable to provide any 
kind of other support. 
 
Members of TOÇEV who were well acquainted with the circumstances faced in the 
region mentioned the different reasons they chose to signs memorandums of 
understanding with respective governorates.  They noted that they were confronted with 
the negative or indifferent attitudes of public authorities towards the development of the 
region and the role of NGOs within this process, the restrictions resulting from a lack of 
initiation on the part of civil servants in the region, and the instability of public offices.  
Despite the top-down problem solving approaches of public institutions, NGOs still 
preferred to choose governorates as their partners in the region, indicating their own 
tactless approaches to project implementation. 
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We cooperate with governorates because they are usually welcoming of 
us when we come to the region.  Last time we brought a truck of items 
for distribution but the truck reached Diyarbakır before the scheduled 
time.  We said it belonged to the governorate and left the truck there 
overnight, which was very convenient.  If you go directly to the 
education director, unfortunately nothing comes out of it.  When you go 
through the channel of the governor, they show more interest; or they 
are obliged to show more interest.  Unfortunately it has to be pressured 
from above.  On the one hand local administrators are incapable of 
taking initiative but on the other, this is still the OHAL region, so if 
they don’t know the organization they are scared of getting involved.  
They think, in case something goes wrong, we don’t want to get in 
trouble.  One more thing is that education directors change so 
frequently in the region.  I have still not been able to understand why 
that happens.  We are in the region one day, we explain ourselves and 
our activities to the director, and we go back in two months, the director 
has changed, so we have to do the whole thing all over again.  In the 
past one year, Adıyaman has seen three different education directors.  
But the governor is always more consistent and more stable. 
 
Similar to relations with the governor, some NGOs noted of their contacts with military 
officials.  For example, both ÇYDD and TOÇEV had received support from members of 
the armed forces in project planning and implementation.  ÇYDD received assistance 
from the military unit in the Bahçesaray county of Van province in the selection of 
children for scholarships.  TOÇEV received labor support from military authorities in 
the construction of a playground for a school building in Adıyaman province.  One NGO 
stated such cooperations resulting from the fact that no other partners are available, 
especially in small settlements and rural areas in the Southeast.  The gendarmerie, in 
particular, was noted as providing all sorts of logistical support to NGOs in need.  
Moreover, for organizations willing to work in rural settlements, no other contacts were 
available except for the local administrators.  Municipalities were available for 
cooperation only in the more urbanized settlements and for projects of a specific nature. 
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Of all the above-mentioned NGOs, perhaps ÇYDD was the most conscious of relations 
with local administrators.  The NGO believed that the mere success of their projects 
resulted from the successful ties they established with local governors.  Local 
administrators, as extensions of the central government, are theoretically in charge of the 
preservation and maintenance of the principles of the Republic, which is ideologically 
close to the working philosophy of the ÇYDD.  The organization, therefore, attaches 
importance to the training of county and province administrators on issues of project 
development and cooperation with NGOs. 
 
We are obliged to work with the local authorities in our project sites, 
meaning the county governor, National Education directors, Social 
Services directors, and other province and county directorates.  Then, 
for our projects, we must develop cooperation with local administrators 
which is important for all NGOs.  Indeed, each year, together with the 
Strategy Division of the Ministry of National Education, we organize 
conferences and symposiums on cooperation between local 
administrators and NGOs.  These workshops last for a minimum of two 
full days.  Governors attend this event in order to design and develop 
projects for the development of the people in their own provinces and 
counties, for the increase of quality of education, for the eradication of 
unemployment, and for the use of local resources.  They bring their 
own projects to the symposium and we, as NGOs, evaluate these 
projects and make suggestions.  In this way, we bring together NGOs 
and local administrators.  This is an extremely useful project and is on 
top of the list of our rural programs.  The success of our rural programs 
is dependent merely on the cooperation of ÇYDD with local 
administrators.  In some places, county governors or National 
Education directors do not support our projects, but with the ones that 
do provide support, we are able to be very creative and productive.  For 
this reason, this project is very important for us. 
 
In reality, however, ÇYDD representatives were aware that not all local administrators 
fully supported the ‘Ataturkian’ cause.  Although province and county administrators 
were appointed by the central government and were therefore not affiliated with any 
political party, the reality was that political interests of local administrators sometimes 
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came to the forefront.  This was primarily why ÇYDD was interested in the training of 
local administrators.  Despite this discrepancy, however, the organization worked with 
state officials who were close to their philosophy of ‘contemporary life’: 
 
Why do some local administrators not provide us support?  I believe 
this to be a completely political issue.  You know that our country is 
living within a reality; the reality of the Turkish-Islam synthesis.  There 
are some reforms [devrimler in Turkish], both implicit and explicit that 
are developing against the reforms of Atatürk.  These are against 
Atatürk, against the reforms of the Republic as established by Atatürk.  
They give the impression as if they are getting by, but we are in fact 
confronted with a Turkish-Islam synthesis that does not really 
sympathize very much with the Republic.  These people are in notable 
positions; they have become county governors, National Education 
directors.  Again, I believe this to be completely political.  Some, on the 
other hand, are because of ignorance of course.  They do not know 
NGOs or they fear harm from NGOs.  So there is both ignorance and 
purposeful political considerations.  Those that have political 
considerations, in the last years, have also resorted to dissimulation 
[takkiye in Turkish].  They have seen that things get done with ÇYDD, 
that ÇYDD does productive work, that when ÇYDD comes to a county, 
school buildings and community centers are constructed, illiteracy rates 
drop, number of children attending schools increases, number of girls 
attending schools increases, then they think ‘I must get along with 
ÇYDD’ and consequently change their roles.  But generally we like to 
work and produce good work with those that provide us complete and 
honest support. 
 
The other extreme of NGO cooperation with the state was demonstrated by TEGV, 
which consciously made the distinction between state officials appointed to the locality 
and administrators that were elected by the community.  TEGV highly valued the 
initiation that came from municipalities due to the reasoning that this initiation was an 
indication of demands from below, leading to local mobilization.  They saw the 
construction of their educational units and parks as well as the promotion of volunteers 
for these facilities as an extension of the local community making use of its own local 
resources: 
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We are talking about municipalities.  In Sivas you have the Saadet 
Party, in Bozüyük you have the MHP or the Anavatan.282  We keep an 
equal distance to all.  We don’t use a political jargon.  We have our 
rules.  If people comply with these rules then we go into cooperation 
with them, irrespective of their political standing.  It makes no 
difference for us.  Because we say that that municipality is what the 
people want.  It is for this reason that we think our cooperation with 
that municipality will bring us into contact with that community.  But 
we don’t use a political jargon because there are people in the 
community who have not voted for that particular party.  The best way 
to involve the local community into our projects is working through the 
municipalities.  But getting in touch with the community is not possible 
only through the municipality.  We work also through the teachers.  But 
it is important that these teachers get involved on a voluntary basis. 
 
TEGV’s philosophy of ‘voluntarism’ is well institutionalized, which extends to the 
organization’s other approaches, including the high importance they attach to the 
monitoring of the children’s personal development, which acts as input to TEGV’s 
evaluation of its own work.  Similarly, TEGV displayed an institutional approach to 
almost all aspects of their work, including their principles of coordination with local 
officials. 
 
Our policies are well thought-out from the very beginning of the 
foundation of TEGV.  In meetings where we introduce the organization, 
they ask us, there is a unit in Erzincan, why don’t you have one in 
Erzurum?  Because there is no initiative there.  So we don’t go there to 
open up a unit but what we do is, in places where there are no TEGV 
units or educational parks, we have our ‘Ateşböceği’ trucks in which we 
demonstrate on a micro-scale what TEGV is.  These become attraction 
centers for people in the region and we have many units which we 
opened as a result of these demonstrations.  The last example is in 
Samsun where the municipality provided 30 decares of land, the 
university, the Chamber of Industry and Trade, the lawyers, NGOs and 
everybody else formed a large committee.  Within 2 years time, this 
committee constructed an educational park on this 30 decares of land 
without TEGV paying a single penny!  We are currently only providing 
them logistical support.  In fact, this is the kind of thing we really long 
for and expect to achieve; this kind of ‘civilness’ and ‘localness’.  In 
other words, we want the parks and units to become a part of the people 
there in the region. 
                                                 
282  All the three parties stated have different orientations.  Saadet Party has a religious agenda while MHP 
is ultra-nationalist and Anavatan is a center-right party. 
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These policies look attractive in approach but in fact there are greater problems to 
working with municipalities than working with the local administrators of governorates 
or directorates: 
 
The mayors of Diyarbakır, Van, Hakkari, and Yüksekova are 
HADEP283 members.  Nowadays the situation is getting better but the 
municipalities of these locations usually have tremendous problems of 
resources.  Hakkari, for instance, has a debt of 4 trillion TL. from the 
previous period.  Because they have their own internal problems, they 
are usually unable to provide our activities with logistical support.  So 
we are not always able to secure the local initiation that we would like. 
 
Very different from all the relationships mentioned so far was the one experienced by 
AÇEV.  Being an innovator in its field of operation, AÇEV brings alternatives to models 
of education.  The provision of education being one of the main tasks of the state, AÇEV 
works in direct link with the policy making level of the Turkish government.  However, 
AÇEV members talked about the tremendous difficulties of operating in this fashion.  
Despite their long-standing cooperation with the Ministry of National Education, the 
organization was still not fully convinced of its role as technical innovator.  In fact, and 
surprisingly so, this role was not something that they emphasized in the description of 
their projects. 
 
When AÇEV was established in 1993, NGOs were a new concept for 
the [Turkish] state.  So at that time, it was difficult for us to think of 
ourselves as ‘training’ the state because at that time NGOs were not 
readily accepted [by the state].  Now, especially after the [Marmara] 
earthquake, things have changed because the earthquake disaster 
created an environment for NGOs to make themselves known; to make 
their voices heard.  For us it really wasn’t easy to start giving these new 
courses on child and adult education.  You have to be good, really good 
for the public authorities to start appreciating your work, your research 
                                                 
283  The political party with a Kurdish orientation. 
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and your application in the field.  You have to prove yourself to the 
state before you can get recognition.  For us as an NGO, to be working 
on the adoption of our program and model by the Ministry is something 
very exciting. 
 
7.5.  Strengths and Weaknesses of NGOs in Turkey  
 
All the NGOs interviewed were discontent about the current situation of a ‘civil society’ 
[sivil toplumculuk in Turkish] in Turkey.  This criticism was made despite the fact that 
of the 9 NGOs that were surveyed, 6 of them had quite an institutionalized structure, 
mission statement and working philosophy.  Except for 3 NGOs, all the others were 
relatively up to date on the existing terminology used in their own fields of operation.  
They made comparisons of themselves with the practices of NGOs abroad.  This was 
particularly clear in the discussions during the 8th NGO Symposium284 which took place 
in December 2000.  NGOs agreed on their deficiencies of capacity and project 
development.  Confronted with certain problems, NGOs voiced their anxiety about the 
difficulty of finding solutions to certain problems.  There were questions at the 
Symposium of what NGOs in Europe would do in certain situations that were faced by 
their counterparts in Turkey. 
 
It was clear that NGOs need to build their capacity in the successful design and 
implementation of projects.  This awareness was present among some NGOs that noted 
their need to become more ‘professional’, indicating that their activities were being 
carried out based on “emotional” criteria.  Even though most NGO staff members were 
content about the decision making structures within their organizations, some members 
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admitted that the opinion of one, usually the president of the foundation or association, 
was automatically the opinion of the entire organization.  It was agreed that this 
organizational structure based on the authority of one leader prevented the 
institutionalization of NGOs in Turkey. 
 
I observed that there was generally not much interest among NGOs in other 
organizations like themselves.  There was little awareness of other NGOs as well as 
projects similar to their own carried out by other organizations.  Even though such cases 
were rare, international committees and networks established by intergovernmental 
agencies such as UNICEF and UNESCO created platforms for NGOs working on 
similar issues to come together at the policy making level. 
 
In terms of funding policies and practices, internal fund-raising was observed as an 
important part of an NGO budget.  This included donations, membership fees, the 
transfer of movable and unmovable assets, and revenue obtained as a result of 
professional fund-raising events such as the organization of concerts, festivals, and some 
other innovative projects.  One of the NGOs I interviewed, for instance, had started a 
campaign in which a small percentage of the price of certain products sold in 
supermarkets was fed into activities of the organization.  Similarly, the entire income of 
the jubilee match of a famous football player was transferred to one of the NGOs.  
Another organization had established a ‘foster family’ system in which families donated 
a fixed amount of funding for the full educational support of a single child and periodic 
updates were given on the improvement of the supported child.  International funding 
                                                                                                                                                
284 This is a symposium that is periodically organized by NGOs for NGOs in Turkey. 
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also made up an important part of the budget of certain NGOs.  However, this was never 
the only source of funding; neither was it the most important one. 
 
Despite their strengths, though, none of the NGOs were consciously working on 
partnerships that provided support to the development of grassroots initiatives.  The one 
organization that worked closest to this mode of operation was the TEGV with its 
emphasis on the development of ‘voluntarism’ at the local level.  Almost all the cases 
studied consisted of NGOs that had been established either by academicians, 
industrialists and businessmen, or civil servants and others with connections to public 
institutions.  Except for KAMER, none of the other NGOs had been founded by or had 
employees who were in any way related to the vulnerable and disadvantaged group in 
society that they claimed to represent.  Perhaps TKV’s Diyarbakır branch office might 
also be considered as the other case of the employment of locals. 
 
Similarly, none of the NGOs within the framework of the current thesis had innovative 
relations with the Turrkish state.  Refering to Clark’s classification of NGOs noted in the 
beginning of this chapter, most NGOs acted as ‘relief and welfare agenceis’ and ‘public 
service contractors’ rather than as organizations of ‘technical innovation’.  Authorities 
and institutions of the state were contacted merely as tools for the operationality of relief 
projects rather than as ends to the improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
state.  Likewise, NGOs did not have the concern of collaboration with the Turkish state 
for the purposes of the adoption of policies of global development and good governance. 
 
 257 
 
As summarized in this chapter, the subsequent organizational structure and working 
philosophy of NGOs in Turkey affects their relationship with the target group on the one 
hand and the Turkish state on the other.  Further analyses of this relationship in general 
and the particular interaction of NGOs through the ÇATOMs is the focus of the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VIII: 
NGOs AS THE LINK BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY 
 
8.1.  Characterization of the Communities285 
 
The communities in which the ÇATOMs were situated carried some characteristics in 
common.  The communities were situated mainly in the outskirts of cities, a 
characteristic which was more common in the larger cities and province centers such as 
Batman and Siirt.  Relatively smaller, the ÇATOM in Cizre was located in an older part 
of the city.  Similarly, Beytüşşebap being a smaller county, the ÇATOM was somewhat 
distant from the town center.  In the village of Uluköy, the location of the ÇATOM 
building did not make much of a difference as the entire village space was easily 
accessible.  Nevertheless, except for Uluköy, all other ÇATOMs were selected for 
settlements that had received (and continued to receive in most cases) migrants from 
villages and small settlements in the region. 
 
Most communities in which the ÇATOM building was located clearly had infrastructural 
problems.  Despite the fact that some communities had started forming as early as the 
mid-1980s, most still had the appearance of newly formed squatter neighborhoods, with 
randomly scattered houses, half-finished house constructions, newly constructed houses 
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with no concrete paste or paint.  As the families explained, with every little money that 
they find, a small part of the house is constructed, so the constructions continue over a 
long time period in a step-by-step manner.  Small shops [bakkal or more recently market 
in Turkish] are opened up here and there with the minimal amount of money that is 
needed to start up a small business as such.  As most communities had a relatively long 
past, school buildings were present in all the communities that I visited for the purpose 
of the study. 
 
Ethnic286 diversity was more prevalent in the communities of large cities such as Batman 
and Siirt.  As I found out, the local population in Siirt is mainly of Arabic origin while 
those living in the villages are mainly Kurdish.  There was talk about the intermingling 
of these people with the increase in internal migration from the villages into the city of 
Siirt.  Similarly, Batman revealed its true mixture of peoples in its outskirt 
neighborhoods.  This mixture was also prevalent in Cizre where settled Kurds, nomadic 
Kurds [göçerler in Turkish], Turks, Arabs and other smaller identities all live together.  
Relations with Syria and Iraq, as well as religious diversity were all elements of cultural 
richness in the communities that I visited. 
 
Despite such diversity on a micro scale, women in the region did not make a statement 
of differences in ethnic origin, although few comments were made of cultural 
differences.  Only a few women, who had spent some time in Istanbul and other large 
                                                                                                                                                
285  I use the word ‘community’ to denote a territorially shared space rather than a locality based on 
communal identity.  I use it as equivalent to what is referred to as mahalle in Turkish. 
286  I use the word ‘ethnic’ to denote “groups with a subjective belief in their common descent” as used by 
Walker Connor in Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1994). 
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cities of Turkey, were aware of the growing assertions and claims to ethnic identity.  
They spoke of differences between Arabs and Kurds although both sides have now 
started understanding and speaking each other’s language due to recent territorial 
integration of previously separate neighborhoods.  This awareness was especially the 
case for the Arabs in Siirt who, given their traditional settlement in the urban part of the 
city, made the distinction of Kurds living in rural Siirt.  Rather than the assertion of 
identities other than Turkishness, there was the idealized conception of the ‘city’, 
referring primarily to Istanbul, but also to Ankara, Izmir, Mersin, Antalya and 
Gaziantep, among others.  This was especially so among young, unmarried girls whose 
mere conceptions of Turkishness related to learning the Turkish language only because 
this would provide access to schooling and the slight chance of visiting Istanbul.  
Learning Turkish was important because it provided access to a world completely 
different from their own.  Similarly, mothers who explicitly wanted their children to get 
an education mentioned the importance of learning the language.  Women eager to 
become literate were those who wanted to have more control over daily chores, although 
some politically conscious men insisted that children be taught Kurdish at home. 
 
In fact, let alone ethnic differences, women in the region did not even have a 
consciousness of their gender roles as women.  As mentioned earlier, only women who 
had confronted the urban reality of the larger cities in western Turkey made statements 
of their womanhood and their relations with the opposite sex.  Otherwise, women 
limited to the realities of their village or settlement in the Southeast had no conceptions 
of their gender.  My questions about what kinds of problems they faced as women 
yielded little other than blank looks.  Concerning their problems in general, however, 
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they mentioned the displacement process from the villages to other settlements, 
subsequent decreases in relative quality of life, the absence of the men in their families, 
and the resultant immobility of women.  It was clear that most women in the region did 
not see themselves as individuals and more importantly as ‘women’.  Now that 
communities based on tribal relations had been largely dissolved, there was only the 
family, close kin, and to a slight extent the tribe.  Gender identity was barely non-
existent. 
 
Although young girls and some women reported a degree of emancipation through the 
acquisition of skills in facilitating their daily lives and gaining some awareness about 
issues of health and personal hygiene, they did not exert the abilities of organization, 
advocacy, leadership or coordination, as foreseen by the GAP project.  Besides finding a 
friendly atmosphere at the ÇATOM, I encountered a limited number of women who had 
become aware of their potentials in creating solutions and alternatives to their daily 
problems.  The limited empowerment and personal development felt by individual 
young girls and women were clearly insufficient to be transformed into developments at 
the family and community level. 
 
It is also important to note, meanwhile, that the ÇATOM project deals with a target 
group whose characteristics are strongly embedded in centuries of tradition and locality.  
ÇATOMs work with women who believe that their status as women is directly 
proportional to family income level.  For women who had recently left the village, items 
such as furniture, durable goods and electronic equipment at home, land, golden jewelry, 
connections with the city, and bearing a large number of children, especially male 
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children, were cited by women as indicators of high status.  Improving the status of 
women in Southeastern Anatolia, therefore, initially entails that these women gain an 
awareness of gender issues, in order to take a step forward on the strenuous path to 
gender balanced development in the region.  For young girls who live between the two 
contrasting worlds of the home environment and the life on TV, this change becomes 
even more pressing. 
 
Further characteristics of realities of women in the region and the effects of the ÇATOM 
project were portrayed in chapter V, from which I will again try to extend into a greater 
understanding of why ÇATOMs have been so slow at reaching the greater aim of gender 
awareness and social mobilization at the grassroots level. 
 
8.2.  Role of the ÇATOMs 
 
An analysis of the dynamics within the ÇATOM structure is carried out at three levels.  
The grassroots level analyzes the interaction of the ÇATOM with its participants of local 
women and young girls as the target group, their families and the community.  The 
management level looks at the internal organization of the ÇATOM structure, evaluating 
the decision making, planning and implementation practices within the ÇATOM.  The 
management level of analysis also includes elements of sustainability of the ÇATOM 
formation.  Finally, the local state level analyzes the interaction of the ÇATOM with 
institutions of the state and its effects on the effectiveness of these local institutions. 
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8.2.1.  Grassroots Level 
 
Some impressive results of the ÇATOMs were collected at the grassroots level.  A large 
number of participants reported benefits on an individual basis.  Especially young girls 
expressed their enthusiasm for attending the activities of the ÇATOM.  ÇATOMs 
provided for them a space in which they could gain some skills and educational 
knowledge with practical values.  ÇATOMs also act as spaces of socialization for young 
girls who have extremely limited opportunities for leaving the home environment. 
 
The participants of young girls and women learn a variety of different skills and 
knowledge as a result of attending the activities of the ÇATOM.  The fact that 
educational sessions are undertaken in a participatory manner, directly involving the 
participant makes absorption of knowledge more successful.  Similarly, skills of high 
practical use and intended for income generation are provided.  Participants learn how to 
-  local state 
    authorities 
-  other institutions 
ÇATOM 
-  target group 
-  families 
-  community 
-  field worker 
-  ÇATOM committee 
-  instructors 
 
(1) grassroots level 
(2) management 
      level 
(3) local state level 
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sew for themselves items which they would otherwise have to purchase.  The health 
education sessions, for instance, are particularly interesting for young girls and women 
as they are interested in the practical knowledge they gain from these sessions.  There 
was also a level of awareness among girls concerning problems faced by many women 
in the region.  Since their attendance in ÇATOM activities, young girls noted that they 
were now more sensitive towards certain issues such as kin marriages and felt 
uncomfortable about the large number of siblings and their heavy workload in the home. 
 
In addition to the many different skills and knowledge that they gain at the ÇATOM, the 
young girls are happy about spending time outside the home in the friendly atmosphere 
they find at the ÇATOM.  This is especially important as girls have hardly any other 
occasion to leave their home environment.  They are satisfied with the interactions 
among each other, their instructors, and the ÇATOM field worker.  The attention they 
receive from the field worker and the instructors makes them feel important, particularly 
when their opinions are asked for and they get the chance to participate in the decisions 
taken at the ÇATOM. 
 
ÇATOMs are crucial in terms of their broader impacts beyond what is given to 
participants who are actually present in the educational and training sessions at the 
ÇATOM building.  After having attended the courses, most participants then carry the 
knowledge gained at the ÇATOM into the home environment.  Women and young girls 
that come to the family planning and health education sessions at the ÇATOM feel 
better about having learned the various methods of contraception in addition to other 
practical knowledge they can use in their homes.  In most ÇATOMs this education is 
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mostly attended by young girls of pre-marital age.  They are interested in contraception 
methods, health at pregnancy, child-care, and other knowledge they will make use of in 
their homes especially after marriage.  Mothers are usually unable to attend these 
sessions as they are busy with the children and the house chores.  For these women, 
educational sessions are undertaken during the night time when a few women get 
together in a house; a time when the men are away at coffee houses. 
 
Another way of reaching these women is through their daughters who inform their 
mothers and neighbors on what they have learned at the ÇATOM.  Although the young 
girl does not use contraception herself, she educates the daughter-in-law in the house on 
the various techniques of contraception.  Women in the region are usually timid about 
consulting medical staff, especially male staff, on issues of women’s health.  Receiving 
essential knowledge through their daughters becomes highly critical.  As young girls are 
lectured on the importance of health facilities where appropriate, girls are also influential 
in convincing their mothers, sisters and other family members to make more frequent 
use of the health services, including the use of mid-wives at child birth. 
 
8.2.2.  Management Level 
 
Field workers employed at the ÇATOMs were a special characteristic of the 
organization.  These were young girls from the locality who had been hired to handle 
and coordinate the management of the ÇATOM.  Interviewing the ÇATOM field 
workers, I was able to observe the effect of ÇATOM work on their ability to plan and 
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organize activities, mobilize certain funds through the local state level, and ensure direct 
cooperation with NGOs.  ÇATOM field workers were situated in such a position that 
they were able to provide the link between the two levels.  On the one hand, the fact that 
ÇATOM field workers were fairly familiar with the community with which they were 
working was a great advantage in gaining the trust of young girls, women, their families, 
and the community members.  They were thus able to maintain the respect of the 
neighborhood, a factor that is highly important in a region where most families are 
traditionally suspicious of state officials and public services.  In the ÇATOMs, 
participants and their families were confronted with field workers and instructors with 
whom they could communicate in their own mother tongue.  On the other hand, given 
their knowledge of the locality and their close contacts with the local women and young 
girls, ÇATOM field workers were in a better position than outsiders to argue for the 
needs of the women in the region, as well as to demand funds and other direct benefits 
from the local state authorities.  ÇATOM field workers were influential in ensuring the 
participation of the target group in ÇATOM activities.  They were also partially 
successful in raising public awareness about the specific needs of women and convince 
local state authorities that they were sincerely working for the embetterment of women’s 
status and living conditions in the community and in the region. 
 
During interviews, field workers noted the positive effects of ÇATOMs on their personal 
development.  Despite their initial insecurity and inexperience, field workers reported 
feelings of heightened self-confidence.  With the start of field activities, field workers 
gained experience in carrying out surveys at the household level, gained in-depth 
knowledge of the problems faced by the women in their localities, and learned how to 
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write, plan, implement projects and reports.  This has resulted in support from their 
surroundings for many of the field workers.  Perhaps the most interesting outcome of 
involvement in the ÇATOM was that of the only male field worker in the ÇATOMs. 
 
As a result of my work at the ÇATOM, I am now softer in my dealings 
with women.  Before I never used to defend women this much, but I 
realized how valuable they are in fact.  I came to understand this as I 
listened to the girls one by one.  My wife is extremely happy about me 
working here.  Before I started working here, my friends criticized me, 
asking me what kind of a man I was, planning to work for a woman’s 
organization.  The fact is, I was also a bit embarrassed in the beginning 
and I didn’t think it was right for me to be doing this kind of thing.  
Because I didn’t believe in women’s rights and things like that.  When I 
first started the job, the local instructors would run away from me.  
They couldn’t even drink tea with me in the same room.  I was also 
very timid in the beginning and initially I was unable to participate in 
the activities.  Then slowly as we started having chats and informal 
meetings, we all started becoming more comfortable.  Slowly 
everything changed and developed.  When the participant girls get 
special attention from me or from the instructors, they become very 
different.  It is easy to observe the changes and improvements with a 
more participatory approach.  When we don’t see them for 2-3 days, we 
call their homes.  Their parents see that we are interested in the well 
being of the girls.  This makes both the girls and their parents happy. 
(Field worker, Cizre [male]) 
 
The instructors in the ÇATOMs were of three different sources and all seemed to 
provide a different input.  One group were instructors who were formerly ÇATOM 
participants themselves and then showed such improvement that they became eligible to 
become instructors.  The impact of the ÇATOM among these instructors in particular 
was very strong.  These were young girls who would have never had the chance to teach 
in official positions, as they did not have the required attainments as instructors, but in 
the ÇATOMs they were skilled enough to give participants the basic practical education 
and training they needed to partly improve their living standards.  Moreover, these 
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instructors again had the advantage of easily communicating with the participants as 
they were from the locality. 
 
I was a student at the ÇATOM for 3 years.  I wanted to become an 
instructor here because I enjoyed the ÇATOM environment very much.  
When girls start coming to the ÇATOMs, they start experiencing lots of 
change.  The same thing happened to me.  I was very different when I 
first started coming here.  I was very timid and would never talk, but 
now I have changed.  My family is also happy about these changes.  As 
a result, there has been changes in the family.  They tell me, ‘you have 
learned a lot of things, now you can help us in things that need to be 
done outside the house.’  And this makes me very happy. (Instructor, 
Beytüşşebap) 
 
Another instructor explained that she gained the trust and respect of her husband after 
completing the embroidery course at the course and becoming an instructor herself.  She 
recited of her husband being surprised about this development and telling her that he 
would have never imagined his wife being a teacher.  After working as an instructor at 
the ÇATOM for several months, she was given permission by her husband to work 
anywhere she liked.  This, she recounted, increased her own self-confidence and 
enthusiasm towards work outside the home. 
 
The second type of instructors were those who were experts in their specific fields as 
they had undergone the official training procedures to become qualified instructors at 
public institutions.  These were experts in the fields of social work, handicrafts, kilim 
weaving, adult literacy, nutrition, and mother-child care education, among others.  They 
were official instructors who were centrally assigned to positions at Public Training 
Centers, Community Centers of the Social Services and Child Protection Agency, 
provincial Directorate of Agriculture, and so on.  They were officially assigned by the 
respective province governors to work in the ÇATOMs.  As they were experts in their 
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own fields, these instructors were helpful in the improvement of the local instructors.  
Perhaps more importantly, these instructors developed themselves personally as a result 
of working at the ÇATOMs. 
 
I have developed myself tremendously since working at the ÇATOM.  
My specialization is health issues but I have discovered to look at 
things more holistically here at the ÇATOM.  I was not very 
enthusiastic about teaching; I would teach my material at the Public 
Training Center and then leave.  But it is not like that at the ÇATOM.  
We have established much better communication with the girls here.  
There is a very different atmosphere here at the ÇATOM.  I enjoy 
teaching more here at the ÇATOM.  (Instructor, Batman) 
 
A third category of instructors were those who were in the region given other 
assignments such as school teachers, but had decided to informally and voluntarily 
contribute part of their time to sharing their knowledge and experience with the young 
girls and women that came to the ÇATOMs.  These volunteer instructors also included 
self-educated or officially educated women who were in the region due to the jobs of 
their spouses, mainly members of the armed forces.  Given the deprived nature of the 
cities in Southeastern Anatolia, these women enjoyed passing time at the ÇATOMs 
while at the same time feeling the satisfaction of contributing to the development of 
these young girls.  The flexible, participatory and informal structure of the ÇATOM was 
what attracted these women to the ÇATOMs as opposed to other strictly public 
institutions.  The relatively small age difference between these volunteer instructors and 
the participants added to the mutual benefit.  Volunteer instructors had plenty to recite: 
 
The girls in Cizre have terribly small worlds and they see their homes 
as prisons.  Families earn quite a bit of money from the fuel oil trade 
across the border, but the rate of girls attending schools is unbelievably 
low.  They are sent to school just enough to learn how to read and write 
in Turkish.  They love to sit and have chats with us, speak about 
themselves, and ask plenty of questions.  They are jealous about the 
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west because they see Istanbul on TV.  They get very affected by shows 
like Televole, but at the same time, there is a fear of the west.  The 
things they are most interested in are talking about topics of beauty, 
make-up, hair models, and love affairs.  But this is understandable as 
the girls in Cizre are severely oppressed inside the home and 
community.  The men in Cizre go home at nights just to sleep; they 
have no connections with the home but still exert strong pressure on the 
girls.  I am really very sad about the helplessness of the girls here.  I am 
so glad I was not born here.  I have realized the value of my husband.  
(Volunteer instructor, Cizre) 
 
Other interesting interactions took place between these specific instructors and ÇATOM 
participants.  The interaction between the two was not a one-way flow of knowledge and 
experience.  As these instructors were foreigners to Southeastern Anatolia in general and 
to the locality in particular, they talked about the enrichment they felt about learning the 
local culture though their close interaction with the participants in the ÇATOMs.  These 
instructors were particularly happy about the local dishes they learned to make from the 
young girls and women that came to the ÇATOM.  In return, they taught the girls a 
variety of dishes from their own localities in other parts of the country.  Together with 
other instructors, they were able to combine cooking and enjoying these dishes with an 
educational session on healthy cooking and preserving techniques, which thus rendered 
education in the ÇATOMs more participatory and enjoyable.  This two-way interaction 
between these specific instructors and members of the local community was a crucial 
advantage in a country in which the western and eastern parts have, for decades, been 
isolated from one another.  This kind of an interaction has the additional advantage of 
young girls and women from the locality meeting and getting to know women in other 
parts of Turkey, hence acting as an indirect awareness raising tool on how women in the 
region can change their status for the better.  These were some of the additional 
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intangible impacts of the ÇATOMs, as recounted by another volunteer instructor in 
Beytüşşebap. 
 
We learn a lot of things personally by coming to the ÇATOM.  
Together with the girls we make new dishes here and give each other 
recipes.  This way, we learned about the local dishes and herbs in this 
region.  We exchange a lot of information with the girls.  The people in 
this region are incredibly hospitable.  This is my first time in the region 
and before coming here, people always have very different things in 
mind, but it is actually so different from what you envisage.  This was 
one of the best things that we learned through the ÇATOM.  (Volunteer 
instructor, Beytüşşebap) 
 
This mutual relationship was emphasized by more than one volunteer instructor. 
 
Here we get to know and understand a different culture.  The instructors 
and volunteers that come from abroad live through a process of 
reciprocal learning.  Upon our arrival in Cizre, when I was interested in 
coming to the ÇATOM, my husband, who is a lieutenant at the military 
unit, told me that I would be bored of coming here.  But I initially 
started coming for the sole purpose of keeping myself busy and getting 
out of home during the days.  But the attractiveness of the ÇATOM 
environment, the desperate need of the participant girls, and their 
curiosity were factors that attached me to the ÇATOM.  We prepare 
local dishes with the girls that come here; we have different chats, and 
the exchange that takes place here at the ÇATOM is very special. 
(Volunteer instructor, Cizre) 
 
The ÇATOM management committee, as the last group in the management level 
category, acted as the main measure of the sustainability of the project.  Despite some 
small scale problems in the formation and maintenance of the committees, interviews 
with the committee members revealed the interest of the ÇATOM field worker and the 
instructors in sharing power with the participants.  One major outcome of the committee 
on its members was their enhanced feelings of responsibility towards the beneficiaries.  
Having become part of a decision making committee, the members enthusiastically 
recited their increased involvement in the planning and implementation of activities as 
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well as the budget of the ÇATOM.  Being in a position to take decisions, the committee 
members felt more obliged to consult and acknowledge the participants on what was to 
be planned and implemented in the ÇATOM.  The fact that these committees were re-
elected every 6 months gave other participants the chance to get a feeling of 
responsibility and share power.  I was able to observe that sharing the process of 
decision making and implementation became a crucial factor in the enhanced self-
empowerment of young women as well as the sustainability of the project. 
 
8.2.3.  Local State Level 
 
ÇATOMs did exhibit some success in raising awareness on issues of women, gender, 
and development among local public authorities.  One was a case recited by a social 
worker in a Community Center of the Social Services and Child Protection Agency.  
Although these centers do not make a differentiation in terms of gender in their 
objectives and activities of community development, in one particular case, the social 
worker claimed that after the establishment of the ÇATOM in Batman, community 
development efforts at the Community Center had taken on a gender dimension and 
women were now given special attention. 
 
On the other hand, Public Training Centers (PTCs), under the Ministry of National 
Education, felt threatened by the presence of ÇATOMs in most cases.  The PTC has 
objectives similar to those of the ÇATOMs, except that they concentrate more on 
individual skill development rather than a community orientation like the ÇATOMs.  
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Despite the partial similarities in vision, the authorities of the PTC adopted a negative 
attitude towards the ÇATOMs.  This, of course, made it harder for the ÇATOMs to 
coordinate activities with this institution.  After taking the views of the PTC, it was 
interesting to learn that in fact, in most cases, a larger number of girls attended the 
ÇATOM activities and courses compared to those of the PTC.  In one case, for instance, 
although the PTC boasted that it had adult literacy courses and not the ÇATOM, I later 
found out that it was actually the ÇATOM that first offered literacy courses to illiterate 
young girls and women in that particular settlement.  These findings made it clear that 
even though the PTC was influenced by the activities and courses of the ÇATOM, the 
situation portrayed by the PTC authorities and instructors was completely different.  
This was also prevalent in the PTC’s emphasis on the importance of discipline and the 
lack of such discipline in the ÇATOM environment.  In cases where the ÇATOM was 
highly active and influential among the participants, the authorities of the Public 
Training Center even tended to argue that the ÇATOM was under the supervision and 
auspices of the PTC.  This was an indication that local public authorities had a hard time 
with the idea of sharing power, as well as portraying their inability to coordinate efforts 
and resources in an attempt to bring together creative energies. 
 
The fact that the authorities at the Public Training Center were highly negative about the 
presence of the ÇATOM was an indication that they regarded the ÇATOM as 
competition.  This, in turn, helped the PTC improve, or at least try to improve, its own 
activities.  In one case, for instance, the PTC was unaware of the significance of 8 March 
while the participants of the ÇATOM organized a Women’s Day festival on that day.  
Upon large scale enthusiasm for the festival, the instructors of the Public Training 
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Center decided to arrange their own 8 March festivities, but only managed to organize it 
for the 25th of the same month. 
 
In short, the ÇATOM managed to prove to other state initiatives with similar missions 
and activities that participation could be easily ensured and that things could be done 
differently, that is, resources could be used more efficiently and effectively.  The 
ÇATOM is well on the way of showing how bureaucratic and social constraints can be 
reduced, and the patriarchal hegemony of state institutions challenged.  Although certain 
changes are difficult to implement given the deep-rooted interests and socio-cultural 
values involved, ÇATOMs have been able to make changes to a certain extent. 
 
An instructor in Siirt ÇATOM, who used to previously work at the Public Training 
Center, made the comparison between the two institutions.  She said that the ÇATOM is 
similar to the environment of Training Centers in Turkey during the 1970s.  Prior to 
their specialization, Training Centers used to value the provision of practical knowledge 
to the participants, and one instructor used to provide a wide range of different 
information.  But now, she stated, the Public Training Centers are interested only in the 
provision of certificates of participation.  Whether the participant has learned fully is no 
longer relevant: “There is unnecessary discipline, mandatory participation, a strict 
curriculum and time schedule.  The girl attends the first two classes, but then is unable to 
attend the third day because of her obligations at home.  She is then rarely able to finish 
the course she started.”  The instructor regrets the fact that Public Training Centers are 
no different from the formal education environment in schools.  The instructor assured 
her satisfaction for working at the ÇATOM where the girls are more relaxed and hence 
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learn better: “the girls sing and dance whenever they like.  This is important for them as 
discipline is the last thing they need in their lives.” 
 
Others in the management level of the ÇATOM have given good overviews of the 
relative success of the ÇATOMs compared to similarly working public training 
institutions. 
 
Compared to Public Training Centers, the participants at the ÇATOM 
are better and more enthusiastic about coming here.  The activities at 
the ÇATOM are different and more diverse.  Before the PTC, the 
ÇATOM started the literacy course for women.  When I was working at 
the PTC, everything was finished after I completed the course at the 
end of the day, but we take much more responsibility for the girls here.  
There is very good communication and dialogue between the students, 
teachers, and Gönül [field worker].  Moreover, household visits are 
undertaken in the ÇATOM.  Compared to the PTC, the ÇATOM has 
better communication with the people in the community.  The cozy 
atmosphere of the ÇATOM has now become addictive; Saturday and 
Sunday passes so slowly.  Also, there are more girls attending the 
activities of the ÇATOM compared to the PTC.  The ÇATOM is more 
flexible compared to the PTC and girls prefer this because they have 
responsibilities at home.  When you don’t provide them a flexible 
environment, they don’t come; they can’t come.  While working at the 
Public Training Center, our dialogue with the director of the center and 
the instructors was not always very smooth, but we are very 
comfortable with Gönül at the ÇATOM.  Also, the age difference 
between us [the instructors] and Gönül is very small, which makes us 
all very close to each other.  (Instructor, Beytüşşebap) 
 
In conclusion, one major revelation of the ÇATOMs in relation to the local state level 
was the outcome that ÇATOMs help improve the functioning of local state institutions, 
the most obvious one being the workings of the Public Training Centers.  The ÇATOM 
raises awareness about the fact that things can run differently in these institutions.  
Instead of applying an outdated and tedious curriculum, and sticking blindly to a strict 
time schedule in a hierarchical and mechanical work environment, ÇATOMs 
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demonstrate the success of participatory education and training possibilities.  Girls are 
able to come and go as they like which gives them space to help out with daily chores at 
home while creating time for activities at the ÇATOM and eventually reaching self-
empowerment.  This makes the PTCs aware of the fact that they can arrange their own 
curricula in a way that enables a higher attendance of the target group in their own 
programs. 
 
Given the fact that ÇATOMs have already started creating competition among local 
Public Training Centers, in the longer run, through their activities, ÇATOMs can play 
the role of increasing the quality of training and education provided in these Training 
Centers in the Southeast.  In the longer run, once this competition is created and the 
quality is increased, cooperation between the ÇATOMs and the Public Training Centers 
will become less relevant. 
 
8.3.  Role of NGOs 
 
On the one hand, despite the limitations of organization at the community level, a 
relatively high level of success is reached on an individual level in terms of the impacts 
felt by the young girls and women that attend the activities of the ÇATOM.  Considering 
the extremely closed character of the culture in the region, this is in fact a positive 
development.  The internal structure of the ÇATOM and management level activities 
also exhibit a high potential for internal participation and the practice of democratic 
modes of decision making, ensuring sustainability among young girls and women at the 
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organizational level.  Similarly, despite limited collaboration with municipalities, 
relations with the state authorities are relatively satisfactory and some success is attained 
in raising awareness about women and issues of gender at the local state level.  Although 
the management committee guarantee to a certain extent the internal sustainability of the 
ÇATOM structure, their dependence with respect to finances hamper their potential for 
transition to an initiative of a fully civic nature, thus endangering full sustainability.  A 
further analysis of the present situation in the ÇATOMs, the role of NGOs within this 
organization, and suggestions for improvement are suggested in the following sections. 
 
8.3.1.  True Nature of NGO Involvement in the ÇATOMs 
 
Interviews with the Social Programs coordinator, assistant coordinator and other 
personnel of the GAP Administration revealed the true formation of ÇATOMs.  In the 
initial design, ÇATOMs were not thought to have their own personnel, including the 
field worker.  The initial idea was the employment of social service experts (social 
workers employed by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency) for the handling 
of ÇATOM management.  In time, however, the Administration realized that this could 
not be realized because the Social Services Agency did not have sufficient personnel in 
the region for its own community centers.  There is a lack of social services experts 
working and willing to work in the Southeastern region of Turkey. 
 
Within time, changes from the initial plan were implemented.  One such change was the 
assignment of field workers instead of social workers of the Social Services Agency.  
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Although the idea of a ‘field worker’ was there, as explained by the coordinator of the 
Social Programs at the GAP Administration, the idea was the provision of these field 
workers from the Social Services Agency.  Hence, although ‘local participation’ was an 
essential component of the working philosophy of the GAP Administration as 
determined by the approach of a human-centered sustainable development, the selection 
of field workers from the locality was initially not the consideration.  The GAP 
Administration was aware, however, that someone was needed in each ÇATOM for the 
organization and coordination of activities and for the establishment of contacts with the 
community.  Even though social service experts were not available in the region, 
someone was needed in the ÇATOMs for working with the target group, detecting their 
needs, and designing projects and activities according to these needs.  The decision was 
eventually taken on the provision of local girls from the community to act as field 
workers. 
 
It was only after this decision that Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı and other NGOs came into 
the picture.  TKV was a natural partner because the organization had carried out the 
study on women’s status in the region prior to any projects on women’s empowerment 
within the GAP Administration.  Having laid out an action plan from the research they 
carried out on women’s status in Southeastern Anatolia, TKV was later somewhat 
present during the planning stage of a women’s project.  Although TKV personnel 
believe in their contribution to the design and development of the ÇATOM idea, 
relevant personnel in the GAP Administration are not particularly impressed with the 
contributions of TKV and other NGOs.  GAP personnel highly value their own 
knowledge and know-how on issues of social development and they believe themselves 
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to be the pioneers on the rhetoric and implementation of human-centered sustainable 
development in the region and in Turkey.  They regard themselves as paving the way for 
NGOs in the field of participatory development approaches and practices. 
 
TKV, on the other hand, admits that the planning and implementation processes of the 
ÇATOMs was not a conscious development on both parts.  The matter pretty much 
evolved haphazardly and ÇATOMs consequentially came to take their current 
formation.  For instance, the introduction of TKV was mainly due to practical reasons of 
personnel employment for the ÇATOMs.  Given the legal status and coordinating role of 
the GAP Administration, the agency is unable to hire personnel due to obstacles arising 
from regulations.  TKV thus became important for the hiring of personnel to be 
employed from the locality as field workers.  Since these girls would be high school 
graduates with no particular skills fit for the position, it was decided by both parties that 
TKV would provide periodic training to these field workers in preparing them for the 
approach of participatory gender balanced development in their localities.  This was the 
mindset in which the relationship between TKV and the GAP Administration came 
about and flourished.  The same motives led to the hiring of temporary contractual staff 
through TKV to work as instructors in the case that public instructors involved in similar 
activities in public institutions such as the Public Training Centers were not readily 
available.  Both parties are eventually satisfied with the result in the sense that field 
workers have arisen from within the community instead of being appointed from 
Ankara. 
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Despite the haphazard and unstructured involvement of TKV and other NGOs in the 
ÇATOM project, experts at the Social Programs Coordination of the GAP 
Administration idealized the involvement in and the preference of NGOs to work in 
cooperation with the ÇATOMs: 
 
Some NGOs have resources at hand that they would like to allocate for 
the region.  Our aims and their aims are in agreement, so they come to 
us for possible cooperation and we design projects together.  There is 
an institution that works well – the GAP Administration, and there is a 
center that works well for the benefit of women.  ÇATOMs have many 
successes.  NGOs come to us because they have seen the successes of 
these projects.  We haven’t gone around looking for NGOs to work 
with.  They are the ones who come to us in hope of cooperation.  In 
terms of the involvement of NGOs, we have reached the point where 
NGOs go directly to the ÇATOM they want to work with.  Moreover, 
we encourage the ÇATOM field workers to make direct contacts with 
these NGOs and design and implement projects together without our 
support.  For instance there are NGOs in Istanbul and Ankara that 
directly call up a ÇATOM and ask for participants in a particular 
seminar or training session. 
 
One interesting example is the ÇATOM connection with an 
international NGO in the name of Anatolian Artisans.  Two experts 
came from the US-based NGO, working for fair trade, to take a look at 
what the girls and women in the ÇATOMs were producing; to see if the 
products could be evolved into something that is marketable.  They 
have decided to bring in new designs, fabric, etc. for better products.  
Once these new items are produced, they will be marketed by the NGO 
through the internet.  Another important exchange of ÇATOMs with 
NGOs is the Agenda 21 initiative of the Aliağa municipality in Izmir.  
They have invited 15 women from ÇATOMs to be present at their 
festivities.  (Assistant Social Programs Coordinator of the GAP 
Administration, Ankara) 
 
TKV involvement has resulted in relatively more conscious field workers in terms of the 
philosophy of participatory development, communication with participants, and the 
more technical skills of book-keeping, reporting, and the monitoring and evaluation of 
their activities.  However, not all NGOs involved in the project have a systematic 
approach to their projects with and in the ÇATOMs.  In fact, it is only Ana Kültür that 
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has had the most systematic approach to working with the ÇATOMs.  Other NGOs have 
either been involved on a sporadic basis, mostly for reasons of convenience, or indirectly 
through the use of the target group of the ÇATOMs in the running of their own projects 
rather than the planning and implementation of projects specifically designed for gender 
balanced development through the ÇATOMs.  Three of the NGOs that I interviewed 
were only in the process of considering possible coordination with the GAP 
Administration on possible projects in the region. 
 
8.3.2.  Relations with the Bottom: Civic Grassroots Initiation through 
ÇATOMs 
 
Although the ÇATOMs aim to reach young girls and women of ages 14-50, participant 
observation and interviews revealed that a majority of the participants were single young 
girls.  At first glance this gave the impression that ÇATOMs were not able to reach the 
intended target group.  However, participatory assessment of the internal dynamics of 
extended family life in the region clarified the reasons behind this.  As families are large 
in the Southeastern Anatolia region, young girls and women in the family are 
responsible for taking care of the children and house chores.  Given their heavy 
workload within the home, mothers are hardly ever available to spend time at the 
ÇATOM.  The large number of children in the family also contributes heavily to a 
woman’s workload.  The elder daughters and daughter-in-laws [gelin in Turkish] are 
also kept in the home for support to the mother or mother-in-law.  This is especially the 
case for daughter-in-laws as they are brought into the husband’s home primarily for this 
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purpose.  Their main task is handling the house chores.  In this case, the daughters of the 
household are relatively freer compared to the gelin.  Hence, it is the younger girls 
within the family that were usually the most available to attend activities at the ÇATOM. 
 
Let alone women’s organization at the community level, social and cultural constraints 
at the regional level prevent benefits for women at the individual level.  When there are 
such harsh restrictions to the mobility of a woman as an individual, her mobility within a 
group becomes unthinkable.  In lines with the factors mentioned above, it was 
interesting to observe that the lack of organization was partially a result of women’s 
position within the internal dynamics of the family and household arrangements.  Young 
girls were uninterested in community work as they would most probably soon be leaving 
their neighborhood after marriage, at a young age, to live with their husbands’ families.  
The main interest of most single young girls was merely building up their truceau and 
getting ready for marriage.  This was the primary drive behind the attendance of most 
young girls in ÇATOM activities. 
 
Research within the community revealed that it is only through awareness raising among 
newly wedded women and other married women in the community that self-organization 
among women can take place.  This, however, is not an easy task as these women are 
assigned other priorities by the men in their families and men still prevail as the 
dominant figure within the household.  In addition to this as a reason of low mobility 
within the community, I observed a lack of initiative and capability on the part of the 
ÇATOM field workers to organize women for economic or other purposes.  The lack of 
motives on the part of the ÇATOM field workers can be attributed to the local political 
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history in the region and the traditional modes of decision making.  Strictly patriarchal 
and hierarchical decision making structures have retarded efforts at self-initiation among 
the local people in the region. 
 
Putnam287 brings a constructive overview of interactions between ‘democratic 
governance’ and ‘civic community’, which he defines as a community “bound together 
by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation” as opposed to “vertical relations 
of authority and dependency”.288  Elements of social capital in the Southeastern Anatolia 
region, as explained in chapter V, are effective in social organization only within a given 
community based on chosen tribal relations.  Elements of trust set the norms and 
networks within a village community in Southeastern Anatolia.  However, there is also a 
strong tradition of patron-client relations both within and among village communities in 
the region, which reveals itself strongly in tribal loyalties and gender relations.  In a 
region where tribal tensions can lead to armed confrontations between community 
members,289 it can be concluded that relations are primarily vertically structured and 
horizontally fractured.  Moreover, Putnam asserts that such vertical bonds of clientalism 
easily undermines any kind of horizontal group organization and solidarity, as clients 
have no incentives of cooperating while it is only vertical ties with the patron that 
produces results.  Hence, the social capital of village communities in Southeastern 
Anatolia results in cooperation only within the community as opposed to cooperation 
                                                 
287  Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy  (Princeton: Princeton 
U. P., 1993). 
288  Ibid., 88. 
289  For an extensive study, look at Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, Tribe and Kinship among the Kurds  
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991). 
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across communities.  In such a case, the spontaneous formation of civic communities in 
the Southeast seems quite unlikely. 
 
As Putnam describes, “voluntary cooperation is easier [only] in a community that has 
inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and 
networks of civic engagement.”290  To make the situation even graver, Putnam claims 
that “ironically, ‘strong’ interpersonal ties (like kinship) are less important than ‘weak’ 
ties (like friends) in sustaining community cohesion and collective action.”291  
Communities in Southeastern Anatolia have the characteristic of strong loyal 
attachments to tribal relations and suspicion of non-tribal affinities.  After the internal 
displacement of communities as witnessed since the mid-1980s in Southeastern 
Anatolia, non-tribal confrontations have become characteristic of the newly formed 
migrant neighborhoods.  Possessing no historical experience and inheritance of 
cooperation through ‘weak’ ties of interaction, the formation of civic communities in 
migrant neighborhoods of Southeastern Anatolia becomes an almost impossible task.  
As Putnam concludes, “building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to 
making democracy work.”292 
 
For purposes of practicality, the main task, then, should be the development of a 
territorially-based community identity rather than one that continues to value 
interpersonal ties such as kinship and tribe.  The incentive for mobilization within a 
territorially-based community can be organized around ‘collective consumption 
                                                 
290  Putnam, Making Democracy Work. 
291  Ibid., 175. 
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demands’ as suggested by Castells.293  Community members can collectively demand the 
satisfaction of their basic needs such as shelter, water, sewage, education, health, and 
food, among other necessities.  The community might equally be interested in the 
acquisition of a healthier and safer living environment through improved garbage 
collection or the raising of awareness on environmental issues.  Through collective 
action, communities can easily be more demanding of their municipalities for the 
efficient and effective use of resources, thus acting as a control mechanism for local 
administration.  Direct and indirect political participation of community members in 
processes of decision making can be encouraged. 
 
ÇATOM field workers have to be made aware of such subtleties in social and 
community organization, and approaches to grassroots mobilization and community 
development.  The role of women in this new conceptualization becomes crucial and 
determinant.  Women, as the main target group, are especially well positioned for such 
collective action at the community level.  Despite their limitations as oppressed 
members of the household and community, action for the purpose of collective 
consumption is less threatening than the direct action for a demand in the change in 
gender roles.  Through mobilization for collective action aiming at the benefit of the 
entire community, women will get the chance of becoming more active members of their 
community, indirectly challenging gender roles, while upgrading the living conditions in 
their localities.  Having carried out extensive field research on women’s political 
                                                                                                                                                
292  Ibid., 185. 
293  Castells cited in Heidi Wedel, “Gecekondulu Kadınlar ve Yerel Siyaset [Women in Squatter 
Neighborhoods and Local Politics],”  Defter.  9:28 (Summer 1996), 45. 
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participation in the squatter neighborhoods of Istanbul, Wedel294 admits the manifold 
obstacles faced by women in terms of social organization and mobilization, but she also 
points to the fact that compared to men, women are effected more by the problems 
arising particularly in squatter neighborhoods and they are in possession of better local 
and social capital, thus rendering them more effective in community mobilization.  
However, women are in need of being made aware of their potential in community 
activation.  Wedel observes that only recently women have been making use of this 
potential by slowly rendering ineffective the traditional obstacles against their 
mobilization and voicing their demands for their assertion as active members of the 
community. 
 
Progress on an individual level is attained by almost all girls that attend the activities at 
the ÇATOM, but this progress has not yet extended to the family or communal level.  
Similarly, the training provided to field workers has given them tremendous potential in 
their communication with the target group and has enabled them to comprehend and 
appreciate a more human centered approach to development issues.  But what needs to 
be developed in the ÇATOMs among the field workers is their ability to mobilize the 
community, hence revealing the urgency of training of field workers on topics such as 
the techniques for community organization, supplemented with a case-oriented approach 
of actual stories of women’s organization and the potential benefits.  Some ÇATOMs 
organize small scale projects such as visits to nearby sites of interest, through the 
ÇATOM management committee where existent, and through the use of the ÇATOM’s 
                                                 
294  Heidi Wedel, Siyaset ve Cinsiyet: Istanbul Gecekondularında Kadınların Siyasal Katılımı [Politics 
and Gender: Women’s Political Participation in Squatter Neighborhoods of Istanbul]  (Istanbul: Metis 
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monthly budget.  GAP personnel view this as ‘seeds of mobilization’, which might be 
important to a certain extent, but more profound collaborations of a collective type must 
be organized for a more deep-rooted grassroots mobilization. 
 
Although some NGOs talk about grassroots development and participatory democracy, I 
was able to observe no cases of NGOs assisting women in the community to organize 
around a certain issue.  For example, in Siirt ÇATOM where the garden around the 
building is left stranded with goats grazing on the little greenery in the surroundings, no 
efforts are made by the field worker or the participating girls and women in organizing 
the garden so that they have a small green space to share during the summer months.  
Such activities of gathering girls together for which concrete results are obtained, 
participants will understand what it means to work collectively.  While helping to 
beautify their surroundings, they will simultaneously be learning to mobilize one another 
for a simple collective purpose. 
 
Other similar collective projects for girls and women can easily be organized by field 
workers.  More serious organizations can also be undertaken for the more essential 
needs of the community.  Many communities in Southeastern Anatolia have inadequate 
social services such as water, roads, garbage collection, health and educational facilities.  
Young girls and women can be encouraged into activities promoting the provision of 
such services.  Acknowledging the difficulties of the region, both at the social and 
communal level as well as the management level, training by NGOs on the more 
concrete means of community mobilization would perhaps bring the true spark to the 
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functioning and sustainability of ÇATOMs in Southeastern Anatolia.  Although training 
sessions are provided to field workers by NGOs other than the TKV, it is dubious as to 
whether this training trickles down to the instructors, the management committee, and 
eventually the participants. 
 
Schuurman and van Naerssen,295 pointing to elements of emancipation by way of 
collective action, mention the possible role of communities in the prevention of 
segregation based on religion, race, gender, social status and territoriality.  Some NGOs 
that I interviewed mentioned only indirectly the graveness of ethnic consciousness in the 
Southeastern Anatolia region.  Especially noticed among the male youth in the region, 
during their visits to the Southeastern provinces, NGO representatives talked about their 
confrontation with attitudes of segregation in the form of ‘us’ versus ‘you’.296  Activities 
of some Istanbul-based NGOs operating in the Southeastern Anatolia region are seen by 
some locals as further assimilation projects of the Turkish state.  In order to put an end 
to tensions associated with ethnic identification in Southeastern Anatolia, two NGOs 
mentioned their idealized projects of conflict resolution in the region.  As the tension 
reveals itself most strongly among male Kurdish youth in the region, one NGO talked 
about the importance of bringing together youth from the western and eastern parts of 
the country in an effort to resolve conflict through the building of tolerance for one 
another.  “It is only through such confrontation that both sides will be able to ease the 
tension” argued one NGO member.  The second NGO representative concretized this 
project with the suggestion of the use of sports events as a force of binding among the 
                                                 
295  Schuurman and van Naerssen cited in Heidi Wedel, “Gecekondulu Kadınlar ve Yerel Siyaset [Women 
in Squatter Neighborhoods and Local Politics],”  Defter.  9:28 (Summer 1996), 46. 
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youth.  It was argued that mixed football teams of Kurdish and Turkish youth in regional 
football tournaments would help ease the tension in the Southeastern Anatolia region.  
Although different from the direct objectives of the ÇATOMs, such projects of social 
harmony were encouraging as an indication of the capability of NGOs in producing 
ideas for possible projects of an innovative and sustainable nature, aiming at the core 
problems within society in Turkey. 
 
8.3.3.  Relations with the Top: Ensuring Sustainability 
 
In terms of the problems with top level authorities, mainly the governors to which 
ÇATOMs are procedurally linked through protocols, ÇATOMs seem to be in the 
disadvantage of being a project of the GAP Administration.  As clearly stated in chapter 
VI, local administrators in the Southeastern Anatolia region have negative perceptions of 
the GAP Administration.  Little is understood of the coordinating position of the 
Administration as local state offices are only interested in institutions with financial 
resources.  Otherwise, when officials from the GAP Administration make suggestions 
for cooperation, local administrators smear at the ‘pure talk’ of the GAP officials.  Local 
administrators argue that they are very well aware of the problems in the region and all 
they need is funding to implement their projects. 
 
Internal relations and organizational structures at the state level show staggering 
resemblances to those at the community level.  Hierarchical modes of decision making 
and centralized structures of authority are prevalent within the state institutions.  Turning 
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to Putnam’s297 argument of the impracticality of constructive cooperation in the presence 
of vertical structures of authority and dependency, it makes sense that efforts of the GAP 
Administration at coordinating activities are met with no enthusiasm from the local state 
officials.   
 
The main reason for this negative attitude towards the GAP Administration relates to its 
function as a coordinating agency as opposed to an implementing agency.  There is 
confusion on the part of the governors and other provincial and county directors as to the 
functions of the GAP Administration.  Given that fact that public institutions and their 
personnel are not used to the concept of cooperation, any new initiative is seen as a 
threat rather than an opportunity.  The organizational structure, behavior and approach 
of bureaucracy in Turkey, which has always used vertical lines of authority and 
communication, is not in a position to understand the significance of horizontal lines of 
communication.  Hence, any institution with this kind of an approach, regardless of 
whether this is a public institution, is marginalized and left to struggle in its own circle 
of affairs.   
 
Moreover, the same structure and web of relations are prevalent in terms of ÇATOM 
interactions with the local administrators.  The patronizing attitude of governors towards 
ÇATOM field workers was evident in observations of their confrontations.  The fact that 
ÇATOM field workers are young girls from the locality might very well be influential in 
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the further belittling of the responsibilities and capabilities of the field workers and 
subsequently the ÇATOMs. 
 
Unlike the possibility of ÇATOM improvement by NGOs through training for grassroots 
mobilization at the community level, NGO assistance in terms of relations with the local 
state seems a task that is nearly unattainable.  Two factors are influential in this regard.  
One is the fact that NGOs themselves are not fully aware of their roles as intermediaries 
and the means through which they can satisfy these roles.  Second is the internal 
deficiencies of NGOs in their own institutionalization and sustainability.  Both 
discussions are elaborated in the following section. 
 
ÇATOMs are established through a memorandum of understanding with the province or 
county governor but the ideal would be their full cooperation with the respective 
municipalities.  Since municipalities are elected offices, one would assume their 
responsiveness to their respective community.  Some NGOs have noted of their 
occasional collaboration with responsive and interested municipal authorities while 
merely one NGO stated their intentional effort at collaborating with municipalities as an 
indication of civil initiation from the grassroots.  In most cases, however, NGOs did not 
distinguish between cooperation with local governorates and municipalities.  
Collaboration at the state level was mainly arbitrary and one based on convenience 
rather than a conscious decision to mobilize the grassroots.  It seems as if the diversion 
of relations and communications with governors to initiation from municipalities will 
greatly help establish a more civil character for the ÇATOMs.  If a municipality requests 
the establishment of a ÇATOM in a given locality, this can be taken as an indication of 
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the readiness to support women’s organization in that locality.  Through this kind of an 
initiation, funds from the municipality can also be secured to an extent.  If ÇATOMs 
were encouraged in locations where there is full support from the municipality, this 
would guarantee the civic sustainability of the centers.   
 
While the GAP Administration stressed ÇATOM’s involvement with province 
governors, the only example that NGOs provided of support from the municipality was 
the ÇATOM in the Yeşildere municipality of Gaziantep where there was a demand and 
full support from the authorities.  One NGO defined the mayor of Yeşildere as a truly 
‘civil societal person’ [sivil toplumcu in Turkish].  Otherwise, if the municipality is 
uninterested, then even if a ÇATOM is established in a locality, sustainable cooperation 
with the municipality will most probably not be maintained, hence resulting in continued 
dependency on governorates.  This is especially the case in a region where vertical lines 
of power and patriarchal structures are even more established than those in other parts of 
the country. 
 
Despite the idealizations above, however, as one NGO representative mentioned, 
municipalities in Turkey do not undertake their appointed responsibilities and in most 
cases are not in fact responsive at all to their electors.  Although they come to office 
through the votes of the electors, there is not an established system in which elected 
administrators work in correspondence to the needs of the community.  Relations are 
again maintained through vertical lines of power, much as an extension of the same 
situation within the community.  One NGO representative in the region even defined the 
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elected authorities as resorting to ‘dirty politics’, thus choosing to refrain from municipal 
authorities. 
 
On the other hand, given the role of ÇATOMs as an alternative to the existing models of 
public institutions, their survival is essential for the purposes of competition and their 
role in the increasing of quality of other institutions with similar objectives.  Given the 
negativity on the part of the governorate as well as provincial and county directorates, 
the positive effects of the ÇATOMs on the functioning of Public Training Centers are 
devalued and competition results in tension among institutions.  If ÇATOMs had a 
municipal character rather than the character of a public institution, the existing 
competition might have created greater avenues for the constructive outcomes of this 
competition. 
 
In the current organizational structure of the ÇATOMs, governors have full control over 
the existence and survival of ÇATOMs.  In such a situation, the better field workers are 
at encouraging participation and creating competition, the more they risk being closed 
down by the governor.  Since most governors regard ÇATOMs as nothing but a waste of 
public resources, they tend to view hard working ÇATOM field workers as potential 
instructors in public institutions.  This risks the closing down of the ÇATOM and an end 
to the competition created by these centers, thus putting an end to the potential of 
ÇATOMs in increasing the effectiveness and performance of state institutions. 
 
The reasons behind the ineffectiveness of services provided by public institutions are 
partly political.  Political interests in the ineffective organization of public institutions 
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and services, and the inability of others to voice their discontent of this arrangement both 
lead to the exacerbation of the problem.  The thesis has already stressed the underlying 
behavioral factors contributing to the distortion of incentives for better performance and 
effectiveness at the state level.  Of these necessary incentives, World Bank experts 
emphasize the importance of ‘greater competitive pressure’ among public institutions 
and ‘increased citizen voice and partnership’ for a better outcome in terms of the 
provision of social services and eventual development.298  The ÇATOMs, as clearly 
seen, pose an incredible potential in undertaking both incentives for the creation of more 
effectively working state institutions, namely greater competition and increased local 
grassroots visibility. 
 
8.3.4.  NGO-GAP Relations and Deficiencies of NGOs 
 
Even though the GAP Administration does have a more progressive and up-to-date 
approach to development issues, implementations, in most cases, do not go further than 
what is written on paper.  This is due to three main reasons.  One is the criticism that 
NGOs point out about the GAP Administration, which is the importance they attach to 
the image they pose to the outside.  The Administration spends large amounts of funding 
for the promotion of the region and the GAP project abroad through numerous 
publications.  If, NGOs claim, more attention was paid to the internal development of 
the Administration, projects would be carried out more successfully.  Both 
Administration personnel and NGO staff acknowledge the fact that the GAP authorities 
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give importance to personal and departmental development through attendance in 
international seminars and a variety of training programs abroad.  In that sense, 
Administration employees are up-to-date on the latest developments in their fields.  
However, they are viewed as weak in the further internalization of this new knowledge 
and know-how, as well as the reflection of expertise and policies into the field. 
 
Second is the influence of the State Ministers responsible for the Southeastern Anatolia 
region.  Depending on the Minister, ÇATOMs have become tools of manipulation of 
these authorities, as the Minister has decided on the construction of ÇATOM buildings, 
their locations, and the personnel to be employed in these buildings.  This, clearly, 
renders ÇATOMs far from civic initiation at the outset.  The third reason is the fact that 
there is tremendous criticism of the GAP Administration on the part of province and 
some county governors in Southeastern Anatolia.  These negative feelings naturally 
prevent a fruitful cooperation between ÇATOMs and the governors, as ÇATOMs are 
regarded merely as a waste of public resources.  Governors made no difference between 
ÇATOMs and Community Centers or Public Training Centers, thus unaware of the 
‘civil’ character of ÇATOMs as emphasized by the GAP Administration.  In most cases, 
governors reluctantly support ÇATOM activities.  Even though all governors that I 
interviewed were highly satisfied with the ÇATOM field workers, the only problems 
they had were with the GAP Administration itself.  Because of this reaction to the 
Administration, field workers mostly suffered in terms of project implementation. 
 
Nevertheless, the approach of the GAP Administration towards issues of development is 
highly progressive and there is a potential environment for NGO cooperation.  Both the 
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personnel of the GAP Administration and NGOs that are acquainted with GAP officials 
acknowledge the fact that the top administration of the GAP is highly welcoming of 
NGO initiatives and collaborations.  Some NGOs, most notably Anne-Çocuk Eğitim 
Vakfı, have noted the insistence of the GAP Administration for their involvement in 
ÇATOMs.  However, it is interesting to note that while NGOs are easily critical of the 
GAP Administration, they are not equally involved in the creation of systematic 
solutions to the problems that they so easily voice.  They are well aware of the 
impediments to greater success in the region through the ÇATOMs, but are not 
motivated to improve the situation, either through more intense involvement with the 
target group or through an exchange of knowledge and know-how in the field of gender, 
participation and development.  They do not make the effort to ameliorate their own 
relations with the Administration, help establish better communications among 
institutions, and get into closer, horizontal relations with their target group.  This was 
partially due to the vertical structure of relations prevalent in NGOs themselves, albeit to 
a lesser extent, as observed within the community as well as the state institutions. 
 
An NGO noted of the problems faced in terms of cooperation with the GAP 
Administration for the training of field workers.  Kadın Emeğini Değerlendirme Vakfı, 
similar to its women’s empowerment projects in the outskirts of Istanbul, wanted to train 
the field workers of the ÇATOMs in the essentials of mobilization at the grassroots 
level.  However, they wanted the GAP Administration to supply a part of the funding for 
the project.  While KEDV would be providing the costs of training and other related 
expenses, they requested the GAP Administration to supply the traveling and 
accommodation costs in Istanbul, where the training would take place.  Due to 
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disagreement on the conditions of cooperation, the project was not realized, although 
meetings were still ongoing at the time of study.  While NGO representatives voice their 
dissatisfaction with difficulties of receiving no assistance from the GAP Administration 
in the operational costs of project implementation in the ÇATOMs, GAP personnel 
equally complain of NGOs demanding too much from the Administration in terms of 
assistance in funding.  GAP representatives complain of NGOs seeing the 
Administration as the ‘GAP Bank’.  Both NGOs and GAP personnel have problems in 
setting the terms of reference for what they call ‘partnership’. 
 
Inadequate funding is indicated as another great impediment to such projects, but it is 
clear from organizations such as the Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı that there are a 
variety of ways for creative fund-raising.  TEGV has succeeded in raising enough funds 
to construct its numerous educational facilities and employ 170 full-time personnel all 
over the country.  The raising of capital for the construction of these units and the 
maintenance of their personnel involves a certain degree of institutionalization and 
professionalization.  Most NGOs working with the ÇATOMs in this region lack the 
institutional prerequisites for systematic involvement in the region and the creation of 
productive ideas and eventual sustainable projects.   
 
It is interesting to observe that all NGOs that are relatively more institutionalized are 
those that are involved in the field of education.  Fund-raising for the benefit of children 
and for the provision of scholarships seems to be a relatively easier task compared to, 
say, the capacity building of local administrations and municipalities or the mobilization 
of women in the Southeast.  More concrete projects such as scholarships and target 
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groups such as children are no doubt easier to promote in terms of fund-raising, but it is 
clear that some NGOs possess the techniques and means of fund-raising.  Plenty of 
events such as concerts and festivals are organized by NGOs for purposes of fund-
raising. 
 
There is the other issue of being geographically far from the target group.  NGOs in 
Istanbul and Ankara are involved in ÇATOMs with no representation in the region.  All 
activities are planned and implemented from the headquarters, which creates a distance 
from the target group.  In women’s empowerment projects where the NGO is physically 
close to the target group, such as KEDV’s projects in the suburban districts of Istanbul, 
successful results are obtained.  NGOs with the sufficient capacity and funding are able 
to successfully mobilize women into becoming empowered individuals and members of 
their community.  This physical and sometimes psychological distance creates barriers 
between NGOs and the young girls and women in the region.  This is, of course, 
partially the result of discouraging regulations pertaining to NGOs particularly operating 
in Southeastern Turkey, where there is still emergency rule. 
 
Despite this distance, Ana Kültür has been able to systematically carry out Women’s 
Day celebrations in the ÇATOMs for the past 5-6 years.  Although problems have arisen 
in the last year, both in the publication of their bulletin and the last women’s day festival 
event, the organization has managed to carry out these activities with only a small 
number of staff.  Given their reluctance for systematic fund-raising, their projects in the 
region with the ÇATOMs have unfortunately come to a halt.  Examples such as these are 
discouraging for other NGOs who are trying to become active with and for the women in 
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the region.  It is difficult to talk about the sustainability of projects when the 
sustainability of NGOs themselves is questionable.  It is nearly impossible for an NGO 
to think long-term and concentrate on the sustainability of its activities when its own 
organizational existence and sustainability is under threat.  This threat is both an internal 
threat including the lack of funding and the level of institutionalization as well as an 
external threat in terms of obstacles presented by the laws and regulations relating to 
NGOs in Turkey. 
 
Turning back to NGOs within the ÇATOM project, even TKV, which is considered the 
most systematic and established NGO in the ÇATOMs, deals only with the training of 
field workers, acting solely like an organization of technical innovation.  Even though 
TKV has a holistic approach to development and uses professional techniques in the 
field, the organization is not concerned with the actual mobilization of the target group.  
Although training is provided in a participatory manner, the knowledge transferred still 
remains highly theoretical as little practical examples are provided.  No simulations and 
concrete examples of success stories are provided to enhance results at the grassroots 
level.  The training is too shallow and abstract for it to be converted into anything 
sustainable at the grassroots. 
 
8.4.  NGOs as the Link between State and Society? 
 
On a rhetorical level, NGOs in Turkey seem to be contributing to the promotion and 
maintenance of a world culture which represents humanity.  However, when taken with 
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respect to their operations of social development in the field and their relations with the 
state, NGOs in Turkey, to a large extent, merely help propogate the official national 
culture.  Similar to the concerns of the Turkish state, they belive that any assertions of 
cultural diversity is a threat to the unity of the Turkish nation-state.  Although the 
organizational structure of NGOs in Turkey seem to be less bureaucratic and more 
informal than traditional organizational structures in Turkey, their approaches to 
decision making are nevertheless hierarchical. 
 
It has been interesting to observe that, despite flaws in project planning and 
implementation, the GAP Administration is more embracing of a global culture.  As 
clearly seen in the analyses above, the partial successes that are attained through 
ÇATOMs are in fact not the result of NGO involvement, but largely the result of efforts 
of the GAP Administration at local participation and gender equality in Southeastern 
Turkey.  In carrying out field assessments and research among the target group, it is 
GAP policy that women and young girls in the ÇATOMs be given the freedom and 
opportunity to express themselves in their mother tongues.  Even though the GAP 
Administration makes no further assertions on the importance of the maintenance of 
local culture for a human-centered and participatory development, the authorities are 
nevertheless willing to accept the fact that there are non-Turkish minorities in the region 
and make the efforts to include them into the phases of project planning and 
implementation.  This development policy and approach is progressive to the extent that 
other state administrators in the region explicitly note their negativities and criticisms of 
the GAP Administration. 
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State-funded Community Centers and ÇATOMs are only premises in which NGOs 
undertake development activity, consisting mainly of relief assistance.  Longer term 
projects aiming at grassroots mobilization and community organization on the one hand, 
and the improvement of the efficiency of the state structure on the other are not concerns 
of NGOs in Turkey.  Hence, these organizations make only small scale contributions 
towards the move to good governance in the country.  Such ‘indifference’ of NGOs is 
regarded as the lack of a ‘democratic culture’299 in Turkey, revealing itself in 
hierarchical power relations from the local community level to the level of state 
institutions.  Hence, it is only to the degree that such grounds are laid and directed by 
public policies and practice that NGOs in Turkey are able to function as mobilizers of a 
global culture.  In other words, mainly due to their institutional resources and access to 
greater funds through intergovernmental development agencies such as the UN agencies 
and the World Bank, it is in fact state policies that open the doors for the further 
globalization of civil society in Turkey. 
 
In that sense, a global development policy is realized in Turkey with the initiation and 
leadership of state authorities.  Although NGOs in Turkey are strongly influenced by 
elements of a global development policy, it is only after concrete steps taken by the 
Turkish state in that regard that these organizations can assert specific development 
policies of a global nature.  Hence, the changes taking place with respect to state policies 
and their institutions are not mobilized by NGOs at the national level, but by other actors 
at the global level.  Although the new global politics predicts that states no longer have 
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the monopoly on the governing of society and the setting of policies, it is interesting to 
observe that the Turkish state still has the monopoly on the setting of development 
policies in relation to civil society at the national level.  The Turkish state strictly 
determines the activities of civil society organizations and the limits of good governance 
in Turkey.  This is partly the result of the lack of institutionalization and 
professionalization on the part of NGOs in Turkey. 
 
In conclusion, the Turkish state, and specifically the GAP Administration as the focus of 
the thesis, is being transformed more by the reflections of a global civil society rather 
than by civil society groups at the national level.  In that sense, NGOs at the national 
level are not in a position to reconcilitate the state with society in Turkey.  On the 
contrary, the Turkish state’s direct interactions with a new global politics as shaped by 
numerous actors at the global level, including international NGOs and multilateral 
development aid agencies, brings about its transformation; more so than NGOs at the 
national level. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
(Istanbul: Friedrich Ebert Vakfı, 1993). 
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CHAPTER IX:  CONCLUSION 
 
The dynamics of both the external forces of global culture and their internal reflections 
in Turkey were highly prevalent in the current study.  With the involvement and 
encouragement of NGOs, a gender balanced and sustainable human development is 
strived in the Southeastern Anatolia Project through the ÇATOMs, as the locus of 
activity for projects designed for and with women in the region.  Global factors and their 
local reflections intermingled with forces at the national level constitute the interesting 
dynamics of relations in terms of NGOs, their target group and the state in Turkey.  The 
Turkish state, while preoccupied with the management of its own domestic affairs, is 
progressively influenced by international pressures.  Such is the case for the GAP 
Administration’s adoption of the policy of ‘sustainable human development’ for the 
closing of the gender gap in the Southeastern Anatolia region. 
 
Despite the stronghold of official ideology as inherited from the early years of the 
republic, GAP administrators are relatively more flexible in their outlook on the social 
structure and culture in Southeastern Anatolia.  They are also critical of the traditional 
top-down approaches of Turkish developmentalists, speaking freely of the Kurdish 
population in the region as well as the need to listen and to directly involve the target 
group in the activities undertaken in the ÇATOMs.  Thus, albeit not overtly promoting 
these values, the social development programs of the GAP project include a regional 
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development strategy that does not place under threat the dissolution of local cultural 
expressions and the collective identity in the region.  This, on the other hand, is an 
arduous task as there are obstacles to this kind of an alternative approach to 
development.  The Turkish armed forces are strict in their persistence of the non-
recognition of a cultural identity different from the unitary nation of the Turks.  
However, the approach of participatory development and the task of NGOs active in the 
region is somewhat facilitated with the assistance received from international 
development aid agencies, a force which the Turkish state, like many other developing 
states, finds hard to contravene.   
 
Similarly, I observed that NGOs in Turkey are quick to adopt the principles and 
approaches of a global development policy.  The personnel of both the GAP 
Administration and NGOs have international contacts in terms of training and 
conferences, and are thus updated on the latest developments in their fields of operation.  
These global processes combined with the inheritance of the Ottoman-Turkish social and 
political culture display community-NGO and NGO-state relations highly peculiar to 
Turkey. 
 
During the entire history of the Ottoman Empire, the state was the sole source of 
authority and was keen on keeping its power and privileges.  Even in a country in which 
Islam had such a strong hold, the state was the sole decision maker on the route to be 
taken concerning development.  Considering the Empire’s infatuation with the ways of 
the West, the ruling elite did not let Islam get in the way of Westernization.  It is clear 
that NGOs in Turkey have followed a similar policy of adapting to the ways of the 
 305 
 
globe.  The rhetoric of a globalized alternative development was present in some of the 
NGOs contacted for the purposes of the current study.  Comments on adopted 
development approaches included ‘local participation’, working at and with the 
‘grassroots’, ‘empowerment’, ‘governance’, multiculturalism’, and ‘sustainability’, 
among many others.  It is clear that global development policy, through intervention, 
legitimizes the discourse and application of identity politics and a politics of difference.  
The aim is an increase in the quality of life through the establishment of development 
efforts on the foundations of culture and thus the creation of multicultural societies as 
those that are evolving in countries of the West.  This is evident from the growth in the 
numbers of local scale projects being carried out through the participation and 
empowerment of the beneficiaries, thus giving them the chance to decide on the 
direction of their own transformation. 
 
However, despite the use of such fancy words pertaining to a global development policy, 
none of the NGOs within the scope of the current study were in fact in the process of 
implementation of such approaches in the field.  It was as if these concepts had been 
imported and were symbolically there, as I observed no revelations of such approaches 
in actual project implementation.  The main reasons behind this deficiency were 
observed as the lack of institutionalization and professionalization at the NGO level.  
Although some sporadic efforts are made at successful projects, inconsistencies in 
funding as well as organizational structures impede the establishment of professional 
and sustainable field applications and cooperation with other NGOs as well as related 
state institutions.  For instance, despite the influence of global social policies and the 
adoption of new perspectives of development for the GAP project, the design of the 
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ÇATOM project, in actuality, evolved in quite a conventional manner.  It was only by 
coincidence that the design of the ÇATOM centers reached their final structure, 
including the assignment of local field workers to be trained as local development 
specialists.  The ÇATOM was initially designed as yet another community center of the 
Social Services and Child Protection Agency. 
 
Formed as part of the women’s movement in Turkey, spiritual feminism was the drive 
behind the establishment of one of the NGOs that I interviewed.  In the words of the 
head founder, the organization aimed at the establishment of a bridge between the 
women-centered cultures of ancient Anatolia and the culture of patriarchy as presently 
experienced by women in the country.  The aim was the building of capacity from the 
power inherent in this ancient culture.  Thus, the desired outcome for women’s 
development was “a synthesis and fusion of the traditional and the local with the current 
and the modern”.  Despite such a hybrid philosophy and prescription for women’s 
development, no specific projects had been implemented by the respective NGO that 
pragmatized this approach.  Hence, this philosophy remains as a mere inspiration for 
women’s rights advocacy rather than the foundations for an actual working tool.  
Similarly, except for one NGO that mentioned the word ‘multiculturalism’, none of the 
others referred to the existence of a diversity of particular cultures in the Southeast.  The 
one NGO that did mention the concept, however, clearly directed no efforts to that cause 
in its projects.  Some civil society organizations present at an NGO symposium in 
Istanbul also mentioned the global move towards multiculturalism, but no discussions 
were made of its possible reflections at home and in the field. 
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This is in lines with the observation of NGO definitions of politics.  All the NGO 
representatives that I interviewed referred to politics in the narrow definition of the 
concept, confining it to party politics.  Even though involvement in politics was regarded 
as crucial for the society in Turkey, it was only through the involvement of party politics 
that the concept was discussed.  Thus, NGOs were cautious to state their abstinence 
from ‘politics’ as conventionally defined.  Despite the global trend of a blurring of 
boundaries between the political and the nonpolitical, Turkish NGOs were distinct in 
their maintenance of this boundary.  This was possibly due to the highly political context 
of the discussions revolving around NGO activity in the country.  Any statement 
regarded as overtly political draws sharp attention to the survival of that NGO.  Hence, 
as strategies of survival, NGOs prefer to refrain from political judgments. 
 
This was the partial explanation behind the nationalist stance ofseveral NGOs.  Some 
NGOs specifically stated their caution in being ‘unbiased’ which they made in reaction 
to statements that challenged the official policies and regulations of the Turkish state.  
Even an Istanbul-based NGO with a lobby character acknowledged but refrained from 
advocating the diverse cultures and identities of its target group in the Southeast.  The 
most accommodating were the comments of the Diyarbakır-based advocacy NGO 
working specifically for Kurdish women’s empowerment in the region: “We are women 
with different ethnic identities but we all think as citizens of the Turkish republic.”  
Members of the latter NGO confirmed the prejudices of the state in the Southeast with 
respect to nongovernmental activity, but assured that such prejudices and other 
inconveniences were changing with the positive effects of the country’s integration 
process into the European Union.  It was thus clear that, despite reservations, a claim for 
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cultural difference was the most proudly made by the one local NGO that I contacted, as 
opposed to NGOs based outside the region but working for the people in the region. 
 
Another observation in lines with the proceeding argument is the loaded development 
terminology in Turkey.  Even though NGOs keep track of the activities of the voluntary 
sector on the international scale, and are acquainted with the updated terminologies in 
their fields of operation, their definitions of the respective concepts are highly 
contextual.  They are sometimes defined through the use of Kemalist rhetoric, and the 
adaptations of the relevant terms are in line with the current social, cultural and political 
realities in Turkey.  In practice, ‘local participation’, for instance, did not connote 
working with and for the local community, or the word ‘grassroots’ did not imply an 
activism from the bottom but an assistance from the top, thus hinting at the traditional 
social interactions based on vertical power relations and hierarchy.  In one case, the 
concept of ‘grassroots’ was used to simply denote ‘fieldwork’. 
 
There are the extreme cases of this phenomenon in which development is defined both 
rhetorically and pragmatically along the lines of republican epistemology.  The 
standpoint of such NGOs were strictly Kemalist and had no intentions of losing anything 
from their republican roots and attachments of ‘educating the masses’ and elevating 
them from their ignorance.  These NGOs were almost more concerned about the 
educating of people to act as carriers and perpetuators of Atatürk’s principles and 
reforms rather than the provision of social welfare for the needy.  The positioning of 
such NGOs was very similar to that of the state which is centered around the 
maintenance and strengthening of the nation-state in the determination of policies in all 
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fields, including social development.  Hence, in this respect, such NGOs are nothing but 
the mere extensions of the Turkish state, both in practice and rhetoric. 
 
As they are unable to pragmatize the principles of global development, NGOs in Turkey 
act mainly as assistant providers of public services, as they are so viewed by the state.  
NGOs mainly function to fill in the roles not covered by ineffective state projects and 
programs, hence acting as duplicators of state programs and ideologies.  Only one NGO 
that I interviewed showed qualities of a systematic collaborative interaction with state 
institutions, in which the quality of state programs were being improved with the 
innovative nature and assistance of the respective NGO.  As a result of this interaction 
between the NGO and the related state officials, public administrators were being trained 
by NGO staff.  This slightly more egalitarian relationship between the NGO and 
respective state officials was undertaken by the NGO in an apprehensive manner, 
showing signs of insecurity.  My questions on the verification of this kind of an 
interaction was met with precaution by the NGO representative as she bashfully 
reminded me that the NGO had no intentions of taking over the responsibilities of the 
respective state institution.  I did not observe NGO-state relations of a more ideal nature 
in which state institutions seek the representation of NGOs on all aspects of government 
policies and programs.  In that respect, there is a long path to yet be covered by NGOs in 
Turkey. 
 
What I did observe, however, and which I regard as an accomplishment of the ÇATOM 
project is the potential of these women’s empowerment centers in the increasing of the 
effectiveness of related state institutions.  In addition to the raising of awareness among 
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certain public administrators in the locality, ÇATOMs displayed qualities of raising the 
standards of Public Training Centers and Community Centers in the region with similar 
objectives to the ÇATOMs.  There was even an incident in which many observers noted 
that the ÇATOM had set a model for a larger community development project in a 
province of the Southeast.  This positive effect of the ÇATOMs, however, is undertaken 
in an atmosphere of severe tension and negativity.  The intense competition felt by local 
state institutions in respective localities is such that it also blocks all possible 
interactions for healthy and systematic cooperation with ÇATOMs.  The positive effects 
of the ÇATOM in terms of increasing the effectiveness of local state institutions in terms 
of their responsiveness to the needs of the community is nevertheless one of the most 
important outcomes of the ÇATOM project.  In conclusion, even though the main 
objective of ÇATOMs is the empowerment of women within the framework of 
sustainable human development and the building of local women’s resources and 
capacity, the current study revealed the impact of the project on other stakeholders, 
namely the functioning and effectiveness of local state institutions.  
 
What is interesting here, however, is the trivial impact of NGOs on the specific positive 
effects of the ÇATOM project.  In the case of social development in Southeastern 
Anatolia, NGOs are unable to advocate the principles of global civil society and hence 
the demands and voices of the local community unless such an approach is tolerated by 
authorities and regulations of the state.  The policies and practice of the GAP 
Administration, exceedingly different from those of other state administrations and the 
armed forces in Turkey, in fact, take the lead in acting as a mirror to developments of 
global culture.  Only after the further adaptations of such development approaches by 
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state authorities and the relaxation of regulation restricting the activities of civil society 
will NGOs be able to contribute to and help sustain a global culture in Turkey.  In that 
sense, NGOs in Turkey are unable to provide the link between state authorities and the 
local community. 
 
Similar to the modernizers of the republic, NGOs use merely the rhetoric of a global 
social and development policy, as practices of alternative development approaches are 
not implemented in the field.  The Ottoman-Turkish heritage of social and political 
culture is prevalent in all levels of society.  Vertical relations of authority and 
dependency is a characterization both of the local community in which the ÇATOMs 
operate as well as the macro level of state structures and institutions.  This, naturally, 
also has its effects on the organizational structure of NGOs in Turkey and the decision 
making processes within these institutions.  Although these are characteristic of NGOs 
all over the country, they are particularly important as impediments to NGO activity in 
Southeastern Turkey. 
 
Given the potential loss of the stronghold of nationalist ideologies and hierarchical 
decision making structures within the Turkish state and bureaucracy, development 
initiatives in the GAP region through an international compliance to the requirements of 
a global sustainable human development, and the relaxation of military presence and 
subsequent prejudices in the region pose tremendous opportunities for the further 
involvement of NGOs in initiatives such as the ÇATOM project.  Such developments 
and changes in the country and particularly in the Southeastern Anatolia region create 
remarkable avenues for the existence and operation of Southeastern NGOs that are 
 312 
 
culturally sensitive, gender aware, and participatory.  Although there is currently little 
activity with respect to genuine grassroots initiatives in the Southeast, the positive 
changes taking place on a global scale generate their share of reflections at the local 
scale in Southeastern Anatolia.  This was clear in the words of the representative of the 
local women’s NGO in Diyarbakır: “Civil societal activity in the Southeast is rare and 
the NGOs that manage to exist are highly politicized.  We are involved specifically in 
feminist politics, therefore we confront less obstacles compared to local NGOs working 
on issues of human rights.  Even though we have always been legal and open, we used to 
confront tremendous problems in the region.  But since the last 3-4 years Turkey is 
rapidly changing.  We really feel the effect of the European Union integration process.  
We feel it immensely.  There is an incredible relaxation in the region during these last 
several years.  Prejudices in the region are changing and we are full of hope.” 
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